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NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
 
Human Rights Watch selected case studies for this report on workers= freedom 
of association in the United States with several objectives in mind.  One was to 
include a range of sectorsCservices, industry, transport, agriculture, high techCto 
assess the scope of the problem across the economy, rather than to focus on a single 
sector.  Another objective was geographic diversity, to analyze the issues in 
different parts of the country.  The cases studied here arose in cities, suburbs and 
rural areas around the United States. 
Another important goal was to look at the range of workers seeking to exercise 
their right to freedom of associationChigh skill and low skill, blue collar and white 
collar, resident and migrant, women and men, of different racial, ethnic and national 
origins.  Many of the cases involved the most vulnerable parts of the labor force.  
These include migrant farmworkers, sweatshop workers, household domestic 
workers, undocumented immigrants, and welfare-to-work employees.  But the 
report also examines the rights of U.S. workers with many years of employment at 
stable, profitable employers.  These include packaging factory workers, steel 
workers, shipyard workers, food processing workers, nursing home workers, and 
computer programmers. 
The cases studied here offer a cross-section of workers= attempts to form and 
join trade unions, to bargain collectively, and to strike.  The cases reflect violations 
and obstacles workers met in the exercise of these rights.  In many cases, workers= 
voices recount their experiences.  Human Rights Watch also made written requests 
for responses and comments from employers identified in the report.  Most of them 
declined.  Of those who did respond, most did not want to be identified by name.  In 
several cases, the names of individual managers are known to Human Rights Watch, 
but they are omitted so as not to profile them unduly in a human rights report with 
wide distribution to the public.  This report is intended to illuminate systemic 
problems in U.S. labor law and practice, not conduct of individuals. 
In addition to interviews, the report relies on documented evidence in 
proceedings under U.S. labor law.  Researching and writing a report like this is 
different from other international human rights investigations and reports carried out 
in zones of armed conflict, in refugee camps, or in countries without functioning 
legal systems.  The United States has an elaborate system of constitutional, statutory 
and administrative labor law.  In many of the cases studied here there are legal 
records and decisions by neutral adjudicators.   
In many cases, the report relies both on interviews with workers and on 
records available from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or federal court 
decisions.  Workers in the private sector who are covered by the National Labor 
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Relations Act (NLRA) can file charges with the NLRB for violations of their 
statutory rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike.  Decisions of the 
NLRB are subject to review by the federal courts This gives rise to investigations 
and resulting legal procedures that produce an often extensive written record.  
Where such a record is available, Human Rights Watch relies on it to shed light on 
the nature and extent of workers= rights violations. 
To supplement its on-the-ground research and official records, Human Rights 
Watch used credible news accounts of instances where workers= rights appear to 
have been impaired.  Books published by university presses and based on extensive 
field research are also used, as are law review and social science journal articles. 
No Human Rights Watch assertion in this report is based on unfair labor 
practice charges against employers.  Workers can file such charges with the NLRB 
claiming a violation of their rights, but the charge by itself is an allegation.  Human 
Rights Watch begins relying on NLRB records with the issuance of complaints by 
the general counsel of the agency.  Complaints are issued when an investigation 
finds merit in the charge. 
The NLRB is scrupulous in evaluating charges and issuing complaints.  Fewer 
than 15 percent of unfair labor practice charges result in complaints.  However, the 
NLRB makes intensive efforts to settle meritorious cases before issuing complaints, 
as well as after issuing complaints but before a hearing.  Human Rights Watch 
refers to such settlements in this report.  Their use is not intended to characterize 
conduct cited in the settlements as unlawful under the NLRA, but to provide an 
account of the conduct in light of international standards. 
Findings of merit in unfair labor practice charges are based on detailed 
investigations of charges by regional agents of the NLRB and evaluations by 
experienced labor law attorneys in the regional offices.  These investigations 
include interviewing and taking affidavits from workers who filed charges and from 
potential witnesses.  They also involve consulting extensively with employers and 
offering them an opportunity to rebut any charges through written position 
statements and dialogue with the NLRB regional officials.  Based on these 
investigations and evaluations of the evidence, labor law enforcement officials 
decide whether charges have merit.  Only upon finding that charges are meritorious 
does the NLRB seek pre-complaint settlements or, failing settlement, issue 
  
complaints and set cases for trial before administrative law judges, normally several 
months in the future.1 
                                                 
1While the proceeding before an administrative law judge is a trial in the normal sense of the 
wordCthe presentation of evidence and examination and cross-examination of witnessesCit 
is called a Ahearing@ in U.S. labor law parlance. Further references to this stage of U.S. labor 
law procedures will use the term Ahearing,@ but it should be understood that it involves a 
formal legal proceeding under rules of evidence, not an informal proceeding more often 
associated with the term Ahearing.@ 
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NLRB records show that in the past decade a very consistent 35-40 percent of 
unfair labor practice charge cases are deemed meritorious following an 
investigation.2  Two-thirds of these are settled before complaints are issued, with 
settlements containing some form of relief.  Relief often involves back pay for 
workers who suffered discrimination, along with posting by employers of notices in 
the workplace stating that they will not engage in the conduct cited in the settled 
charges.3 
The NLRB general counsel=s method of interviewing witnesses, obtaining 
corroborating evidence, and giving employers an opportunity to respond before 
issuing a complaint or settling a meritorious charge is analogous to the standard 
research methods of Human Rights Watch and other organizations that seek to 
document human rights abuses, most often in areas of conflict where a legal system 
is inoperative, if it even exists.  In the United States, however, succeeding stages of 
NLRB and federal court proceedings provide further foundation for Human Rights 
Watch=s analyses in this report.   
Decisions of administrative law judges are based on testimony and documents 
subject to the rules of evidence and related examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses.  Decisions normally are issued several months after a hearing is 
concluded.  In cases that were not yet decided as this report goes to press but that 
have available transcripts of hearing testimony, Human Rights Watch uses 
testimony from the transcripts in its analysis.  Where written decisions of 
administrative law judges are available, Human Rights Watch uses them and not 
prior testimony from transcripts or complaints. 
Administrative law judges= decisions are appealable to the NLRB=s five-
member board in Washington.  The NLRB can take one, two, or three years to issue 
                                                 
2See National Labor Relations Board, 1998 Annual Report (hereafter NLRB Annual Report), 
Chart 5, p. 9. 
3Settlements normally contain a non-admission clause by which employers do not concede 
that they broke the law. In using such settlements as a documentary basis for analyzing 
workers= exercise of freedom of association, Human Rights Watch is not asserting that 
employers violated the NLRA. However, the information is relied on in some cases in 
discussions of violations of international norms regarding workers= freedom of association. 
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its decisions.  In several of the cases studied here, the findings of administrative law 
judges have been appealed and are still pending.  Most such findings are upheld by 
the NLRB on appeal. 
Where the NLRB has ruled on appeals from administrative law judges= 
decisions, Human Rights Watch uses the board=s rulings, not the prior decisions, as 
the basis of its analysis.  However, board rulings are themselves subject to appeals 
to a federal circuit court.  In some cases in the report, such appeals are pending.  
Indeed, circuit court rulings can be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, although 
such appeals are rare and none of the cases studied are in this position.  Where 
decisions of federal appeals courts are available, Human Rights Watch uses them.  
Federal courts of appeals uphold NLRB rulings in approximately 80 percent of 
appealed cases.4 
In sum, where using NLRB and federal court records as the basis for analyzing 
cases in terms of workers= freedom of association under international human rights 
standards, Human Rights Watch uses the Alast best@ documented evidence and 
determinations.  However, where noted, some determinations were still pending on 
appeal as this report goes to press and could be reversed.  It must again be stressed 
that Human Rights Watch uses information from documented legal proceedings to 
inform the analysis of workers= rights under international standards, not to assert 
conclusively that U.S. law was violated except where, in fact, there has been a final, 
conclusive determination to that effect under U.S. law. 
This report could not address all the issues in U.S. labor law and practice with 
implications for workers= freedom of association.  For example, minority 
unionismCthe right of workers to organize and bargain collectively when they are a 
minority of the employees in a workplace, a right recognized in many other 
countries= labor law systemsCis not discussed here.5  Neither is denying workers the 
                                                 
4See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, Table 19A, p. 182. NLRB decisions are upheld in full in 
almost 70 percent of the cases; other decisions are affirmed in part or modified by the courts. 
5The case has been made that minority unionism and minority bargaining are possible under 
U.S. labor law, but workers have not pressed the issue. See Clyde Summers, AUnions 
Without Majority B A Black Hole?@, 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 531 (1990). 
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right to have a coworker present at a disciplinary interview with management when 
there is no union in the workplace, a recurring issue in U.S. labor law that concerns 
freedom of association.6  Nor is the issue of workers= right not to associate or to 
disassociate from a union considered here. 
                                                 
6See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975; Materials Research Corp., 262 
NLRB 1010 (1982); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 NLRB No. 55 (1985); Epilepsy Found. of 
N.E. Ohio, 331 NLRB No. 92 (2000). 
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An important distinction in U.S. law between Amandatory@ and Apermissive@ 
subjects of bargaining is also not treated here, although many analysts suggest that it 
unfairly restricts the scope of workers= bargaining rights, especially over workplace 
closures.7  The application of antitrust laws to block organizing efforts by workers 
deemed independent contractors is another obstacle to freedom of association for 
affected workers, but it is not taken up here in detail.8  The issue of secondary 
picketing for organizational purposes (Aorganizational picketing@) is set aside, while 
secondary action as a means of strike support (Asecondary boycott@) is addressed.  
Both actions implicate workers= freedom of association, but the latter is more 
severely restricted in U.S. law, and more options are available to workers seeking to 
form a union.9 
The denial to state and local public employees in many states of the right to 
bargain collectively and the right to strike is referred to in discussions of workers 
excluded from the protection of U.S. labor laws, but without a full analysis or case 
studies.  Brief mention is also made of the denial to federal employees of the right 
to bargain over economic terms and conditions of employment or to strike, without 
further treatment.  Problems of agricultural workers, domestic household workers 
and other excluded categories are treated at greater length in this report. 
Case studies fall into two broad categories.  One involves cases where U.S. 
law comports with international standards regarding freedom of association, but 
                                                 
7See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, AThe Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor 
Movement,@ 38 Stanford Law Review 1123 (1986); First National Maintenance Corp. v. 
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
8See Michael C. Harper, ADefining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective 
Bargaining,@ 39 Boston College Law Review 329 (March 1998). 
9Organizational picketing is action taken by workers to compel a non-union employer to 
recognize and bargain with a union without an NLRB election. A secondary boycott is action 
taken by workers to have a Asecondary@ supplier or customer firm cease doing business with 
(thus cease economically supporting) a Aprimary@ employer involved in a labor dispute with 
workers at the primary firm. See sections 8(b)(7) and 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. 
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government enforcement action is not sufficient to protect workers= exercise of their 
rights in the face of violations by employers.  In some cases studied here, 
governmental power itself interfered with workers= freedom of association. 
The second category involves cases where U.S. law conflicts with 
international labor rights standards and thus places legal obstacles in the way of 
workers seeking to exercise rights to free association.  In practice, distinctions 
among violations by employers, lack of effective enforcement by government, and 
legal obstacles cannot always be neatly made, but the general structure of the report 
approaches the issues with these distinctions in mind.  Human Rights Watch=s 
recommendations follow similar lines, suggesting ways to make enforcement of 
workers= rights more effective under existing U.S. law and proposing changes to 
U.S. law where it fails to protect workers= freedom of association.   
  
 9 
I.  SUMMARY 
 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form and join trade unions. 
CInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the United 
States in 1992) 
 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other mutual aid or protection. 
CNational Labor Relations Act (passed by Congress in 1935) 
 
I know the law gives us rights on paper, but where=s the reality? 
CErnest Duval, a worker fired in 1994 for forming and joining a union 
(speaking in 1999) 
 
Every day about 135 million people in the United States get up and go to their 
jobs in service, industry, agriculture, non-profit, government and other sectors of the 
enormous and complex American economy.  The rate of new job creation in the 
United StatesCalmost twenty million in the 1990sCis the envy of many other 
countries. 
Under a wide-angle lens the American economy appears strong.  
Unemployment is low, and wages are inching up after years of stagnation.  In focus, 
though, there are alarming signals for Americans concerned about social justice and 
human rights.  A two-tier economy and society are taking shape.  Income inequality 
is at historically high proportions.10  Worker self-organization and collective 
                                                 
10See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; Economic Policy Institute, APulling 
Apart: A State-by-State Analysis of Income Trends@ (January 2000), showing that 
the average income of families in the top 20 percent of the income distribution was 
$137,500, or more than ten times as large as the poorest 20 percent of families, 
which had an average income of $13,000, and that throughout the 1990s the 
average real income of high-income families grew by 15 percent, while average 
income remained the same for the lowest-income families and grew by less than 
two percent for middle-income families B not enough to make up for the decline in 
income in the 1980s. See also Richard W. Stevenson, AIn a Time of Plenty, The 
Poor Are Still Poor,@ New York Times, January 23, 2000, Week in Review, p.3; 
James Lardner, AThe Rich Get Richer@ What happens to American society when the 
gap in wealth and income grows larger?@, U.S. News & World Report, February 21, 
2000, p.38. 
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bargaining, engines of middle-class growth and social solidarity in the century just 
ended, have reached historically low proportions.  Although trade unions halted a 
declining membership trend in 1999, slightly increasing the absolute number of 
workers who bargain collectively, the percentage of the workforce represented by 
unions did not increase.11 
Many Americans think of workers= organizing, collective bargaining, and 
strikes solely as union-versus-management disputes that do not raise  human rights 
concerns.  This report approaches workers= use of these tools as an exercise of basic 
rights where workers are autonomous actors, not objects of unions= or employers= 
institutional interests.  Both historical experience and a review of current conditions 
around the world indicate that strong, independent, democratic trade unions are vital 
for societies where human rights are respected.  Human rights cannot flourish where 
workers= rights are not enforced.  Researching workers= exercise of these rights in 
different industries, occupations, and regions of the United States to prepare this 
report, Human Rights Watch found that freedom of association is a right under 
severe, often buckling pressure when workers in the United States try to exercise it. 
Labor rights violations in the United States are especially troubling when the 
U.S. administration is pressing other countries to ensure respect for internationally 
recognized workers= rights as part of the global trade and investment system.  For 
example, many developing countries charge that U.S. proposals for a working group 
                                                 
11In 1999 more than sixteen million workers in the United States belonged to trade 
unions. For the workforce as a whole, 13.9 percent of all workers and 9.4 percent of 
private sector workers were union members. While more workers gained union 
representation by forming new unions than lost it through workplace layoffs and 
closures in 1999 for the first time in many years, the proportion of the total 
workforce represented by unions remained unchanged because of employment 
growth in firms and sectors with less union presence. In the 1950s such union 
Adensity@ reached more than 30 percent of the total workforce and nearly 40 percent 
in the private sector. See Frank Swoboda, ALabor Unions See Membership Gains,@ 
Washington Post, January 20, 2000, p. E2. 
Summary 11  
 
 
on labor rights at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are motivated by 
protectionism, not by a concern for workers= rights.  U.S. insistence on a rights-
based linkage to trade is undercut when core labor rights are systematically violated 
in the United States. 
This report occasionally touches on rights of association outside the context of 
trade unionism.  One example is the right of workers to seek legal assistance for 
work-related problems.  Most of Human Rights Watch=s investigation, however, 
deals with workers= attempts to form unions and bargain with their employers.  
Forming and joining a union is a natural response of workers seeking to improve 
their working conditions.  It is also a natural expression of the human right, indeed 
the human need, of association in a common purpose where the only alternative 
offered by an impersonal market is quitting a job.12 
                                                 
12Union-represented workers generally have higher wages and benefits than non-represented 
employees. In 1999, union members had median weekly earnings of $672, compared with a 
median of $516 for workers who did not belong to a union. They are also protected against 
arbitrary discharge or other forms of discrimination under a "just cause" standard contained 
in nearly every union contract. For most non-represented workers in the private sector, 
an employment-at-will doctrine prevails. An employer can dismiss a worker for "a 
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all," in the classic formulation, except 
where laws specifically prohibit discrimination. On comparative weekly earnings, see 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, AUnion Membership in 1999" 
(January 19, 2000). For extensive discussion of the at-will doctrine, see Pauline T. Kim, 
ABargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection 
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Without diminishing the seriousness of the obstacles and violations confronted 
by workers in the United States, a balanced perspective must be maintained.  U.S. 
workers generally do not confront gross human rights violations where death squads 
assassinate trade union organizers or collective bargaining and strikes are 
outlawed.13  But the absence of systematic government repression does not mean 
that workers in the United States have effective exercise of the right to freedom of 
association.  On the contrary, workers' freedom of association is under sustained 
attack in the United States, and the government is often failing its responsibility 
under international human rights standards to deter such attacks and protect 
workers= rights. 
                                                                                                             
in an At-Will world,@ 83 Cornell Law Review 105 (1997); Richard A. Epstein, AIn Defense 
of the Contract at Will,@ 51 University of Chicago Law Review 947 (1984).  
13At the same time, Human Rights Watch did find instances in various case studies of 
interference with workers= rights by government authorities. They included biased 
intervention by police and local government authorities and government subsidization of 
workers= rights violators. While these cases do not rise to a level of systemic abuse, they are 
no less troubling and, if they are not addressed and stopped, such abuses could spread. 
Summary 13  
 
 
The cases studied in this report are not isolated exceptions in an otherwise 
benign environment for workers= freedom of association.  They reflect a broader 
pattern confirmed by other researchers and borne out in nationwide information and 
statistics.  In the 1950s, for example, workers who suffered reprisals for exercising 
the right to freedom of association numbered in the hundreds each year.  In the 
1960s, the number climbed into the thousands, reaching slightly over 6,000 in 1969. 
 By the 1990s more than 20,000 workers each year were victims of discrimination 
leading to a back-pay order by the NLRBC23,580 in 1998.14  The frequency and 
growing incidence of workers= rights violations should cause grave concern among 
Americans who care about human rights and social justice. 
 
Policy and Reality 
Workers in the United States secured a measure of legal protection for the 
right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike with passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the Wagner Act of 1935, the original National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).15  These advances came after decades of struggle and 
sacrifice from the time, a century before, when trade unions were treated as a 
criminal conspiracy.  The NLRA declares a national policy of Afull freedom of 
association@ and protects workers= Aright to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .@16  The NLRA makes it unlawful 
for employers to Ainterfere with, restrain, or coerce@ workers in the exercise of these 
rights.  It creates the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce the law by 
investigating and remedying violations.  All these measures comport with 
international human rights norms regarding workers= freedom of association. 
The reality of NLRA enforcement falls far short of its goals.  Many workers 
who try to form and join trade unions to bargain with their employers are spied on, 
                                                 
14See NLRB Annual Reports 1950-1998; 1998 Table 4, p. 137. 
15The Norris-LaGuardia Act outlawed Ayellow-dog@ contracts (requiring a worker to 
renounce union membership as a condition of employment) and ex parte labor 
injunctions (by which judges enjoined strikes and jailed strike leaders after hearing 
only the employer=s argument in a case). The Wagner Act created Section 7 rights, 
defined unfair labor practices, and set up the NLRB for enforcement. Senator Norris 
and Congressman LaGuardia were both Republicans; Senator Wagner was a 
Democrat, reflecting a tradition of support for workers= rights from both major 
political parties. 
1629 U.S.C. '' 151-169, Section 7. 
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harassed, pressured, threatened, suspended, fired, deported or otherwise victimized 
in reprisal for their exercise of the right to freedom of association.   
Private employers are the main agents of abuse.  But international human 
rights law makes governments responsible for protecting vulnerable persons and 
groups from patterns of abuse by private actors.  In the United States, labor law 
enforcement efforts often fail to deter unlawful conduct.  When the law is applied, 
enervating delays and weak remedies invite continued violations.   
Any employer intent on resisting workers= self-organization can drag out legal 
proceedings for years, fearing little more than an order to post a written notice in the 
workplace promising not to repeat unlawful conduct and grant back pay to a worker 
fired for organizing.  In one case cited here, a worker fired for five years received 
$1,305 back pay and $493 interest.17  Many employers have come to view remedies 
like back pay for workers fired because of union activity as a routine cost of doing 
business, well worth it to get rid of organizing leaders and derail workers= 
organizing efforts.  As a result, a culture of near-impunity has taken shape in much 
of U.S. labor law and practice. 
Moreover, some provisions of U.S. law openly conflict with international 
norms and create formidable legal obstacles to the exercise of freedom of 
association.  Millions of workers are expressly barred from the law=s protection of 
the right to organize.  U.S. legal doctrine allowing employers to permanently 
replace workers who exercise the right to strike effectively nullifies the right.  
Mutual support among workers and unions recognized in most of the world as 
legitimate expressions of solidarity is harshly proscribed under U.S. law as illegal 
secondary boycotts.  Labor laws have failed to keep pace with changes in the 
economy and new forms of employment relationships creating millions of part-time, 
temporary, subcontracted, and otherwise Aatypical@ or Acontingent@ workers whose 
exercise of the right to freedom of association is frustrated by the law=s inadequacy. 
                                                 
17Under the NLRA, back pay awards are Amitigated@ by earnings from other employment. 
Employers who illegally fire workers for organizing need only pay the difference, if any, 
between what workers would have earned had they not been fired, and what they earned on 
other jobs during the period of unlawful discharge. Since workers cannot remain without 
income during years of litigation, they must seek other jobs and income, leaving the 
employers who violated their rights with an often negligible back pay liability. 
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Workers= Voices 
"I know the law gives us rights on paper, but where's the reality?" asks Ernest 
Duval, a certified nurse assistant at a Florida nursing home.  Duval and several 
coworkers were unlawfully fired in 1994 for activities like wearing buttons, passing 
out flyers, signing petitions, and talking with coworkers about banding together in a 
union at their workplace in West Palm Beach.  In 1996 a judge found their 
employer guilty of unlawful discrimination and ordered Duval and his coworkers 
reinstated to their jobs.  In 1999 they were still out of work despite an NLRB order 
upholding the judge=s ruling.18  The employer continued to appeal these decisions, 
now to federal courts where years= more delay is likely.  Meanwhile, the fired 
workers remain off the job, and their coworkers are frightened into retreat from the 
organizing and bargaining effort. 
AWe know our job, we love our job, we love our patients, but management 
doesn=t respect us,@ Marie Pierre, another nursing home assistant, told Human 
Rights Watch.19  Pierre served as a union observer at two representation elections in 
1998 and 1999 at a nursing home in Lake Worth, Florida.  The union won both 
elections, but Pierre was fired in December 1999 for speaking Creole with 
coworkers.  The company has refused to accept election results, appealing them to 
the NLRB and raising the prospect of years more of appeals before the courts. 
AThey don=t let us talk to Legal Services or the union.  They would fire us if 
we called them or talked to them,@ said a farmworker in North Carolina to an 
Human Rights Watch researcher examining freedom of association among H-2A 
migrant laborers.20  The H-2A program grants migrant workers a temporary visa for 
agricultural work in the United States.  They labor at the sufferance of growers who 
can fire them and have them deported if they try to form or join a union. 
A continent=s breadth away, an apple picker in Washington State told Human 
Rights Watch of threats from Athe consultant that was telling [the company] how to 
beat the union.@21  Part of a growing industry that specializes in telling employers 
how to defeat workers= self-organization, the consultant told striking apple workers, 
                                                 
18See PVM I Associates, Inc. D/b/a King David Center and U.S. Management, Inc. and 1115 
Nursing Home Hospital and Service Employees Union-Florida, 328 NLRB No. 159, August 
6, 1999. In Duval=s case, the judge found that management discharged him on fabricated 
misconduct charges because it was Adetermined to rid itself of the most vocal union 
supporter.@ 
19Human Rights Watch telephone interview, North Miami, Florida, March 8, 2000. 
20Human Rights Watch interview, near Mount Olive, North Carolina, July 15, 1999. 
21Human Rights Watch interview, Sunnyside, Washington, November  6, 1999.  See Chapter 
IV., Washington State Apple Industry below. 
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AYou have thirty minutes to get back to work or you=re all fired.@22  A convoy of 
police cars escorted trucks and vans full of workers sent by other apple growers to 
break the strike.  Farmworkers in the United States are excluded from coverage by 
laws to protect the right to organize, to bargain, and to strike, and can be fired for 
exercising these rights. 
                                                 
22A videotape of the workers= picketing activity, reviewed by Human Rights Watch, shows 
the consultant making this statement.  For more details, see Chapter IV., Washington State 
Apple Industry below. 
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Nico Valenzuela is another kind of victim.  He and his coworkers at a 
Chicago-area telecommunications castings company  voted by a large majority in 
1987 to form and join a union.  Valenzuela is still working, but collective 
bargaining proved futile in the face of a management campaign to punish workers 
for their vote.  Despite repeated findings by the NLRB that the company acted 
unlawfully, legal remedies took years to obtain.  The workers abandoned bargaining 
in 1999, twelve years after they formed a union, never having achieved a contract.  
The delays Atook away our spirit,@ said Nico Valenzuela of the bargaining process.  
AI don=t know how the law in this country can allow these maneuvers.@23 
Lloyd Montiel, a twenty-seven-year veteran employee at a steel mill in Pueblo, 
Colorado, exercised the right to strike along with 1,000 coworkers in response to 
management=s threats during bargaining.  The company permanently replaced them 
with newly hired strikebreakers, many coming from other states.  AHow can the 
government and Congress allow companies to do this?@ he asks.  AThey [the 
employer] can plan a strike, cause a strike, and then get rid of people who gave 
them a lifetime of work and bring in young guys who never saw the inside of a steel 
mill.@24 
At a world of work far removed from steel mills and nursing homes, Barbara 
Judd, a high-tech contract worker in Redmond, Washington, found herself and 
coworkers who formed a union caught between the firm where they worked and 
their temporary employment agencies when they sought to bargain collectively.  As 
Apermatemps@Clong-term workers at a single firm, but nominally employed by 
outside agenciesCJudd=s group had no one to bargain with.  Denying their 
                                                 
23Human Rights Watch interview, Chicago, Illinois, July 8, 1999.  For more details, see 
Chapter IV., Northbrook, Illinois Telecommunications Castings below. 
24Human Rights Watch interview, Pueblo, Colorado, May 20, 1999.  For details on the legal 
underpinnings of an assertion of unlawful conduct, see the discussion and footnotes in 
Chapter V., Colorado Steelworkers, the Right to Strike and Permanent Replacements in U.S. 
Labor Law  below. 
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employment status, the firm refused to bargain with the group.  Meanwhile, the 
temporary agencies refused to bargain with workers placed at the firm.25 
                                                 
25Human Rights Watch interview, Seattle, Washington, November 4, 1999. For 
details, see Chapter IV., Contingent Workers below. 
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The stories of these and other workers who have tried to exercise the right to 
freedom of association promised by international human rights instruments and by 
the U.S. labor law principles are the focus of this report.  The cases reported here 
are not exceptional, and the findings are not novel for those familiar with domestic 
U.S. discourse on workers= rights to organize and bargain collectively.  
Congressional committees and presidential commissions have reached the same 
conclusions, and Human Rights Watch has consulted these sources among others in 
preparing this report.26 
 
International Human Rights and Workers 
Human Rights Watch brings to the discussion an analysis of workers= freedom 
of association in the United States in light of international human rights standards.  
An international human rights perspective provides new ways of understanding U.S. 
labor law and practice and of advocating changes to bring them in line with 
international standards. 
Freedom of association is the bedrock workers= right under international law 
on which all other labor rights rest.  In the workplace, freedom of association takes 
shape in the right of workers to organize to defend their interests in employment.  
Most often, workers organize by forming and joining trade unions.  Protection of 
their right to organize is an affirmative responsibility of governments to ensure 
                                                 
26See, for example, Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the House Committee 
on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., AReport on Pressures in Today=s Workplace@ 
(1980); Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, 98th Congress, AThe Failure of Labor Law: A Betrayal of American 
Workers@ (1984); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor-Management Relations, 
Report No. 134, AU.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation@ 
(1989); U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report (May 1994). 
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workers= freedom of association.  As one scholar notes, AStates are . . . obligated 
[under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the 
United States] to protect the formation or activities of association against 
interference by private parties.@27 
But the right to organize does not exist in a vacuum.  Workers organize for a 
purpose: to give unified voice to their need for just and favorable terms and 
conditions of employment when they have freely decided that collective 
representation is preferable to individual bargaining or  management=s unilateral 
power. 
                                                 
27See Manfred Nowak, U.N.  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 
(Strasbourg, N.P. Engel, 1993), p. 387 (noting that Athe US was unsuccessful with its motion 
in the HRComm to protect freedom of association only against >governmental 
interference.=@). 
The right to bargain collectively stems unbroken from the principle of freedom 
of association and the right to organize.  Protecting the right to bargain collectively 
guarantees that workers can engage their employer in exchange of information, 
proposals and dialogue to establish terms and conditions of employment.  It is the 
means by which fundamental rights of association move into the real and enduring 
life of workers and employers.  The right to bargain collectively is "real" 
implementation in the economic and social setting of the "ideal" civil and political 
rights of association and organizing.   
At the same time, the right to bargain collectively is susceptible to a higher 
level of regulation than the right to organize.  Bargaining is more than an exercise 
of the pure right of association by workers, since it implicates another partyCthe 
employerCand can carry social effects outside the workplace.  Collective 
bargaining takes a wide variety of forms in different countries reflecting their 
national histories and traditions.  For example, some countries protect bargaining by 
workers whose unions represents only a minority of employees in workplaces.  
Others, like the United States, require majority support.  Some countries allow 
multiple union representation among workers in the same jobs.  The United States 
and others require exclusive representation by a single union for workers in a 
defined Abargaining unit.@ But regardless of differences in models of collective 
bargaining, the underlying basic right must be given effect. 
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The right to bargain collectively is compromised without the right to strike.  
This right, too, must be protected because without it there cannot be genuine 
collective bargaining.  There can only be collective entreaty.  Here, too, a greater 
level of regulation is contemplated under international norms since strikes can affect 
not just the parties to a dispute, but others as well.  The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights proclaims A[t]he right to strike, provided that 
it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.@28  The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) has long maintained that the right to strike 
is an essential element of the right to freedom of association, but recognizes that 
strikes may be restricted by law where public safety is concerned, as long as 
adequate alternatives such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration provide a 
solution for workers who are affected.   
The right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike 
unfold seamlessly from the basic right to freedom of association.  But they should 
not be equated with outcomes for the exercise of these rights.  Workers do not have 
a right to win an NLRB election.  They do not have a right to win their collective 
bargaining demands.  They do not have a right to win a strike on their terms.  
Nothing in this report should be seen to argue for any specific outcome in an 
organizing, bargaining, or strike dispute.  However, employers must respect and the 
state must protect workers= fundamental rights. 
                                                 
28ICESCR, Article 8 (d). 
In recent months, the U.S. government has amplified calls for integrating 
human rights and labor rights into the global trade and investment system in such 
venues as the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas.  Freedom of association is the first such right cited in calls for labor 
rights in trade agreements.  But to give effective leadership to this cause that is not 
undercut by hypocrisy, the United States must confront and begin to solve its own 
failings when it comes to workers' rights.  Moving swiftly to strengthen labor rights 
enforcement and deter labor rights violations in the United States will reinforce the 
sincerity of U.S. concern for ensuring worldwide respect for core labor standards. 
 
International Labor Rights Norms 
A widely accepted body of international norms has set forth standards for 
workers= freedom of association.  They can be found in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other United Nations instruments, in conventions of the ILO, in 
workers= rights clauses in regional trade agreements, and in other international 
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compacts.  They are also grounded in the near-universality of national laws 
protecting workers= freedom of association in all countries= labor law systems.   
Workers= freedom of association in human rights instruments has been 
complemented by legal guidelines on international labor norms developed in detail 
by the ILO.  These norms set forth the right to organize, the right to bargain 
collectively, and the right to strike as fundamental rights.  They are inextricably tied 
to the exercise of the right to freedom of association and must be protected by 
national governments.  Nearly every country is a member of the ILO.  Each is 
bound by ILO Conventions 87 and 98 dealing with freedom of association whether 
or not they have ratified those conventions, since freedom of association is taken to 
be a constitutional norm binding on countries by virtue of their membership in the 
organization.29 
The United States has not ratified Conventions 87 and 98 but has long 
acknowledged its obligations under them.  In 1998, the United States championed 
adoption at the ILO of a landmark Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work stating that  
 
                                                 
29ILO member countries are Abound to respect a certain number of general rules . . . among 
these principles, freedom of association has become a customary rule above the 
conventions.@ See Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission on Chile, (ILO, 1975), para. 
466. 
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all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, 
have an obligation, arising from the very fact of membership in the 
Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in 
accordance with the Constitution [of the ILO], the principles concerning 
the fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions, 
namely: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining; . . .30 
 
International human rights law prohibits the use of state power to repress 
workers= exercise of their right to freedom of association.  Forming and joining 
unions, bargaining collectively, or exercising the right to strike may not be banned 
or rendered impotent by force of law.  Officially or unofficially, authorities may not 
harass workers, arrest them, imprison them, or physically abuse or kill them for such 
activities.   
Moreover, governments must take affirmative measures to protect workers= 
freedom of association.  Governments have a responsibility under international law 
to provide effective recourse and remedies for workers whose rights have been 
violated by employers.  Strong enforcement is required to deter employers from 
violating workers= rights.   
In the United States, millions of workers are excluded from coverage by laws 
to protect rights of organizing, bargaining, and striking.  For workers who are 
covered by such laws, recourse for labor rights violations is often delayed to a point 
where it ceases to provide redress.  When they are applied, remedies are weak and 
often ineffective.  In a system replete with all the appearance of legality and due 
process, workers' exercise of rights to organize, to bargain, and to strike in the 
United States has been frustrated by many employers who realize they have little to 
fear from labor law enforcement through a ponderous, delay-ridden legal system 
with meager remedial powers. 
                                                 
30See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its 
Follow-Up, adopted by the International Labour Conference at its Eighty-sixth 
Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998, p. 7. 
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II.  FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
General 
This section summarizes Human Rights Watch=s findings and offers 
recommendations for addressing workers= rights violations by employers, 
inadequate enforcement of workers= rights by government, and legal obstacles that 
hinder workers= exercise of the right to freedom of association under international 
labor rights standards.  Some of the recommendations could be achieved by 
administrative action.  Some could be accomplished by the judicial branch in future 
labor law cases.  But for the most part, action by Congress in the form of new 
legislation is called for. 
U.S. labor law and practice are deeply entrenched, and its elements that 
frustrate rather than promote workers= freedom of association are not easily 
changed.  Agencies can work incrementally at the margins of established rules but 
cannot take dramatic new initiatives absent legislation by Congress.  In contrast to 
some areas of U.S. law, courts have often acted in the labor law arena to curtail 
workers= rights.  Indeed, this report suggests that many of the features of U.S. labor 
law and practice that counter international norms result from court-fashioned 
doctrine, not just from statutory deficiencies. 
As a political reality, Congress must work cooperatively with the 
administration and executive agencies with a joint commitment to craft and adopt 
new legislation halting violations, strengthening enforcement, and removing the 
obstacles to workers= exercise of freedom of association described in this report.  
For the most part, the recommendations offered here call for legislative action.  
Where a defined, practically achievable administrative action or judicial approach is 
called for, it is noted. 
But beyond the technicalities of administrative regulations, jurisprudence or 
statutory reforms, a larger reality looms over labor law and practice in the United 
States.  So long as worker organizing, collective bargaining, and the right to strike 
are seen only as economic disputes involving the exercise of power in pursuit of 
higher wages for employees or higher profits for employers, change is unlikely.  
Reformulating these issues as human rights concerns can begin a process of change. 
What is most needed is a new spirit of commitment by the labor law 
community and the government to give effect to both international human rights 
norms and the still-vital affirmation in the United States= own basic labor law for 
full freedom of association for workers.  The specific findings and 
recommendations that follow should be seen in this broader context. 
One way to begin fostering such a change of spirit is for the United States to 
ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 98.  This would send a strong signal to workers, 
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employers, labor law authorities, and to the international community that the United 
States is serious about holding itself to international human rights and labor rights 
standards as it presses for the inclusion of such standards in new global and regional 
trade arrangements. 
Authorities and courts can take another step toward creating a climate of 
respect for workers= rights by looking to international human rights standards to 
inform their analyses and remedies in cases arising under U.S. domestic law.  The 
NLRB, for example, has no support staff specializing in international labor law.  
Equipped with such expertise, the board could begin to examine the relevance and 
applicability of human rights norms or ILO conventions in its work.  The private bar 
has a role here, too.  Trade union and employer counsel should brief and argue 
points of international labor law to advance respect for workers= fundamental rights. 
  
Perhaps most important, the primary actors in the labor fieldCworkers 
themselves who seek to exercise rights enshrined in international law, and trade 
union leaders and organizers who assist themCshould view and carry out their 
mission as one that includes human rights concerns, not simply as a business of 
rendering services in exchange for dues payments or as a path to personal 
advancement or enrichment.  At the same time, their employer counterparts should 
begin to view workers= self-organization as a fundamental human right, and treat it 
as such. 
 
Finding: Discrimination against Union Supporters 
The basic international norm protecting the right to organize is stated in ILO 
Convention 98: AWorkers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination . . . more particularly acts calculated to cause the dismissal of or 
otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or participation in 
union activities.@ The NLRA=s Section 8(a)(3) appears to meet this goal, making 
unlawful any discrimination against workers for concerted activity, including union 
activity. 
Firing a worker for organizing is illegal but commonplace in the United States. 
 Many of the cases examined by Human Rights Watch for this report reflect the 
frequency and the devastating effect of discriminatory discharges on workers= rights. 
 An employer determined to get rid of a union activist knows that all that awaits, 
after years of litigation if the employer persists in appeals, is a reinstatement order 
the worker is likely to decline and a modest back-pay award.  For many employers, 
it is a small price to pay to destroy a workers= organizing effort by firing its leaders. 
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Recommendation: Interim Reinstatement; Tougher Remedies 
Two measures are needed to give effect to the international norm cited above. 
 First, where the NLRB=s investigation finds merit in a worker=s charge of 
discriminatory discharge, the worker should be reinstated while the case continues 
to be litigated.  Only such an interim reinstatement remedy can overcome the 
devastating impact on individual workers who are dismissed and on the workers= 
overall organizing effort.  In contrast, this remedy creates no more than an 
inconvenience to the employerCkeeping an experienced worker on the job while the 
worker=s claim, already deemed meritorious under the NLRB=s rigorous complaint 
process, is litigated through hearing and appeal stages.  This remedy would also 
curtail appeals lodged solely for purposes of delay. 
Second, abuses should carry a meaningful price so that remedies and sanctions 
have a deterrent value.  Workers should receive full back pay regardless of interim 
earnings.  They should receive punitive damages in cases of willful violations of 
U.S. law.  In addition to paying workers victimized by violations, employers who 
repeatedly engage in discrimination against union supporters should pay substantial 
fines to the NLRB. 
 
Finding: Imbalance in Communication Power 
Employers have wide latitude under U.S. law to campaign aggressively against 
workers who seek to form and join unions.  In written, oral, and filmed 
communication, employers confront workers with carefully scripted declarations to 
dissuade them from choosing union representation and collective bargaining.  For 
their part, trade union organizers campaign aggressively to convince workers to 
choose in favor of representation. 
But the battle is highly unequal.  Employers oversee workers all day, every 
day when they are on the job.  Indeed, employers begin Acampaigning@ the first day 
a worker is hired, communicating the employer=s position about wages, working 
conditions, and treatment by managers.  If workers begin an effort to gain a 
collective voice in the workplace, employers often hire consultants to develop an 
intensive campaign against forming and joining a union.   
The campaign against workers= organizing efforts is most often marked by 
mandatory captive-audience meetings and mandatory, pressure-filled, one-on-one 
meetings between individual workers and their supervisors, with the latter coached 
by consultants on how to present self-organization as risky to employees= interests.  
Underlying all this employer opposition to workers= organizing is the raw power of 
the employment relationshipCthe power to assign work, to pay a wage, to impose 
discipline, and ultimately to dismiss the worker.  Workers hear employers= views 
with this power in mind.   
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Recommendation: More Speech for Workers 
Many worker advocates call for the repeal of Section 8 (c) of the NLRA, the 
1947 Aemployer free speech@ clause that codified court rulings allowing employers 
to campaign against worker organizing.  According to this argument, workers= 
organizing is their own business; employers should stay out of it.  Allowing any 
campaigning by employers invites unlawful interference because of the employers= 
inherent advantage in the employment relationship.  In this view, the employer=s 
Acampaign@ consists of the wages and working conditions afforded to employees; if 
workers decide they need collective bargaining to secure improvements, it should 
be strictly their own affair. 
A human rights analysis approaches these issues differently.  As outlined in 
more detail below, Human Rights Watch advocates more free speech for workers, 
not less free speech for employers.  The goal is to achieve a fair balance for workers 
to hear all views about choosing to form and join a union, and to reduce the level of 
fear that so routinely accompanies workers= organizing efforts. 
 
Finding: Workers= Lack of Access to Union Representatives 
While forced to listen to the employer=s arguments when they seek to organize, 
workers have only haphazard access to union advocates= views and explanations of 
the sometimes complicated process of forming a union and bargaining collectively.  
They may not have any face-to-face communication with organizers in a workplace-
related setting.  Instead, they have to meet union organizers at their homes or at 
meetings outside of work time, which is often difficult.  For farmworkers in grower-
owned housing, even meeting a union representative where they live is often 
prohibited.   
Workers may take union leaflets at the perimeter of employment premises as 
they enter and leave the job, but even here their access to information is restricted.  
For example, under the law workers may not receive information from union 
representatives in publicly accessible parking lots of shopping centers or industrial 
parks.  Workers may distribute union literature in the workplace, but employers can 
often block this under the law by posting a Anondiscriminatory@ rule against 
solicitation.  In the end, the most common form of workers= communication with a 
union is grabbing a leaflet near the workplace entrance by a public road. 
 
Recommendation: Access to Information from Union Representatives at the 
Workplace 
Congress should adopt legislation authorizing the NLRB to develop rules 
allowing workers to receive information from union advocates in non-work areas on 
non-work time within the workplace.  Addressing such matters as time, place, 
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duration, number of union representatives allowed access, and other details, access 
rules should be fashioned to balance the employer=s interest in an uninterrupted 
work process with workers= right to receive information regarding their right to 
associate. 
 
Finding: Forced Attendance and Discipline at Captive-Audience Meetings 
Almost without limits, employers can force workers to attend captive-audience 
meetings on work time.  Most often, these meetings include exhortations by top 
managers that are carefully scripted to fall within the wide latitude afforded 
employers under U.S. lawCallowing Apredictions@ but not Athreats@ of workplace 
closings, for exampleCto deter workers from choosing union representation.  
Employers can fire workers for not attending the meetings.  They can impose a Ano 
questions or comments@ rule at a captive-audience meeting, and discipline any 
worker who speaks up.  Many of Human Rights Watch=s case studies here involved 
the use of captive audience meetings. 
The only limitation on captive-audience meetings is an NLRB rule prohibiting 
such meetings within twenty-four hours of the election.  The board has ruled that the 
Amass psychology@ and Aunwholesome and unsettling effect@ of captive-audience 
meetings tend to Ainterfere with that sober and thoughtful choice which a free 
election is designed to reflect.@31  It is not clear from NLRB doctrine why twenty-
four hours is an appropriate number, or why the same concerns do not apply when 
management holds repeated captive-audience meetings up to the twenty-four-hour 
deadline with no opportunity for union advocates to have equal access to 
communicate with workers. 
 
Recommendation: Proportional Access 
A principle of proportional access should apply where employers force 
workers into captive-audience meetings at the workplace.  Workers should have 
access to union representatives under similar conditions to hear information about 
their right to form and join trade unions and to bargain collectively.   
Equal access for unions should not be automatic.  It should be triggered by the 
employer=s use of captive-audience meetings where an employer does not otherwise 
agree to allow access.  NLRB rules should also permit reasonable opportunities for 
non-disruptive discussion and questioning during such employee meetings, whether 
with employers or union advocates. 
 
                                                 
31 See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427 (1953). 
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Finding: APredicting@ Reprisals 
Under U.S. law, employers and consultants have refined methods of legally 
Apredicting@Cas distinct from unlawfully threateningCworkplace closures, firings, 
wage and benefit cuts, and other dire consequences if workers form and join a trade 
union.  For example, a prediction that the workplace will be closed if employees 
vote for union representation is legal if the prediction is based on objective facts 
rather than the employer=s subjective bias.  While this distinction might be 
discernible to lawyers and judges, it is not clear to workers who hear managers 
holding superior economic power linking Aunion@ and Aclosing@ in captive audience 
meetings and in one-on-one discussions with employees.32 
 
Recommendation: Closer Scrutiny and Tougher Remedies 
Human Rights Watch does not recommend repealing Section 8(c) or unduly 
restricting employer speech.  Instead, the NLRB should more closely scrutinize 
such statements by employers for potentially coercive effect.  Where it finds 
violations, the board should apply strong, swift remedies.  Most potently, the NLRB 
should more often seek Gissel bargaining orders, a special remedy now sparingly 
applied.  Based on the name of a Supreme Court case in which the high court 
upheld the remedy,33  Gissel orders require employers to recognize and bargain with 
unions in cases where a majority of workers freely signed union cards authorizing 
union representation and the employers= coercive threats made a fair election 
impossible.  For their part, the courts should signal approval of wider use of the 
Gissel remedy by upholding NLRB orders for Gissel relief. 
                                                 
32Indeed, employers often carry out such reprisals to retaliate against workers= attempts to 
organize. In a comparative study of anti-union plant closings in the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico, the NAFTA labor commission reviewed 408 federal appeals court and NLRB 
decisions on full or partial plant closings between 1986 and 1995, finding that employers 
were found guilty of unlawful discrimination in 367 cases. See Secretariat of the 
Commission for Labor Cooperation, Plant Closings and Labor Rights (Dallas, Texas, 
Commission for Labor Cooperation, 1997). 
33See NLRB v.  Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
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Finding: Election Acrimony 
NLRB elections too often involve intense, acrimony-filled campaigns marked 
by heated rhetoric and attacks on the motives of both employers and union 
advocates.  The bitterness of a representation campaign can poison chances of a 
mutually beneficial bargaining relationship.  Unfortunately, many of the cases 
examined here appear to be launched on such a road. 
Many analysts have articulated powerful critiques of the NLRB election 
process and urged replacing elections with the quicker, non-confrontational card-
check method of determining workers= choice for representation and collective 
bargaining.34  The card-check system, by which recognition of workers= majority 
sentiment for or against collective bargaining is based on signed authorization 
cards, is examined in several cases in this report involving hotel workers, shipyard 
workers, and apple industry workers.  As they demonstrate, the card-check 
methodCwith sufficient safeguards to ensure that cards are signed 
voluntarilyCallows a reasoned choice in a less coercive atmosphere. 
This argument has merit, and perhaps over time the U.S. system could evolve 
toward a generalized acceptance of the card-check system.  But in American culture 
now and for the foreseeable future, fairly run secret-ballot elections still have a 
moral primacy.  Workers, employers, and the general public see their outcome as 
more legitimate. 
 
Recommendation: Expanded Use of Voluntary Card-Check Agreements 
Human Rights Watch believes that secret-ballot elections should remain a 
standard method of determining workers= choice whether to bargain collectively 
with their employer.  At the same time, experience demonstrates that where workers 
and employers can agree to use card checks that genuinely reflect workers= free 
                                                 
34See, e.g., Craig Becker, ADemocracy in the Workplace: Union Representation in Elections 
and Federal Labor Law@ 77 Minnesota Law Review 495 (1993). The card-check method is a 
standard procedure for choosing representation in several Canadian jurisdictions. Elections 
would still be needed if workers seek bargaining without having gained a majority signing 
cards, or in cases where workers are divided between competing unions seeking 
representation rights. 
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choice, with safeguards against coercion by management, by union representatives 
or by coworkers, they can combine the benefits of freedom of choice and a mutually 
respectful relationship that carries over into collective bargaining.  Public policy 
should encourage the use of voluntary card-check agreements as an alternative 
means of establishing workers= majority sentiment and collective bargaining rights.   
 
Finding: Delays in NLRB and Court Procedures 
Long delays in the U.S. labor law system confound workers= exercise of the 
right to freedom of association. In representation cases, NLRB elections take place 
at least several weeks after workers file a petition seeking an election.  In many 
cases, the election can be held up for months by employer-initiated disputes over 
which workers should be eligible to vote in the election as part of the Aappropriate 
bargaining unit.@ 
An employer can also file objections to an election after it takes place, arguing 
that the union used unfair tactics.  If the NLRB rules in workers= favor and orders 
the employer to bargainCusually several months, but often one or two years after 
the election was heldCthe employer can then undertake what is called a Atechnical 
refusal to bargain@ to obtain judicial review of the NLRB=s decision.  That is, the 
employer can ignore the board=s order.  In contrast, workers cannot appeal an 
NLRB decision upholding an employer=s objections to an election. 
A technical refusal to bargain forces workers and the NLRB to launch a new 
case, this time an unfair labor practice complaint against the employer=s refusal to 
bargain.  The new case often requires years more to resolve in the courts.  In many 
of the cases studied for this report, workers voted in favor of union representation 
years ago, sometimes by an overwhelming majority, but they are still waiting for 
bargaining to begin while employers= appeals are pending in court. 
Debilitating delays also occur in unfair labor practice cases.  Most cases 
involve discrimination against union supporters or refusals to bargain in good faith. 
 After the issuance of a complaint, several months pass before a case is heard by an 
administrative law judge.  Then several more months go by while the judge ponders 
a decision.  The judge=s decision can then be appealed to the NLRB, where one, 
two, or three years go by before a decision is issued.  The NLRB=s decision can then 
be appealed to the federal courts, where again up to three years pass before a final 
decision is rendered.  Many of the workers in cases studied here were fired years 
earlier and have won reinstatement orders from administrative judges and the 
NLRB, but they still wait for clogged courts to rule on employers= appeals.   
Recommendation: Rapid Elections, Faster Resolution of Election Disputes 
The NLRB should conduct an election as quickly as possible after the filing of 
a petition.  The election should take place among workers in bargaining units they 
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seek to form based on their own evaluation of the Acommunity of interest@ most 
responsive to their needs.  Where there are genuine issues of exclusions, such as 
those related to supervisors or independent contractors, elections can go forward 
with challenged ballots set aside and disputes over status of those employees 
resolved after the election, not before. 
Many worker advocates argue that collective bargaining should commence 
when the NLRB has reviewed an employer=s objections to an election, ruled that a 
majority of workers freely selected representation, and issued a bargaining order.  
This would reduce the effect of a Atechnical refusal to bargain@ in defiance of a 
board order, which leaves workers without bargaining rights for years more as 
appeals proceed through the courts.  The argument here is that workers= right to 
bargain collectively should take precedence over employers= gaining an unfair 
advantage by deliberate delaying tactics. 
Human Rights Watch stops short of this policy here.  The right of appeal to the 
civil courts is a basic element of due process.  Given the mutual commitment 
needed for a sustained, respectful relationship between workers and employers, 
legal uncertainty over representation rights should not cloud the bargaining process. 
 Requiring an employer to bargain in good faith while the employer at the same time 
refuses to accept the majority status of the workers= bargaining representative is 
legally and practically untenable. 
The solution recommended here is to bring the corresponding rights of 
workers and employers as close to parallel as possible.  Workers have no right to 
appeal an NLRB decision upholding an employer=s objections to an election and 
ordering a rerun election.  Just as workers have to Alive with@ NLRB decisions on 
election objections, employers should also have to accept NLRB orders except in 
extraordinary circumstances.  The NLRB is the specialized agency created by 
Congress to hold representation elections and guarantee their fairness.  Human 
Rights Watch recommends legislation creating a legal standard for court review of 
NLRB final bargaining orders similar to the standard for review of arbitrators= 
decisions, which are rarely disturbed by the courts.35  Along with a new standard for 
review, a Afast-track@ procedure for courts of appeals to decide whether an 
employer=s refusal to accept the board=s decision meets the high threshold for 
judicial review should be established.  This will separate truly extraordinary cases 
                                                 
35A policy of judicial deference to arbitrators= decisions was established by the Supreme 
Court in the ASteelworkers Trilogy@ cases: United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. 
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 
363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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from those where an employer undertakes a technical refusal to bargain only to gain 
time to undermine the workers= choice of a bargaining representative. 
 
Finding: Outmoded Concepts of Bargaining Units 
U.S. labor law is still largely based on the model of fixed employee groups 
working for a single employer.  That model is still relevant for a majority of 
workers, and protection of the rights of association of workers in that majority 
model must be maintained.  But there are many new employment relationships often 
described as atypical or contingent where workers= freedom of association is 
frustrated. 
Recommendation: Bargaining Units Shaped by Workers= Needs 
Labor law must change to encompass the rights and interests of contingent 
workers, contract workers, and others involved in new occupations and industries as 
diverse as office cleaning, child or elder caregiving, and temporary workers in high-
tech companies and service industries. 
Expanding the concept of the Abargaining unit@ would allow workers in novel 
employment relationships to merge their interests with those of others in similar 
jobs with other employers.  Allowed to associate in a collective bargaining 
arrangement with corresponding multi-employer associations, workers could 
address their needs in areas beyond traditional wages and benefits.  For example, 
they could bargain for improved training and career ladders providing upward 
mobility in their employment sector.  An isolated employer views these as costs 
creating a competitive disadvantage, but employers collectively could approach 
them as opportunities to upgrade skills and productivity in the sector as a whole.36 
 
Finding: Staff, Budget Cuts at NLRB 
Congress has hobbled the NLRB over many years by failing to keep staffing 
and funding levels in line with the growing volume of cases, especially unfair labor 
practice cases.  The number of cases filed each year has tripled since the 1950s, but 
the NLRB=s staffing level has fallen from nearly 3,000 full-time employees in 1980 
to fewer than 2,000 in 1998, only slightly more than staffing levels in 1950. 
The NLRB=s staff and budget constraints have retarded efforts to recruit 
investigators, agents, and attorneys with foreign-language skills to protect the rights 
of foreign-born workers, a rapidly growing part of the labor force.  Many of the 
                                                 
36For an extensive development of this argument for expanding bargaining Aunits@ beyond 
the 1930s factory model, see Stephen A. Herzenberg, John A. Alic, and Howard Wial, New 
Rules for a New Economy (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1998), pp.161-166. 
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workers= rights violations recounted in this report were suffered by immigrants who 
do not speak English. 
In its earlier decades the bulk of the NLRB=s caseload involved representation 
cases, i.e.  running elections.  Now more than 80 percent of its workload involves 
unfair labor practice cases.  Requiring careful investigation, often extensive 
settlement negotiations, and complicated litigation in cases that go to hearing, unfair 
labor practice cases are much more staff-intensive than representation cases.  Yet 
the size of the NLRB staff and its inflation-adjusted budget have not been adapted 
to the fact that time-consuming investigation and litigation have replaced 
administration of elections as the main task of the agency. 
Recommendation: More Staff and Resources for NLRB; Renewed Recruiting  
Campaign 
As the premier federal agency charged with protecting workers= freedom of 
association in the United States, the NLRB is a critically important human rights 
enforcement agency.  It should have the staff and resources to carry out its mandate 
effectively.  For fiscal year 2000, Congress did approve an increase in the NLRB=s 
budget from $184.5 million to $205.7 million, the first substantial increase in many 
years.37  This will allow the NLRB to hire additional staff.   
But the FY 2000 increase should not be a one-time adjustment.  A multi-year 
plan for increasing staffing levels should be joined with a determined campaign by 
the NLRB to retain experienced, committed staff and to recruit outstanding college 
and law school graduates, as well as young and mid-career individuals interested in 
moving into human rights work.  In appealing to potential NLRB staffers committed 
to human rights enforcement, particular attention should be paid to applicants= 
foreign-language skills so that they can help the sizeable number of migrant and 
other foreign-born workers who suffer violations of their right to freedom of 
association. 
 
Finding: Government Involvement in Frustrating Workers= Rights 
In some cases studied for this report, government officials and police 
intervened one-sidedly to deter workers from choosing representation and collective 
bargaining.  In one, a town=s mayor passed out leaflets citing plant closings to 
workers on their way to vote in an NLRB election.  The U.S. Navy paid more than 
$5 million for a company to defend actions deemed Aegregious misconduct, 
                                                 
37See Bureau of National Affairs, ANLRB,@ BNA Daily Labor Report No. 6, January 10, 
2000, p. S-5. 
Findings and Recommendations 35  
 
 
demonstrating a general disregard for employees= fundamental rights@ by a judge 
who heard evidence in the case.  There are no provisions in U.S. law for 
withholding lucrative government contracts from companies that repeatedly violate 
workers= rights. 
Welfare recipients required to find jobs under the 1996 welfare reform are 
especially vulnerable to violations.  State agencies administering federal monies for 
welfare-to-work are required to provide a grievance procedure to protect these 
workers from unjust firings, but regulations are silent about workers= rights to 
organize, to bargain, or to strike.  In many states, a welfare-to-work employee who 
exercises the right to strike automatically loses cash assistance or other welfare 
benefits.  The same fate can befall a welfare-to-work employee who refuses to 
accept a job at a workplace where workers are on strike.  Many welfare-to-work 
laborers are also treated as Atrainees@ who do not meet the definition of Aemployee@ 
under labor laws protecting employees= right to organize. 
 
Recommendation: No Interference, No Favoritism; Debarment 
National associations of state, county and municipal governments and police 
organizations should undertake special training and educational programs to make 
local officials aware of workers= right to freedom of association and related rights to 
organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike.  Such programs should emphasize 
the importance of non-interference with these rights and ways to ensure that keeping 
the peace does not become, in effect, a euphemism for intimidation of peaceful 
workers.  Federal law should be interpreted or amended to provide for federal 
investigation and prosecution of local officials who violate workers= freedom of 
association, in the same way that federal civil rights enforcement measures are 
available. 
Government subsidies for hiring workers in empowerment zones should be 
conditioned on compliance with the NLRA and other relevant labor rights laws.  
This requirement should be enforced by having companies that violate workers= 
rights repay the government for subsidies paid.  Congress should consider a 
Adebarment@ law prohibiting the awarding of government contracts to companies 
that repeatedly violate workers= rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to 
strike.  Finally, federal regulations should make clear that the right to freedom of 
association for welfare-to-work employees must be respected by government and 
private employers in administering assistance programs. 
 
Finding: Surface Bargaining, Superficial Remedies 
Employers can continue to thwart workers= choice to form a union and bargain 
collectively by bargaining in bad faithCgoing through the motions of meeting with 
36 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
workers and making proposals and counterproposals without any intention of 
reaching an agreement.  This tactic is called Asurface bargaining.@ The problem is 
especially acute in newly organized workplaces where the employer has fiercely 
resisted workers= self-organization and resents their success. 
Proving surface bargaining is extremely difficult, since a well-coached 
employer can follow a legal roadmap created by earlier NLRB and court decisions 
to give an appearance of good faith.  Even when the violation is so clear that the 
NLRB and courts uphold a surface bargaining charge, the only remedy currently 
available is an order to return to the bargaining table, where the same cycle can 
repeat itself .  In one case studied here, a company was repeatedly found guilty of 
bad-faith bargaining after workers voted in favor of union representation, yet no 
contract was reached for twelve years after the vote, and workers ultimately 
surrendered bargaining rights. 
 
Recommendation: Stronger Remedies, First-Contract Arbitration 
Stronger NLRB-ordered and court-ordered remedies, including punitive 
damages, should be fashioned for willful refusal to bargain in good faith.  Where 
workers have formed and joined a new union in a previously unorganized 
workplace and the employer is found to bargain in bad faith, workers should have 
recourse to first-contract arbitration as a remedy.  Average contract settlements in 
comparable industries or facilities can be used as a guidepost for an arbitrator 
applying the first-contract arbitration remedy. 
While this remedy should be extraordinary in a system that advances free 
collective bargaining as a paramount principle, it may be the only effective step 
where workers have been deprived of the right to bargain freely by the employer=s 
violation of the rule of good faith.  As indicated, this remedy would be available 
only for first-contract negotiations in a newly organized workplace where the 
employer is found guilty of bad-faith bargaining.  This gives workers an opportunity 
to establish a bargaining relationship that would most likely have taken shape had 
the employer bargained in good faith.  It also provides a chance to demonstrate to 
the employer that both parties can act responsibly and respectfully under a 
collective agreement, making good-faith negotiations more probable in subsequent 
bargaining. 
 
Finding: Exclusion of Millions of Workers from Protection of Organizing and 
Bargaining Rights  
International norms refer to the right of Aevery person@ to form and join trade 
unions and to bargain collectively.  Several of the cases examined by Human Rights 
Watch for this report involved workers excluded from coverage by the NLRA, such 
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as agricultural workers, domestic employees, and Aindependent@ contractors who 
actually work in a dependent relationship with a single employer for years.  
Moreover, supervisory and managerial exclusions are used to deny organizing rights 
to many workers inappropriately placed in these categories.  In the public sector, 
many states deny state and local employees the right to bargain collectively.  As 
noted above, many welfare recipients employed in workfare programs are 
categorized as Atrainees@ and excluded from organizing and bargaining protection.   
In all, millions of workers in the United States are excluded from coverage of 
laws that are supposed to protect the right to organize and bargain collectively.  
Workers who fall under these exclusions can be summarily fired with impunity for 
seeking to form and join a union.  Even where the employer does not fire them, 
workers= requests to bargain collectively can be ignored. 
 
Recommendation: Eliminate Statutory Exclusions, Narrow Supervisory and 
Managerial Definitions 
Congress should bring agricultural workers and domestic workers under 
NLRA coverage with the same rights and protections as all other covered workers.  
Legal reform should also subject employers= claims of workers= independent 
contractor status to strict scrutiny by the NLRB and the courts under standards that 
make workers= real-life dependence on employers the test for NLRA coverage.  
Congress should also act to bring low-level supervisors and managers under the 
mantle of laws protecting rights of association, with adequate safeguards against 
conflicts of interest among groups of employees.  Federal and state legislation 
should be enacted to protect public employees= exercise of the right to bargain 
collectively and the right to strike, under conditions established in international 
norms.  Welfare-to-work and workfare employees should be covered by laws 
protecting rights of organizing and collective bargaining. 
In general, workers who want to organize and bargain collectively should have 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, except where there are manifestly no 
employers to bargain with or where the essence of such workers= jobs is so truly 
managerial or supervisory that they effectively would be bargaining with 
themselves. 
 
Finding: Subcontracted and ALeased@ Workers are denied Freedom of 
Association and Effective Remedies 
As seen in several cases in this report involving farmworkers, express-delivery 
employees, and high-technology temporary agency employees, many employers can 
use subcontracting arrangements, supplier chains and temporary employment 
agencies to avoid any obligation to recognize workers= rights of organization and 
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collective bargaining.  In effect, workers labor Afor@ the prime employer while 
nominally employed Aby@ a supplier, subcontractor or agency.   
The same problems afflict workers in the apparel manufacturing industry, in 
janitorial services, and other sectors characterized by layers of subcontracting 
arrangements, where prime contractors often simply cancel the contracts of 
subcontractors whose employees form and join unions.  The result is widespread 
denial of workers= freedom of association under international norms, often affecting 
the most vulnerable workers in the labor force. 
 
Recommendation: Make Prime Contractors and Employers of APermatemps@ 
Responsible for Workers= Rights of Association, Organizing, and Collective 
Bargaining 
Congress should enact legislation cutting through the fiction of subcontracted 
employment relationships like those cited that are structured to avoid responsibility 
for recognizing workers= rights.  Fixing responsibility should be based on a test of 
effective economic power to set workers= terms and conditions of employment, not 
the formality of an employment relationship.  The dominant entity in the 
employment relationship holding real power over workers= terms and conditions of 
employment should have legal responsibility to recognize and bargain with workers 
when a majority choose representation.  This principle should apply to large apparel 
retailers for sweatshop workers, to building owners= associations for janitorial 
cleaning workers, to agricultural growers who use labor-supplying middlemen, and 
to other forms of labor contracting. 
 
Finding: Nullification of the Right to Strike By the Permanent-Replacement 
Doctrine  
Employers= power to permanently replace workers in the United States who 
exercise the right to strike runs counter to international standards recognizing the 
right to strike as an essential element of freedom of association.  International norms 
limit the right to strike, excepting members of the military and police and 
authorizing alternatives such as mandatory arbitration when strikes affect public 
safety.  But international norms do not authorize permanent replacements.  The ILO 
has determined that the right to strike Ais not really guaranteed when a worker who 
exercises it legally runs the risk of seeing his or her job taken up permanently by 
another worker, just as legally.@ 
Permanent replacement crosses the line balancing the rights of workers and 
employers and undercuts a fundamental right of workers.  The prospective pain of a 
strike or lockout is the most powerful incentive to reach a collective agreement 
without a strike.  The balance of pain after a strike or lockout has begun is an 
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equally powerful incentive to resolve the dispute expeditiously.  But with the one-
sided pain of a strike marked by permanent replacements, the employer maintains 
operations, workers who exercised the right to strike are left to languish, and after 
just one year permanent replacement workers can vote to extinguish the strikers= 
right to representation and collective bargaining.   
U.S. law forbids permanent replacement of workers who strike over 
employers= unfair labor practices, as distinct from Aeconomic strikers@ seeking better 
contract terms.  The latter can be permanently replaced; unfair labor practice 
strikers are entitled to reinstatement when they end their strike.  But it often takes 
years of NLRB and federal court proceedings before a final decision is made as to 
whether replaced workers have a right to reinstatement.  In a case studied by Human 
Rights Watch for this report, workers at a Colorado steel mill who ended a strike in 
1997 still do not know their fate, despite NLRB decisions firmly in their favor 
ordering reinstatement.  In 2000 their employer vowed Ayears and years of hearings 
before there=s any conclusion on this.@ 
 
Recommendation: Reverse the Permanent-Replacement Doctrine 
Congress should enact legislation prohibiting the permanent replacement of 
workers who exercise the right to strike.  Some trade union advocates argue that a 
reform should go even further, prohibiting temporary replacements as in some 
Canadian jurisdictions, or even requiring an employer to cease operations in a legal 
strike, as in Mexico.   
Human Rights Watch does not recommend such a drastic change.  Instead, the 
balance should be restored to a genuine equilibrium permitting employers to engage 
temporary replacements, as they now can, alongside non-striking employees or 
supervisors and managers who maintain operations.  However, temporary 
replacements should give way to employee strikers when the strike ends.  In effect, 
prohibiting permanent striker replacements effectuates a Abalance of pain@ in a strike 
that promotes more rapid resolution of a dispute while respecting both workers= 
right to strike and management=s ability to operate. 
 
Finding: Stifling of Solidarity Action by Workers 
U.S. labor law creates a total prohibition on workers involved in a labor 
dispute seeking solidarity help from other workers at companies doing business with 
their employer.  The NLRA backs up the ban by requiring the NLRB to seek an 
immediate injunction to halt any solidarity action or Asecondary boycotts.@ 
Meanwhile, the board=s authority to seek injunctions to halt employers= unfair labor 
practices, however egregious and destructive of workers= rights such practices might 
be, is only discretionary and is rarely used by the NLRB.   
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In contrast to the United States= total ban, other countries have fashioned rules 
for balancing the interests of workers and employers, protecting workers= right to 
join in solidarity and employers= right to avoid unwarranted economic harm if they 
are truly neutral to a dispute.  These legal rules comport with the general principle 
formulated by the ILO that workers= solidarity action is lawful so long as the 
primary action is lawful and so long as both are carried out in accordance with legal 
rules. 
 
Recommendation: Reformulate Rules to Allow Workers= Solidarity Action in 
Keeping with Principles of Freedom of Association 
Human Rights Watch recognizes that the issue of workers= solidarity action in 
support of workers involved in a primary dispute is complex.  A purist view sees 
any limit to secondary action as a violation of freedom of association.  But banning 
any limits to secondary action would be as absolute, at the other extreme, as the 
current ban on secondary action itself.  Rather than removing any and all 
restrictions, Human Rights Watch recommends a serious effort by Congress to craft 
new rules allowing workers to seek and to afford solidarity support, looking to 
comparative experience in other developed countries and to ILO analysis and 
principles for guidance.  For example, some countries of the European Union apply 
a rule of "reasonableness" or "proportionality" to workers' invoking of solidarity 
action rights, allowing workers to affect a secondary firm=s dealings with the 
primary company involved in the dispute, but not to influence dealings with other 
companies not involved in a labor dispute.  Some countries have a "last resort" 
requirement to exhaust mediation and conciliation mechanisms before solidarity 
action can be taken. 
 
Immigrant Workers 
International human rights principles apply to all persons regardless of 
immigration and citizenship status.  In the United States, Human Rights Watch 
found workers= rights violations with particular characteristics affecting immigrant 
workers in nearly every economic sector and geographic area examined in this 
report, prompting a separate set of recommendations. 
Immigrant workers are a fast-growing part of the labor force.  Many work in 
industries with low wages, few benefits, unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, 
and harsh treatment by managers.  These workers are urgently in need of the 
protection that can be gained through freedom of association, yet they are 
victimized when they exercise the right.  Moreover, violations of their rights to 
organize and bargain collectively affect their coworkers in many places of 
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employment, diminishing everyone=s ability to exercise the right to freedom of 
association. 
Their status often makes immigrant workers less likely to complain about 
unfair wages and working conditions and afraid to form and join trade unions to 
defend their rights.  For many, the vulnerability of their undocumented status and 
related fear of deportation are the most powerful forces inhibiting their use of the 
right to organize and bargain collectively.  Still, many undertake efforts to form and 
join trade unions, only to suffer reprisals.   
To address this problem, U.S. labor rights policy must give greater attention to 
the right to freedom of association in the application of immigration policy than is 
currently the case.  The following findings and recommendations address first the 
situation of non-agricultural immigrant workers, then conditions of two types of 
migrant farm labor, one undocumented and one with valid visas for temporary 
agricultural work in the United States. 
With regard to immigrant workers covered by the NLRA (that is, non-
agricultural workers), these are Human Rights Watch=s findings and 
recommendations: 
 
Finding: Threats to call the INS; Racial and Ethnic Divisiveness 
Human Rights Watch found repeated use of threats by employers during 
NLRB election campaigns to call the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
to have workers deported if they formed and joined a union.  In some cases, such 
threats may take a racially divisive turn, with employers telling immigrants that their 
U.S.-born coworkersCAfrican-Americans, in cases studied for this reportCare 
forming a union to get rid of immigrants. 
 
Recommendation: INS Forbearance When Workers Exercise Freedom of 
Association; Stronger Remedies 
The current discretionary policy of the INS not to conduct Araids@ or other 
internal enforcement measures while an NLRB election is pending should be made 
mandatory by legislation or by regulation.  A policy foregoing raids or other 
internal enforcement measures should be applied for reasonable periods from a time 
when workers have begun organizing efforts to a phase following NLRB elections, 
whatever the results.  Finally, where the NLRB finds evidence of deliberate race- or 
ethnic-based interference with workers= organizing efforts linked to the vulnerable 
status of immigrant workers, strong remedial action like injunctive relief and 
bargaining orders should be taken. 
 
Finding: Fear of Filing Charges or Testifying; Workers Subject to Deportation 
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Human Rights Watch found that immigrant workers are often afraid to come 
forward to file unfair labor practice charges or to appear as witnesses in unfair labor 
practice proceedings because they fear their immigration status will be challenged.  
Many workers seeking to organize and bargain are in fact undocumented.  
Vulnerability because of their immigration status chills the exercise of these rights.  
Workers who persist in exercising the right to freedom of association are often 
victimized by the employer moving from threat to action: calling the INS to have 
them deported, even though such an act is an unfair labor practice under the 
NLRA.38 
The precarious situation of undocumented immigrants inhibits workers= 
freedom of association on a national scale.39  In one widely publicized incident 
involving hotel workers in Minneapolis, Minnesota, management reported the 
names of nine leaders, all Mexican women working as maids, to the INS after they 
and coworkers voted in favor of union representation.  The workers were fired, 
arrested and faced deportation.40 
Recent reports suggest that the demand for immigrant labor in a period of low 
unemployment has eased pressure for strict enforcement of immigration laws.41  
However, the INS acknowledges that an exception arises in cases where workers 
seek to exercise rights to organize, to bargain, or to strike.  A senior INS official 
stated that an undocumented worker is at little risk Aunless the employer turns a 
                                                 
38The NLRA covers workers= defined as Aemployees@ regardless of immigration status. 
Courts have ruled that undocumented workers covered by the NLRA can file unfair labor 
practice charges if they are discriminated against for union activity. They can obtain a 
reinstatement order if they are fired for union activity. They can vote in NLRB elections. See 
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 833 (1984); NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 
134 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997). 
39For an overall description of the problem, see Nancy Cleeland, AUnionizing is Catch-22 for 
Illegal Immigrants: Undocumented status makes them vulnerable to workplace retaliation . . 
.,@ Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2000, p. A1. 
40See AP Wire Report, AIllegal Immigrants Help Unionize a Hotel but Face Deportation,@ 
New York Times, January 13, 2000, p. A19. The NLRB issued a complaint finding 
meritorious the workers= charge that they were fired for union activity. The case was settled 
with the workers= accepting modest payments without right to reinstatement, but still facing 
deportation. In April 2000, the INS granted the workers two years= Adeferred action@ status 
allowing them to stay. See Kimberly Hayes, AIllegal workers get to stay in U.S.; The INS 
gives seven undocumented immigrants who tried to form a union at a downtown 
Minneapolis hotel Adeferred-action@ status for two years,@ Minneapolis Star-Tribune, April 
26, 2000, p. 1B. 
41See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, AI.N.S. Is Looking the Other Way As Illegal Immigrants Fill 
Jobs,@ New York Times, March 9, 2000, P. A1. 
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worker in, and employers usually do that only to break a union or prevent a strike or 
that kind of stuff.@42 
 
                                                 
42Ibid., quoting Robert L.  Bach, INS associate commissioner for policy and planning. 
Recommendation: ADon=t Ask@ in NLRB Proceedings; Protected Status for 
Workers Exercising Rights of Association 
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NLRB rules should prohibit any assertion of or inquiry into a worker=s 
immigration status by NLRB agents conducting investigations, or by union or 
employer attorneys in NLRB proceedings, or by administrative law judges or other 
NLRB officials at any time.  This is the thrust of an NLRB General Counsel 
memorandum on the subject,43  but it should be codified in NLRB rules and given 
wide, prominent publicity.  This rule must be publicized to give workers confidence 
that their right to freedom of association will be respected and that they cannot be 
questioned about their immigration status in connection with NLRB proceedings. 
Congress should establish a new visa category analogous to AS@ visas for 
undocumented persons who are witnesses in criminal proceedings, or proposed AT@ 
visas for victims of trafficking, for undocumented workers who suffer violations of 
their right to freedom of association through organizing and bargaining collectively. 
 Both victims of violations of these rights, and potential witnesses in NLRB and 
court proceedings, should be granted such temporary visa status for the duration of 
legal proceedings under the NLRA and appeals through the courts, and for a 
reasonable period following the conclusion of such proceedings while the INS may 
consider exercising discretionary authority to allow them to remain in the United 
States. 
 
Finding: Impossibility of Reinstatement 
While under NLRB rules undocumented workers can obtain a reinstatement 
order, they cannot be reinstated if they cannot regularize their immigration status in 
short order.  This is practically impossible.  In one notable case, the attorney for a 
New York City garment factoryChimself a former INS officialCcalled the INS to 
raid the factory and arrest worker leaders where employees had voted in favor of 
union representation.  The NLRB found this to be an unfair labor practice.  
However, despite the fact that evidence of the worker=s status was obtained by 
unlawful means, a federal appeals court upheld a deportation order.44 
 
Recommendation: Interim Reinstatement for Immigrant Workers Who Suffer 
Discrimination 
                                                 
43See NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 98-15 (December 4, 1998). 
44See Montero v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Case No. 96-4130 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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Congress should fashion greater balance between immigration laws and laws 
protecting workers= freedom of association such that immigration rules cannot be 
used to destroy fundamental rights of association.  Workers who obtain a 
reinstatement order because their right to freedom of association was violated 
should be immediately reinstated and granted a work authorization card for 
sufficient time to allow them to seek renewed, extended, or permanent authorization 
under discretionary authority which may be exercised by the INS in such cases.   
 
Agricultural Workers 
With regard to agricultural workers, Human Rights Watch finds and 
recommends as follows: 
 
Finding: Agricultural Workers= Exclusion 
Under current law, all agricultural workers, residents and immigrants alike, are 
excluded from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act affording 
protection of the right to freedom of association and rights to organize, to bargain 
collectively, and to strike.  Except in a few states, agricultural workers can be fired 
with impunity for exercising the right to organize and have no means of obtaining 
recognition and collective bargaining through elections or other means of 
demonstrating majority support.  No law makes such reprisal an unfair labor 
practice, or provides a hearing and enforcement mechanism for redress.  
Furthermore, because of the intermittent and often itinerant nature of agricultural 
labor, workers are not able to pursue a claim even if a forum were available. 
 
Recommendation: End the Exclusion with Added Provisions for Farmworkers= 
Specific  Problems 
Human Rights Watch recommends including all workers under stronger laws 
effectively protecting freedom of association, including agricultural workers.  In a 
reformed NLRA structure recommended by Human Rights Watch, agricultural 
workers, like all workers, would have available interim reinstatement power 
allowing reinstatement while their case is processed, based on the NLRB=s initial 
investigation and finding of prima facie merit in a claim of discrimination.  
However, even the several weeks normally taken by the NLRB to conduct an 
investigation might be too long a time to protect a farmworker.  Instead, agricultural 
worker protection laws should include new, stronger and swifter non-retaliation 
provisions guarding against dismissal for associational activity.  Finally, under 
strengthened NLRA coverage, agricultural workers could avail themselves of rapid 
secret-ballot elections for union representation. 
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Finding: Violations Due to Labor Contracting System 
As in other sectors of the economy, the agricultural labor market is becoming 
layered with contracting and subcontracting systems.  For example, large food 
processors and growers claim not to be employers of farmworkers even where they 
openly or effectively determine wages and working conditions.  These large 
employers claim that smaller farmers or individual growers are the employer.  In 
turn, smaller farmers or growers argue that they are not employers because they use 
labor contractors or crew leaders who supply a labor force.  These labor contractors 
are the real employers, growers claim.  Crew leadersCcalled Acoyotes@ for their 
ruthless tacticsCare often shadowy figures trafficking in migrant farm labor who 
extract large fees from workers and then cannot be found when any legal proceeding 
is brought against them. 
 
Recommendation: Accountability by the Prime Employer 
As recommended elsewhere in this report in sections dealing with contingent, 
atypical, and subcontracted labor, U.S. labor law covering agricultural workers 
should cut through the layers of claimed non-responsibility to hold employers Aup 
the line@ accountable for respecting workers= right to freedom of association.  Such 
employers should also be held liable for violations of the right, as long as such 
employers decisively influence farmworkers= wages and working conditions.   
Where workers have formed and joined trade unions, an agricultural collective 
bargaining framework should allow for multiple-party negotiations bringing all 
interests to the table to settle wages and working conditions for farmworkers.  Thus, 
for example, if a majority of workers harvesting agricultural products for a large 
retail food processor choose to form and join a union, a good-faith bargaining 
obligation should attach to the processor, to growers who supply the processor, and 
the farmworkers= union. 
 
Finding: Denial of Legal Services 
Legal services organizations are barred from representing undocumented 
workers and from filing class action lawsuits to vindicate farmworkers= rights.  
Private attorneys cannot receive attorneys= fees in successful suits for individual 
farmworkers or groups of farmworkers. 
 
Recommendation: Access to Legal Services 
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Access to legal counsel and to the justice system is an essential aspect of 
freedom of association denied to agricultural workers.  Congress should remove the 
ban on representing undocumented workers and on class action lawsuits for 
farmworkers by legal services organizations, and provide for attorneys= fees for 
representing farmworkers on the same basis they are provided under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and civil rights laws.  Where undocumented workers are involved in 
such cases, they should be protected against any inquiry into their immigration 
status. 
 
H-2A Workers 
With regard to a sub-group of agricultural workersC the temporary, legal 
migrants who come to the United States with H-2A visasCHuman Rights Watch 
found specific problems and makes separate recommendations: 
 
Finding: a Restricted Labor Force 
About 30,000 temporary agricultural workers enter the United States each year 
under the H-2A program giving them legal authorization to work in areas where 
employers claim a shortage of domestic workers.  Human Rights Watch examined 
conditions in North Carolina, the state where growers are the largest users of H-2A 
workers.  Some 10,000 H-2A workers are employed in North Carolina. 
H-2A workers are tied to the growers who contract for their labor.  They have 
no opportunity to organize for improved conditions, no opportunity to change 
employers to obtain better conditions, and no access to federal courts to vindicate 
their rights.  Many workers are brought to the United States by associations 
specializing in H-2A migrants.  Representatives of such associations tell workers 
that farmworker unions and Legal Services attorneys are their enemies.  H-2A 
workers are often denied the right to receive visitors through restrictive clauses in 
their housing arrangements. 
 
Recommendation: Mobility, Organizing Rights, and Access to Legal Recourse 
The H-2A program should allow workers to seek work with a different 
employer in the same area, under supervision by H-2A enforcement authorities, if 
the employer they are assigned to violates their rights.  Workers should also have 
access to federal courts when their rights are violated.  Where workers are 
dismissed or discriminated against for exercising rights of association, a 
strengthened regime is needed to ensure swift reinstatement or placement in another 
position where they reside.  Workers should have unfettered access in their living 
quarters to advocates who can advise them about their rights, if workers seek such 
advice. 
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Labor department regulations governing the H-2A program should define as 
an unfair labor practice recruiters= characterizations of unions and legal services as 
Aenemies@ of H-2A workers.  Recruiters who use such tactics should be subject to 
cease-and-desist orders and contempt enforcement for continued violation.  The H-
2A program should instead require that workers be fully informed of their rights to 
organize and bargain collectively, and have access to legal services and to the 
justice system, as they desire. 
It should be noted that many of the problems cited here also apply to workers 
who enter the United States temporarily under the H-2B program covering non-
agricultural workers.  Thousands, for example, labor in agricultural-related 
processing operations and in plants processing chickens, crabs, and other food 
products.45  The development of initiatives to address  problems of H-2A workers 
should also apply to other workers facing similar difficulties. 
                                                 
45For a comprehensive account of conditions of H-2B crab pickers in North Carolina, see the 
three-part series by Anne Hull, AUna Vida Mejor, A Better Life,@ St. Petersburg Times: 
ALeaving Paloma,@ May 9, 1999, p. 1A; AThe Smell of Money,@ May 10, 1999, p. 1A; 
AFreedom Found,@ May 11, 1999, p. 1A. 
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III.  WORKERS= FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
The International Background 
International human rights analysts and advocates have been slow coming to 
grips with issues of workers= rights.  Attention has focused on pressing problems of 
arbitrary detention and torture, massacres of indigenous peoples and ethnic 
minorities, atrocities of war and civil war, and other gross human rights violations, 
not on workers= rights to form and join trade unions and bargain collectively.  For 
their part, worker representatives have been slow to see human rights aspects in 
their work.  The day-to-day challenge of organizing and bargaining in complex 
frameworks of national labor laws leaves little time to learn from international 
human rights discourse.  In the United States and in many other countries, union and 
management officials and attorneys, as well as administrators and judges, seldom 
turn to international law to inform their work. 
All that is changing under the pressures of a globalizing economy and new 
sensitivity to the human rights implications of workers= rights advocacy.  For 
example, employers= organizations, trade unions and governments joined together at 
the International Labor Organization in 1998 to issue a landmark Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.  Their common declaration set out 
freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively as the first 
such principles.   
At the same time, the 1998 action at the ILO was not a  novelty.  Freedom of 
association for workers has long been universally acknowledged as a fundamental 
right.  A widely accepted body of international norms has established standards for 
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workers= freedom of association covering the right to organize, the right to bargain 
collectively, and the right to strike.46 
                                                 
46For additional treatment of human rights principles regarding freedom of association for 
workers, see James A. Gross, AA Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor 
Relations Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association,@ 3 Employee Rights and 
Employment Policy Journal 65 (Chicago-Kent College of Law 1999); see also papers and 
other information available at the web site of the Society for the Promotion of Human Rights 
in Employment (SPHRE) at http://www.mericleinc.com/Sphre/. 
Sources of international labor law on workers= freedom of association include 
human rights instruments developed by the United Nations and by regional human 
rights bodies, principles elaborated through worker, employer and government 
representatives at the ILO, and labor rights clauses in international trade 
agreements.  The United States has acknowledged its international responsibility to 
honor workers= freedom of association by ratifying human rights instruments, in 
particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  It has also 
accepted obligations under ILO conventions on freedom of association and under 
the 1998 declaration. 
The United States has committed itself, through international agreement, to 
effectively enforce U.S. laws protecting workers= rights to organize, to bargain 
collectively and to strike.  It has affirmed obligations to honor workers= freedom of 
association in its own trade laws and in laws governing U.S. involvement in the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilateral bodies.  In all 
these laws, freedom of association is held out as the foremost internationally 
recognized workers= right. 
 
International Human Rights Instruments 
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C The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that "[E]veryone 
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association," and 
"[E]veryone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests."47  
 
C The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) 
declares: "[E]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with 
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests."48  
 
C The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR, 1966) obliges governments to "ensure the right of everyone to form 
trade unions and join the trade union of his choice . . .; the right of trade 
unions to function freely . . .; the right to strike . . ."49 
 
                                                 
47Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.  Res.217A(III), U.N.  GAOR, 3d 
Sess., pt.  1, at 71, U.N.  Doc.  A/810 (1948) (art.  20(1); art.  23(4)). 
48International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.  16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.  
171 (art.22). 
49International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.  16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S.  3 (art.  8). 
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The United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 1992.  The ICCPR requires ratifying states Ato respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant@ and Ato adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.@ The 
ICCPR also constrains ratifying states Ato ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy.@50  
When the U.S. Senate ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights in 1992, it entered several reservations, understandings, and 
declarations sidestepping certain obligations in the covenant, perhaps most notably 
reserving the right to impose capital punishment on minors.51  But it took no 
reservations, understandings or declarations with respect to Article 22 on the right 
to form and join trade unions, or to Article 2 requiring an Aeffective remedy@ for 
rights violations.52 
                                                 
50International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2. 
51See U.S. Senate, Ratification of ICCPR, April 2, 1992. Reservations, understandings, and 
declarations are accepted under international law as a means of ratifying complex 
international instruments while taking exception to certain details, so that wider ratification 
of the instruments can be achieved. 
52In a written exchange between the Senate and the White House on questions posed by 
Senator Daniel Moynihan, first as to whether ICCPR Article 22 alters or amends U.S. labor 
law, the administration responded, ANo,@ asserting that Article 22's Ageneral right of freedom 
of association, including the right to form and join trade unions . . . are fully contemplated by 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.@ On the question whether ratification of 
Article 22 commits the U.S. to ratify ILO Convention 87, the administration again responded 
in the negative, saying Athe two agreements are different in the scope of the rights and 
obligations they provide.@ This exchange, not reflected in the instrument of ratification, does 
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Acknowledging the obligation, the U.S. State Department=s first report on 
compliance with the ICCPR stated that Aprovisions of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee freedom of assembly in all contexts, including the right of 
workers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing. 
                                                                                                             
not lessen the United States= obligation to fully comply with Article 22 of the ICCPR. 
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 . . . The rights of association and organization are supplemented by legislation.@53
 Distressingly, however, the United States devalued the importance of 
protecting the right to freedom of association by claiming that the widespread 
exclusion of workers from coverage under U.S. labor lawsCprimarily agricultural 
workers, domestic workers, and supervisory employeesCAmeans only that they do 
not have access to the specific provisions of the NLRA . . . for enforcing their rights 
to organize and bargain collectively.@54  AOnly@ lacking access to enforcement 
mechanisms means these workers= rights can be violated with impunity.  There is no 
labor board or other authority to remedy violations. 
 
Regional Instruments 
Regional human rights instruments reaffirm the consensus on workers' 
freedom of association as a basic right: 
 
C The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) states: 
"Every person has the right to assemble peaceably with others in a formal 
public meeting or an informal gathering, in connection with matters of 
common interest of any nature.  Every person has the right to associate with 
others to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate interests of a political, 
economic, religious, social, cultural, professional, labor union or other 
nature."55 
 
C The later American Convention on Human Rights (1969) declares: 
"[E]veryone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, 
political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes."56  
 
                                                 
53See Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, ACivil and Political Rights in 
the United States: Initial Report of the United States of America to the U.N.  Human Rights 
Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,@ Department of 
State publication 10200 (July 1994; released September 1994). 
54See U.S. Department of State, ACivil and Political Rights in the United States: Initial 
Report of the United States of America to the U.N.  Human Rights Committee under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights@ (July 1994), p. 166. 
55American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948, in Final Act, Ninth 
International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, Articles 21,22.  
AAmerican@ here refers to the Americas, including North, Central and South America 
and the Caribbean region. 
56American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser.A/16 
(English), T.S.  No.  36 (Nov.  7-22, 1969), Article 16. 
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C Reflecting the international consensus on workers= freedom of association, 
though it does not involve the United States, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) says: 
AEveryone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of his interests.@57 
 
                                                 
57European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov.  4, 1950, E.T.S.  No.  5 (entered into force, Sept.  3, 1953), Article 
11. 
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C The European Union=s Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers (1989) holds: A[E]mployers and workers of the European Community 
shall have the right of association in order to constitute professional 
organisations or trade unions of their choice for the defence of their economic 
and social interests . . . the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements under the conditions laid down by national legislation and practice 
. . . the right to strike, subject to the obligations arising under national 
regulations and collective agreements.58 
 
ILO Conventions and OECD Guidelines 
Building on this international consensus, the ILO, a U.N.-related body with 
nearly universal membership and tripartite representation by governments, workers, 
and employers, recognizes freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize as core workers= rights.  Over decades of painstaking treatment of 
allegations of violations of workers= rights, the ILO=s Committee on Freedom of 
Association has elaborated authoritative guidelines for implementation of the right 
to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike. 
 
C ILO Convention No.  87 on freedom of association and protection of the right 
to organize says that AWorkers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, 
shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the 
organization concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without 
previous authorization.@59 
 
C ILO Convention No.  98 declares that AWorkers shall enjoy adequate 
protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their 
employment . . . Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of 
acts calculated toCa) make the employment of a worker subject to the 
condition that he shall not join a union or shall relinquish union membership; 
b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union 
membership or because of participation in union activities.@ 
                                                 
58European Union, Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, in Roger 
Blanpain and Chris Engels, eds., European Labour Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), Articles 11-13. 
59ILO Convention No.  87, Articles 2, 11. 
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In greater detail, Convention 98 goes on to say: AWorkers= and employers= 
organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference 
by each other. . . Machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be 
established, where necessary, for the purpose of ensuring respect for the right 
to organize . . . Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, 
where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and 
utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers= and 
workers= organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions 
of employment by means of collective agreements.@60 
 
C The ILO=s Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work says 
expressly: AAll members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the 
Organization, to respect, to promote, and to realize, in good faith and in 
accordance with the [ILO] Constitution, the principles concerning the 
fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) 
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; . . .@ 
 
ILO core conventions were officially recognized at the 1995 World Social 
Summit conference in Copenhagen.  In addition to those covering freedom of 
association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, ILO norms on forced 
labor, child labor, and employment discrimination were defined as essential to 
ensuring human rights in the workplace.  Signed by the United States, the 
Copenhagen summit=s final declaration called on governments to ratify these ILO 
conventions, to respect them even if they have not ratified them, and to use 
international labor standards as a benchmark for their national legislation.61  The 
                                                 
60ILO Convention No.  98, Articles 1, 3, 4. 
61 Cited in OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers= 
Rights and International Trade (1996) (hereafter Trade, Employment and Labour 
Standards); see also Hilary Barnes and Andrew Jack, ANations agree on fighting poverty,@ 
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U.N.  High Commissioner for Human Rights includes these ILO conventions in an 
authoritative list of Ainternational human rights instruments.@62 
                                                                                                             
Financial Times, March 13, 1995, p .6. 
62See ILO Focus (Winter/Spring 1997); the Conventions cited are nos.  87 and 98 on 
freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, 29 and 105 on 
forced labor, 100 and 111 on non-discrimination, and 138 on child labor. 
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At the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
United States subscribes to a statement that A[e]nterprises should, within the 
framework of law, regulations and prevailing labor relations and employment 
practices, in each of the countries in which they operate: respect the right of their 
employees to be represented by trade unions . . . and engage in constructive 
negotiations . . . with such employee organizations with a view to reaching 
agreements on employment conditions.@63  The OECD has characterized freedom of 
association and the right to organize and bargain collectively as labor standards that 
Areflect basic human rights which should be observed in all countries, independently 
of their levels of economic development and socio-cultural traditions.@64 
 
U.S. Commitments in the Multilateral Setting 
The United States championed the 1998 adoption of the ILO=s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work that set out freedom of association as 
the first such principle and right.  Upon adoption, U.S. Labor Secretary Alexis 
Herman declared, AThe ILO has underlined and clarified the importance of the 
fundamental rights of workers in an era of economic globalization . . . ILO members 
have accepted the need to be accountable, and with this action there will now be a 
process within the ILO to demonstrate that accountability.@65 
Whether or not a country has ratified Conventions 87 and 98, the ILO has 
determined that ILO member countries are Abound to respect a certain number of 
general rules which have been established for the common good . . . among these 
principles, freedom of association has become a customary rule above the 
Conventions.@66  Though it has so far not ratified Conventions 87 and 98, the United 
States has accepted jurisdiction and review by the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association (CFA) of complaints filed against it under these conventions.   
                                                 
63Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, AGuidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises@ (1976). 
64See OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards (1996). 
65See U.S. Labor Department News Release, June 18, 1998, available at www.dol.gov. 
66See Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission on Chile, International Labor Organization, 
Geneva, Switzerland (1975), para.  466. 
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Several ILO cases involving the United States in the past fifteen years have 
raised issues cited in this Human Rights Watch report.  The United States has 
defended itself in these cases by describing its elaborate system of labor laws and 
procedures and asserting that the system generally conforms to ILO standards.67  In 
many cases, the CFA Anoted with concern@ and Adrew the attention of the U.S. 
government@ to problems the Committee perceived.  In some cases, the committee 
recommended changes in policy and practice.  However, the ILO has no 
enforcement powers, and  the United States took no action to implement the 
recommendations. 
Reporting on compliance and defending against complaints, the United States 
likewise has taken the position that its labor law and practice are generally in 
conformance with the conventions but that some elements of U.S. federal and state 
labor laws conflict with the conventions= detailed requirements.  Ratification of ILO 
conventions, it is contended, would amount to Aback door@ amendment of U.S. labor 
laws without following the normal legislative process because the ratification of an 
international treaty would supersede pre-existing domestic law under the United 
States= constitutional system.68  The leading U.S. employer representative to the ILO 
cautioned against making U.S. law subject to ILO supervision because Athis 
machinery is not in our control@ and the United States could be embarrassed by 
holding its Adomestic laws and practices up to greater international scrutiny and 
criticism than is presently the case.@69 
Before 1999, U.S. reports to the ILO on compliance with freedom of 
association standards offered boilerplate descriptions of American labor law and 
asserted that U.S. law and practice Aappears to be in general conformance@ with 
Conventions 87 and 98.70  Significantly, however, the United States in a 1999 report 
                                                 
67See ILO, CFA Cases nos. 1130 (1987), 1401 (1987), 1416 (1988), 1420 (1988), 1437 
(1988), 1467 (1988), 1543 (1991), 1523 (1992), 1557 (1993), available at www.ilolex.ilo.ch. 
68To take one example, the exclusion of agricultural workers from protection of the right to 
organize clashes with ILO norms. The argument against ratification is developed in detail in 
Edward E. Potter, Freedom of Association, the Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining: The Impact on U.S. Law and Practice of Ratification of ILO Conventions No. 
87 and No. 98, Labor Policy Association (1984). Ratification of ILO conventions is further 
complicated by the fact that, in the U.S. system, later-in-time statutes passed by Congress 
and signed by the president supersede earlier-ratified international treaties. 
69See statement of Abraham Katz, president, U.S. Council for International Business, 
AExamination of the Relationship Between the United States and the International Labor 
Organization,@ U.S..  Senate, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.  1 (1985), pp. 74-101. 
70See, e.g., U.S. Report for the period ending 31 December 1997 under Article 19 of the ILO 
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acknowledged for the first time that Athere are aspects of this [U.S. labor law] 
system that fail to fully protect the rights to organize and bargain collectively of all 
employees in all circumstances.@  
                                                                                                             
Constitution on the position of national law and practice in regard to matters dealt with in 
Conventions 87 and 98, available from the U.S. Department of Labor and on file with 
Human Rights Watch. 
62 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
The 1999 U.S. report stated that Athe United States is concerned about these 
limitations and acknowledges that to ensure respect, promotion and realization of 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, it is important to reexamine any 
system of labor laws from time to time to assure that the system continues to protect 
these fundamental rights.@71  An ILO Committee of Expert-Advisors that reviewed 
country reports called the U.S. statements Astriking for their open recognition of 
difficulties still to be overcome or situations they deemed relevant to achieving full 
respect for the principles and rights in the Declaration.@72 
 
U.S. Trade Laws 
The United States has also affirmed the importance of international norms and 
obligations regarding workers= freedom of association in its own trade statutes.  
Although these laws create obligations for trading partners, they underscore the 
U.S. commitment to freedom of association under international standards.  In these 
statutes governing trade relationships with other countries, Congress defined 
freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively as 
Ainternationally recognized workers= rights.@  
                                                 
71See Annual Report for 1999 to the ILO regarding aspects of Conventions 87 and 98, 
available from the U.S. Department of Labor and on file with Human Rights Watch. 
72See AReview of annual reports under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work,@ ILO Governing Body, March 2000, para.  44. 
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Labor rights amendments have been added to statutes governing the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1984,73 the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation in 1985,74 the Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1986,75 Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1988,76  Agency for International Development (AID) 
funding for economic development grants overseas,77  and U.S. participation in the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other international lending 
agencies.78  All these measures hold out the possibility of economic sanctions 
against trading partners that violate workers' rights.  In every case, freedom of 
association and the right to organize and bargain collectively are the first rights 
listed.   
In formulating the labor rights clauses in U.S. trade laws, Congress has relied 
on ILO guidance.  In its report on legislation governing U.S. participation in 
international financial institutions, Congress pointed to Athe relevant conventions of 
the International Labor Organization, which have set forth, among other things, the 
rights of association [and] the right to organize and bargain collectively.@79  
Analyzing the application of workers= rights provisions in U.S. trade laws, the 
General Accounting Office underscored the fact that Athe international standards 
have been set by the International Labor Organization, which is part of the U.N.  
structure.@80 
                                                 
7319 U.S.C.A.  ' 2461 et.seq.  The GSP program permits a developing country to export 
goods to the United States on a preferential, duty-free basis as long as they meet the 
conditions for eligibility in the program. 
7422 U.S.C.A.  ' 2191 et.seq.  OPIC insures the overseas investments of U.S. corporations 
against losses due to war, revolution, expropriation or other factors related to political 
turmoil, as long as the country receiving the investment meets conditions for eligibility under 
OPIC insurance. 
7519 U.S.C.A.  ' 2702 et seq.  A 1990 labor rights amendment to what is now called the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) expanded the worker rights clause to 
comport with GSP and OPIC formulations.  CBERA grants duty-free status to exports into 
the United States from Caribbean basin countries on a more extensive basis than under GSP 
provisions. 
7619 U.S.C.A.  ' 2411 et.seq.  Section 301 defines various unfair trade practices, now 
including worker rights violations, making a country that trades with the United States liable 
to retaliatory action. 
77Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.A.  '' 2151 et seq. 
7822 U.S.C. ' 1621 (1994). 
79See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.  4426, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., '1621 (a) (1994), codified at 22 
U.S.C. '1621 (a). 
80See General Accounting Office, AAssessment of the Generalized System of Preferences 
Program,@ GAO/GGD-95-9 (November 1994), pp. 99-100. 
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Since passage of the 1984 GSP labor rights amendment, the U.S. State 
Department=s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices refer to ILO 
Convention 87 as the basis of U.S. policy on workers= freedom of association.  The 
reports say, AThe >right of association= has been defined by the International Labor 
Organization to include the right of workers to establish and to join organizations of 
their own choosing@ and Athe right to organize and bargain collectively includes the 
right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and settlement of 
disputes with employers; the right to protection against interference; and the right to 
protection against acts of antiunion discrimination.@81 
                                                 
81See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999 
(February 2000), Appendix B, AReporting on Worker Rights.@ 
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Regarding strikes, the State Department=s human rights policy is that Athe right 
of association includes the right of workers to strike.  While strikes may be 
restricted in essential services (i.e., those services the interruption of which would 
endanger the life, personal safety or health of a significant portion of the 
population) and in the public sector, these restrictions must be offset by adequate 
guarantees to safeguard the interests of the workers concerned.@82  The State 
Department=s formulation of the right to strike reflects the determination by the ILO 
that the right to strike is an essential element of the right to freedom of association. 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United 
States, Canada and Mexico brought with it a labor side agreement, the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).  Freedom of association 
and protection of the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right 
to strike are the first three Alabor principles@ of the NAALC.  This international 
agreement was negotiated at the insistence of the United States government 
following a commitment made during President Clinton=s 1992 electoral 
campaign.83 
The NAALC characterizes the first labor principle as Athe right of workers 
exercised freely and without impediment to establish and join organizations of their 
own choosing to further and defend their interests.@ The agreement formulates the 
right to bargain collectively as Athe protection of the right of organized workers to 
freely engage in collective bargaining on matters concerning the terms and 
conditions of employment.@ It describes the right to strike as Athe protection of the 
right of workers to strike in order to defend their collective interests.@84  With its 
North American trading partners, the United States committed itself to promote the 
                                                 
82Ibid.; see also Hodges-Aeberhard and Odero de Diós, APrinciples of the Committee of 
Association concerning Strikes,@ 126 International Labour Review 544 (1987). 
83See Gov. Bill Clinton, AExpanding Trade and Creating American Jobs,@ Address at North 
Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina (1992). 
84North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Annex 1, Labor Principles 1-3. 
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NAALC labor principles and to Aeffectively enforce its labor law@ to achieve their 
realization.85 
 
* * * * * 
                                                 
85Ibid., Article 2. 
To sum up, an argument that international human rights and labor rights law is 
not relevant to U.S. labor law and practice cannot be sustained.  Basic U.N., ILO 
and regional human rights instruments have forged an international human rights 
consensus on workers= freedom of association that includes the United States.  The 
consensus is strengthened by the accelerating international engagement of the 
United States at the ILO and in regional and multilateral trade fora, where it actively 
supports the cause of internationally recognized workers= rights.  To fulfill both the 
obligations it has assumed and the objectives that it promotes in the international 
community, the United States must live up in its own labor law and practice to 
international labor rights norms on workers= freedom of association and rights to 
organize, to bargain, and to strike. 
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IV.  FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER U.S. LABOR LAW 
 
The U.S. Legal Framework for Workers= Freedom of Association  
 
Constitutional Underpinnings of U.S. Labor Law 
The U.S. Constitution makes no specific mention of the right to organize, to 
bargain collectively, or to strike.  However, the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution (1789) protects freedom of assembly, free speech, and the right to 
petition the government for redress of grievances.  Laws or regulations that violate 
these rights may be struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  The 14th Amendment (1866) and its mandate for "equal protection 
of the law" applies the Bill of Rights to the individual states.  Moreover, each state 
has its own constitution and bill of rights providing equivalent guarantees.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has specifically applied the First Amendment to protect workers= 
organizing, political and legislative action, peaceful picketing and other lawful 
activity.86   
The "commerce clause" in Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution empowers Congress to "regulate commerce among the several states." 
Citing Aburdens and obstructions@ on interstate commerce when employers refuse to 
deal with workers= organization, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the National Labor Relations Act based on the commerce clause.87  The same 
constitutional clause is the basis of federal jurisdiction over most U.S. labor law 
regarding workers= freedom of association, since most commerce is interstate. 
 
Statutory Sources 
Landmark federal legislation in the twentieth century set the framework for 
protection of workers' rights to organize, to bargain and to strike (note that U.S. 
laws often carry the name of their congressional sponsors and are often referred to 
by those names): 
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) established the right of workers in the 
railroad industry to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing.  That law was limited to railway labor because of the central 
importance of rail transportation in the national economy.  In 1964 the RLA was 
                                                 
86See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
87See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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extended to workers and employers in the air transportation sector.  Today, nearly 
one million U.S. rail and air transport workers are covered by the RLA.   
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 outlawed contracts between workers and 
employers in which the worker promised never to join a union.  Such "yellow-dog" 
contracts, as they were called, were a common demand made upon workers by 
employers to prevent exercise of rights to organize and bargain collectively.  The 
Norris-LaGuardia Act also sharply constricted the ability of employers to obtain 
labor injunctions as a strike-breaking measure.  Finally, it relieved workers= leaders 
of personal criminal and civil liability for the acts of individual workers unless the 
leaders participated in or ratified the acts. 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act) of 1935 extended 
to most private sector employees "the right to self-organization, to form, join or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." The NLRA created a new 
concept in American law: the unfair labor practice.  The law defined five unfair 
labor practices, including discrimination against workers for engaging in mutual aid 
or protection and refusal to bargain with workers= freely chosen representatives.  It 
made such practices unlawful. 
The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947 
amended the NLRA, in a number of respects sought by U.S. employers who argued 
that the Wagner Act was too pro-labor.  The LMRA created a new set of unfair 
labor practices under which unions could be held liable.  It established an Aemployer 
free speech@ clause permitting managers to openly and aggressively campaign 
against worker self-organization.  The Taft-Hartley amendments allowed individual 
states to enact "right to work" laws barring voluntary agreements between workers 
and employers to require payment of union dues by all represented employees.  The 
law prohibited "secondary boycotts," where workers involved in a Aprimary@ labor 
dispute seek solidarity action by workers at a supplier or customer of their own 
employer, and instructed the NLRB to seek immediate injunctions against such 
action. 
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-
Griffin Act) of 1959 established a "bill of rights" for individual trade union 
members in internal union affairs, including a right to democratic elections of 
leaders.  The LMRDA set forth detailed financial reporting and disclosure 
requirements for unions.  It also extended prohibitions on secondary action by 
workers. 
Today, the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act are 
the most important federal labor laws governing private sector labor-management 
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relations.  While they are separate statutes, these laws often overlap and refer to one 
another in a complex legislative structure.  For convenience, this bundle of statutes 
is often called Athe NLRA,@ a practice followed in this report.  Other laws such as 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Equal 
Pay Act, the Agricultural Workers Protection Act and so on cover minimum wage, 
hours of work, child labor, workplace safety, nondiscrimination in employment, 
migrant labor conditions and other matters separate from labor-management 
relations. 
 
Labor Law Jurisdiction 
United States labor laws on the right to organize, to bargain collectively and to 
strike fall almost entirely within federal jurisdiction.  Under the commerce clause of 
the U.S. constitution, federal law prevails over state laws on matters of interstate 
commerceCan extremely broad jurisdiction in the complex modern economy.   
U.S. labor laws covering freedom of association mainly are enforced by 
federal government authorities and federal courts.  Occasional state efforts to pass 
legislation on labor relations matters are usually struck down by the courts as pre-
empted by federal law.  The states are allowed a limited legislative or law 
enforcement role where predominantly local interests are at stake. 
 
Basic Labor Law Policy 
Section 1 and Section 7 of the 1935 Wagner Act set forth the central precepts 
of U.S. labor law.   
Section 1 states: AIt is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to 
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce 
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they occur by encouraging the 
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.@ 
Under Section 7 of the NLRA, AEmployees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other mutual aid or 
protection." The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 added to Section 7 the terms "and shall 
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent 
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)." 
An important feature of U.S. labor law is that it protects "concerted activity" 
and "mutual aid or protection." That is, employees do not have to be involved in 
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trade union activity to be protected by the law.  Indeed, they may have no intention 
at all to unionize, but as long as they act in concert their activity is protected under 
the law.88 
 
Exclusions from coverage of the NLRA 
Legal protection for concerted activity, including the right to organize, to 
bargain collectively and to strike, are afforded to "employees" as defined in the law. 
 The definition specifically excludes agricultural workers, domestic workers, 
managers, supervisors, confidential employees and independent contractors from 
coverage.  The exclusion means that employers can discharge these workers with 
impunity for attempting to form and join a union.  Victimized workers have no legal 
recourse (see the discussion in Chapter V., Defenseless Workers: Exclusions in U.S. 
Labor Law.  below).   
 
Unfair labor practices 
The central instrument in U.S. law for protecting workers' rights to organize, 
to bargain collectively, and to strike is the definition of five unfair labor practices in 
Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.  An unfair labor practice violates 
the NLRA and is subject to the remedies provided by the law. 
*Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice to "interfere 
with or coerce" employees engaged in concerted activity.   
*Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes employer "domination" of a labor 
organization an unfair labor practice. 
*Section 8(a)(3) protects the right to organize by defining an unfair labor 
practice of discrimination against workers for protected concerted activities, 
including union activity. 
*Section 8(a)(4) makes it unlawful to retaliate against a worker for filing 
unfair labor practice charges or giving testimony in NLRB proceedings. 
                                                 
88See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962), where the Supreme Court 
ruled that workers who engaged in a spontaneous walkout because their workplace was too 
cold had engaged in a protected concerted activity, even though they were not unionized or 
seeking to unionize. The employer had fired the workers for their concerted activity; the 
court upheld an NLRB reinstatement order. 
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*Section 8(a)(5) defines as an unfair labor practice an employer=s Arefusal to 
bargain@ with a certified collective bargaining representative of employees. 
U.S. labor law is remedial, not punitive.  It does not provide for civil or 
criminal sanctions or penalties in unfair labor practice cases.  An employer that 
commits an unfair labor practice must "cease and desist" from unlawful conduct and 
post a notice in the workplace promising not to repeat the conduct.  Steps must also 
be taken to restore the status quo ante, such as reinstatement and back pay for 
workers discharged for organizing, or a return to the bargaining table in refusal-to-
bargain cases.  In back pay awards for workers, the amount of any interim earnings 
obtained by the worker is deducted from the back pay paid by the employer. 
 
How Workers Form and Join Trade Unions in the United States 
Workers usually take the first steps to exercise freedom of association in the 
workplace with informal meetings among themselves.  In small groups at lunch or 
during breaks, or at a nearby restaurant or coworker=s home, they discuss wages, 
benefits, safety conditions, treatment by management and other problems at their 
workplace.  They might react to a policy move by managementCa change in benefit 
plans, for example, or a new incentive pay system.  They often compare their 
employment conditions to other work experience they have had, or to what they 
know about unionized workplaces in the same community. 
 
Enter a Union 
Sometimes workers= discussions remain gripe sessions, and nothing more 
happens.  But sometimes workers call a local union office for help.89  A union staff 
                                                 
89Sometimes the selection of which union to call is completely haphazard, depending on 
nothing more than seeing a union=s name in the newspaper, or the location of the nearest 
union office, knowing the largest union in the community, or having a friend who belongs to 
a union and calling that union. There is no requirement in the United States, as there is in 
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organizerCan employee of a union whose job is to help workers form new 
unionsCnormally arranges a series of meetings with workers.  Like the workers= 
own initial meetings, these are usually in small groups starting at a worker=s home 
or at a nearby restaurant.   
                                                                                                             
many other countries, that only a union for a particular industry may organize workers in that 
industry. So, for example, some nurses have joined the steelworkers union. Some insurance 
company clerks have joined the autoworkers union. What unions call Ajurisdiction@ is 
jumbled, and unions often compete to represent the same group of workers. One of the main 
activities of the AFL-CIO, the federation of some seventy national unions,  is to set rules and 
regulations for resolving unions= jurisdictional disputes so that they do not squander 
resources in internecine battles when 85 percent of U.S. workers are not represented by 
unions. 
As the circle of interested workers grows wider, meetings start to be held in 
larger union halls or rented meeting space.  Workers tell organizers about 
conditions in the workplace.  Organizers tell workers how the union operates and 
what the union has achieved in other locations.  If the organizing effort takes root, 
the most active workers form an organizing committee to advocate openly for the 
union inside the workplace. 
The union organizer distributes cards for workers to sign indicating their 
desire to join the union and have the union represent them in collective bargaining 
with the employer.  These authorization cards can be signed at any time, beginning 
with the first workers involved in the organizing, then by more workers as the 
organizing effort proceeds.  Alternatively, some unions prefer to have employees 
active in the organizing committee distribute cards and obtain signatures from 
coworkers in a shorter period after the committee takes shape and the organizing 
effort is out in the open.  Under legal rules, workers usually can hand out cards and 
other literature in non-work areas on non-work time, typically in a break or lunch 
room. 
 
Moving to an Election 
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Once cards are signed by at least 30 percent of the workers in the Abargaining 
unit@90  they seek to form, workers can petition the nearest regional office of the 
NLRB to hold a secret-ballot election.  If a majority votes for representation, the 
NLRB will certify the results, creating a legal obligation for the employer to bargain 
with the workers= chosen representative.  Normally, workers wait until a 
supermajorityCtwo-thirds is a common rule of thumbChave signed cards before 
they petition for an election.  Union organizers have learned from experience that 
the percentage of favorable votes in an election usually falls from the percentage 
that signed cards.  They want to enter the election campaign phase with a margin of 
security, hoping to retain a majority when the election is held.91   
 
The Election Campaign 
                                                 
90The concept of a defined Abargaining unit@ is critical for understanding and applying U.S. 
labor law.  Under the law, a group of workers seeking to form a union must have sufficient 
Acommunity of interest@ to bargain as a single group with the employer of their group.  
Litigation over bargaining unit definition (should a janitor be in the same unit with a skilled 
computer programmer, for example) and the employer-employee relationship (can Aleased@ 
employees from a temporary agency bargain with the employer at the place where they work) 
is often complex and causes serious delays in the exercise of freedom of association for 
workers in the United States. 
91Trade unionists attribute the dropoff in union support to employers= campaigns of fear and 
intimidation. Employers call workers= change in sentiment a sincere reversal after hearing 
management=s side in the campaign. 
Most NLRB elections take place four to eight weeks after workers file their 
petition.  About 20 percent of elections are held more than eight weeks later, often 
when the employer contests the makeup of the bargaining unit sought by the 
unionCfor example, arguing that workers included in the union=s petition are 
supervisors who should be excluded. 
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The NLRB calls the weeks between a petition and an election the Acritical 
period@ because an employer cannot claim no knowledge of a union organizing 
effort during this time.  Such lack of knowledge is often used as a defense against an 
unfair labor practice charge when management dismisses a union supporter before a 
petition is filed.92 
The pre-election period is usually marked by vigorous campaigning on all 
sides.  Union supporters hold rallies, wear buttons and T-shirts with a pro-union 
message, and distribute pro-union flyers to coworkers.  Management often engages 
consultants who specialize in designing and implementing forceful campaigns 
against workers= efforts to form and join a union.  They write scripts for employers= 
letters to workers= homes, flyers distributed in the workplace, and speeches to 
workers in Acaptive-audience meetings@ that are a staple of employers= campaigns 
against workers= attempts to form and join a union.93  Such meetings are called 
Acaptive@ because attendance is mandatory for workers, and workers can be 
prohibited from asking any questions or making any comments under pain of 
discipline, including discharge.  In addition, consultants typically train supervisors 
to present management=s anti-union views in smaller individual and group meetings 
with the workers under each supervisor. 
It is common for some workers within the group being organized to oppose 
forming and joining a union.  They often form a AVote No@ committee and join 
managers and supervisors in campaigning against the union.  It is illegal for 
employers to instigate or assist such a committee.  Intensive discussions and 
arguments are common in the workplace during the pre-election period.  After 
                                                 
92Litigating employer Aknowledge@ of a worker=s union activity is often difficult. Some 
unions take the step of sending the employer a letter early in the organizing effort, before a 
petition is filed, identifying organizing committee members so that the employer cannot 
claim lack of knowledge if a worker on the list suffers reprisals. 
93Captive-audience meetings are meetings held by management at the workplace on work 
time to inveigh against union formation and collective bargaining. Speeches, videos, movies, 
overhead projector presentations, role-playing, and even skits using professional actors are 
some of the features of management=s captive-audience meetings. 
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several weeks, the final days before the election usually reach a high pitch of 
tension, often with accusations of lies and dirty tricks. 
NLRB agents conduct a secret-ballot election, usually in the workplace at 
times and places allowing all workers to vote during work time.  When balloting 
ends, the NLRB agents count the votes immediately in the presence of company and 
union observers. 
The NLRB conducts more than 3,000 elections each year at companies where 
workers seek to form and join a trade union for the first time.  A few hundred other 
elections involve decertifications, where workers seek to get rid of a union; 
elections between competing unions; and unit Aclarification@ elections.  Nearly two-
thirds of elections are held in workplaces with fewer than fifty employees.   
For many years now, workers have chosen union representation in 
approximately half of all NLRB elections.  Aggregate vote totals in all elections 
also divide in roughly equal proportion.94 
 
After an Election 
Either party may file objections to the election claiming unfair tactics by the 
other side.  The NLRB will investigate these allegations and hold a hearing if 
necessary.  This Aobjections@ case hearing is usually less formal than an Aunfair 
labor practice@ case hearing, which is more like a full-scale trial before a judge.  
Based on the results of an objections case hearing, the NLRB can certify the results 
of the election or order a new election. 
 
Moving Toward Bargaining 
If the NLRB finds that the election was fairly conducted and certifies that a 
majority of workers chose collective bargaining, the employer is obligated under the 
law to bargain in good faith with the workers= chosen representative.  However, the 
employer can legally defy the NLRB=s order by engaging in what is called a 
Atechnical refusal to bargain.@ Using this tactic, the employer refuses the union=s 
bargaining request and forces it to file a new unfair labor practice charge with the 
NLRB.  The NLRB=s General Counsel must then initiate an unfair labor practice 
case based on the employer=s refusal to bargain, and seek support for the NLRB 
ruling from a federal appeals court.  Years of litigation can follow. 
 
                                                 
94In 1998, a majority of workers chose union representation in 48 percent of Aselect-or- reject 
bargaining rights@ elections conducted by the NLRB. See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, p.13. 
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Collective Bargaining 
The NLRA makes refusal to bargain in good faith an unfair labor practice, and 
the good-faith bargaining obligation applies to both parties.95  In 1998, workers 
charged employers with refusal to bargain in good faith in 7,187 cases, while 
employers charged unions with such refusals in 172 cases.96 
The law requires meeting at reasonable intervals and exchanging proposals on 
Amandatory subjects of bargaining@Cissues of wages, hours and working conditions 
affecting represented employees.  The Agood faith@ bargaining obligation has been 
defined as Aan obligation . . . to participate actively in the deliberations so as to 
indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement 
 . . . a sincere desire to reach an agreement.@97  To bargain in good faith, Aa sincere 
 effort must be made to reach a common ground.@98 
But there are no objective measures of intentions or sincerity.  Good-faith 
bargaining does not require either party to agree to a proposal from the other.99  
Advised by skilled counsel, some employers go through the motions of good-faith 
bargaining to avoid a finding by the NLRB or the courts of bad-faith bargaining or 
Asurface bargaining,@ defined as the Adesire not to reach an agreement.@100  A typical 
maneuver is to make a Akiller proposal@ that the employer knows the union could 
never agree to, while showing flexibility on other issues.  Even if found guilty of 
bad-faith bargaining, the only remedy the employer faces is an order to return to the 
bargaining table, where the cycle can simply repeat itself.101 
                                                 
95NLRA Section 8(a)(5); 8(b)(3). 
96See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, Table 2, p. 130. 
97See NLRB v.  Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.  1943). 
98Ibid. 
99See section 8(d) of the NLRA. 
100See NLRB v.  Reed & Prince Mfg.  Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.  1953), cert.  denied, 346 
U.S. 887 (1953). 
101The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRB has no power to remedy an employer=s 
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AImpasse@ in Bargaining and Unilateral Implementation 
Collective bargaining can end with an agreement.  It can also end with each 
party making final offers without coming to an agreement.  When such an Aimpasse@ 
is reached, the employer is allowed to Apost conditions.@ That is, the employer can 
unilaterally implement its final offer unless the parties agreed earlier to extend prior 
terms and conditions indefinitely (an increasingly rare contract term).  Workers 
must then live with the imposed terms or strike to obtain their own proposal or a 
compromise that might result from a strike. 
                                                                                                             
refusal, made in bad faith for the sole purpose of avoiding an agreement, to accept or even to 
bargain over a proposal from workers other than to order the employer to resume bargaining. 
See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 90 (1970). 
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The impasse doctrine is not contained in the NLRA.  It was elaborated by the 
courts, first by implication in a case where the Supreme Court ruled that unilateral 
changes prior to impasse are unlawful.102  The court said that Aeven after an impasse 
is reached he [the employer] has no license to grant wages increases greater than 
any he has ever offered the union at the bargaining table.@103  This has been taken to 
mean that the employer may implement his last offer to the union upon impasse, and 
this is now the rule in U.S. labor law.104   
 
Strikes and Lockouts 
Whether or not impasse has been reached in bargaining, workers can strike or 
employers can Alock out@ workers in a test of economic strength to achieve their 
bargaining goals, unless a no-strike/no-lockout clause in a prior contract is still in 
effect.  Workers can withhold their labor and set up picket lines at the workplace, 
but they cannot prevent the employer from continuing operations. 
Employers have many options for continuing operations during a strike.  In 
many workplaces managers and supervisors can maintain activity.  As long as 
employers do not use threats to coerce them or promises to entice them, they are 
legally permitted to try to persuade workers not to join strikes or to Across over@ 
picket lines and return to work, which trade unionists call Ascabbing.@ 
Employers may subcontract operations to other employers during a strike.  
They can recover lost income from a mutual aid fund among employers, just as 
workers depend on a union strike fund for assistance.  Even during a strike, 
employers and unions can agree, as many do, to have striking workers maintain 
certain equipment or functions to prevent safety hazards or to assure a rapid 
resumption of operations when the strike ends.  Absent such an agreement, an 
employer may use contractors to this end. 
 
Striker Replacements 
                                                 
102See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
103Ibid., at 745. 
104For a thorough discussion, see Ellen J. Dannin, ALegislative Intent and Impasse Resolution 
under the National Labor Relations Act: Does Law Matter?@, 15 Hofstra Labor and 
Employment Law Journal 11 (Fall 1997). 
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Most important, employers may hire replacements for striking workers.  These 
can be temporary replacements who leave the worksite when the strike ends.  But 
management may also hire permanent replacements, leaving workers who exercise 
the right to strike jobless, able to be recalled to work only when a job is vacated by 
a replacement worker.  Replacement workers, too, are called Ascabs@ by workers 
loyal to the strike.  After one year, an NLRB election to decertify the union can be 
held, with strikers not eligible to participate in the vote.105 
 
How the National Labor Relations Board Works 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the main U.S. law meant to 
protect workers' rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike under U.S.  
law.106  The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the main government 
agency that enforces those rights.  But these are not the only laws and agencies that 
cover workers' freedom of association.  The Railway Labor Act and the National 
Mediation Board (NMB) play parallel roles for workers in the railroad and airline 
industries.  A Federal Labor Relations Act and Federal Labor Relations Board 
cover federal government employees= organizing and bargaining rights. 
In states that allow public employees to form unions and bargain collectively, 
various labor relations laws and boards regulate organizing and collective 
bargaining by state, county and municipal employees.  States also have "little 
NLRBs" for private sector workers in extremely small enterprises that fall short of 
the NLRB's jurisdictional requirements.  The NLRB requires that the employer have 
                                                 
105Se below, Chapter V., Coloradao Steelworker, the Right to Strike, and Permanent 
Replacements in U.S. Labor Law, for treatment of the permanent replacement doctrine. 
106Unless otherwise noted, reference to AU.S. labor law@ or AU.S. labor law and practice@ in 
this report involves the NLRA and related NLRB and federal court decisions and doctrine 
dealing with freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, 
and the right to strike. Where laws or legal matters related to other worker issues like wages, 
hours or working conditions are discussed, those laws or matters will be separately 
identified. 
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annual gross revenues of $250,000 including $50,000 in interstate commerce to 
come under its jurisdiction. 
While millions of private sector workers (agricultural workers, supervisors, 
managers and others) are excluded from coverage by the NLRB, a substantial 
majority of private sector workers in the United States do come under the board=s 
jurisdiction.107  Its operations come up repeatedly in this study, making a "primer" 
on NLRB procedures an important reference.  Knowing how the NLRB works is 
especially needed for understanding how, despite an enforcement staff committed to 
the purposes of the law and a successful record conducting elections and 
prosecuting unfair labor practice cases, legal entanglements in the board and the 
courts often frustrate workers' freedom of association rights.108 
The NLRB has three independent branches: the five-member board in 
Washington, D.C.; a general counsel also based at NLRB headquarters, and a 
division of administrative law judges.  A network of thirty-three regional offices 
carries out NLRB tasks around the country. 
 
Structure and Functions of the Board 
The five-member NLRB is appointed by the president to individual five-year 
terms, subject to Senate confirmation.  A board member=s term is fixed regardless of 
any change in the presidency, so members remain in office when administrations 
change.  It usually takes some time before a new president puts his or her Astamp@ 
on the NLRB so that it comes to be known, for example, as Athe Eisenhower board,@ 
(1952-1960) or the AReagan board@ (1980-1988) or the recent AClinton board@ 
(1992-2000). 
By tradition, no more than three board members can belong to the same 
political party.  Appointments often give rise to controversy, since nominees of 
necessity must be experienced labor law scholars or practitioners and thus have a 
record of writing or advocacy that can be identified as pro-labor or pro-
management.109  Appointments often come in balanced Apackages@ with relatively 
                                                 
107Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics= Current Population Surveys, Human Rights Watch 
estimates that half of all workers in the United States come under NLRB jurisdiction. The 
rest are public employees, railway and airline employees, self-employed individuals, 
microenterprise workers (presumably under state Alittle NLRA A laws) and workers excluded 
from NLRB coverage including independent contractors, domestic workers, managers, and 
supervisors. 
108A comprehensive history of the NLRB is found in James A. Gross, Broken Promise: The 
Subversion of U.S. Labor Relations Policy, 1947-1994 (Philadelphia, Temple University 
Press 1995). 
109The famous labor song AWhich Side Are You On?@ contains the line AThere are no 
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moderate candidates identified as having a labor background or a management 
background.  Such balanced appointments usually satisfy Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress and the administration in the White House.   
                                                                                                             
neutrals there.@ In general, labor law professionals cast their scholarship or their working lot 
with unions or with management early in their careers and remain on one side of the line. As 
this report demonstrates, labor-management relations are highly contentious, and finding a 
middle ground on matters of policy or on appointments to the NLRB is more often a process 
of hard bargaining and painful compromise, not easy consensus. 
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Labor and management partisans often attack as biased an NLRB closely 
linked to an administration they are otherwise unhappy with.  Trade unions vilified 
the Reagan board of the 1980s, and management forces have attacked the Clinton 
board of the 1990s.110  In general, though, while Democratic or Republican majority 
boards might lean one way or another, the NLRB carries out its mandate within a 
centrist range established by the law.  Charges of bias are unwarranted.  However, 
this report demonstrates that the range is established between legal margins that 
often frustrate workers= rights under international human rights standards. 
The NLRB has two main functions.  First, it oversees the representation 
election process by which workers in a bargaining unit choose whether to bargain 
collectively with their employer.  The board conducts a secret-ballot election and 
certifies whether a majority has favored union representation.  If so, the employer is 
obligated to bargain in good faith with the workers' chosen representative.  Upon 
filing of Aobjections to the election@ by a losing party, the board also decides 
whether election campaign behavior has tainted election results.  If so, the board 
orders a re-run election. 
Second, the board serves as an appeal panel that reviews written decisions by 
administrative law judges in cases involving unfair labor practices.  The most 
common unfair labor practices are discriminatory reprisals against workers 
attempting to form and join trade unions (usually firings), and refusal to bargain in 
good faith with workers' chosen representatives.  Unfair labor practices are legally 
and procedurally distinct from the election process and from Aobjections@ to election 
conduct decided by the board in administrative proceedings.  Performing its appeal 
function in unfair labor practice cases, the board is more like a court of appeals than 
an administrative agency. 
 
The General Counsel 
                                                 
110See, for example, AThe NLRB: An Agency In Crisis,@ Prepared Statement by Daniel V. 
Yager, Vice President and General Counsel, Labor Policy Association, before the Senate 
Labor and Human Resources Committee, September 17, 1996, on file with Human Rights 
Watch (arguing that the NLRB under President Clinton Ahas abandoned the neutrality and 
impartiality essential to the administration of a law intended to create a level playing field for 
management and labor@). 
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The general counsel of the NLRB is independent of the five-member board.  
The general counsel has an extremely powerful role in the structure of the agency, 
because he or she has the sole authority to issue a complaint in an unfair labor 
practice case.  There is no appeal to the NLRB or to the courts if the general 
counsel does not issue a complaint. 
Acting through the directors and staff in regional offices, the general counsel 
conducts investigations of unfair labor practice "charges" filed by workers, unions 
or employers.  Key steps in the investigation include interviewing and taking 
statements from workers, employers, and others involved in a case and evaluating 
the evidence gathered.  Employers are informed of any charges and have the 
opportunity to meet privately with board investigators and to present written 
arguments contesting a charge.  Following the investigation a rigorous evaluation of 
the evidence is conducted by a team of experienced NLRB attorneys acting on the 
general counsel=s behalf.  Complex or novel issues can be referred to the general 
counsel=s office for advice.   
The median time lapse to conclude an investigation and evaluation of an unfair 
labor practice charge is nearly three months.111  If the general counsel finds Amerit@ 
in the charge that an unfair labor practice occurred, a "complaint" is issued 
specifying the violations in detail and setting a date for hearing before an 
administrative law judge.  If the hearing takes place (many cases are settled after the 
issuance of a complaint and before hearing), the general counsel acts as prosecutor 
at no cost to the party who filed the charge.  The general counsel is representing the 
public interest and advancing the public policy of the United States, which outlaws 
actions defined in the NLRA as unfair labor practices. 
 
Regional Offices and Regional Directors 
Obviously, the five-person board or the single general counsel does not 
conduct every election or prosecute every unfair labor practice.  The NLRB has 
thirty-three regional offices to handle cases around the country, each with a staff of 
attorneys and agents headed by a regional director.  Depending on the nature of the 
case, the regional director and staff handle "R" cases (representation elections) or 
"C" cases (unfair labor practice charges).   
In all proceedings, regional staff and regional directors strive to achieve 
voluntary settlements of cases without going to hearings.  Parties can submit 
position papers to the regional staff and informally argue their positions with the 
regional director.  The general counsel finds Amerit@ in 35-40 percent of the unfair 
                                                 
111See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, Table 23, p. 187. 
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labor practice charges filed with the board.112  As in any litigation system, most of 
these cases are settled.  Of cases where complaints are issued, about 15 percent 
reach the stage of a completed hearing before an administrative law judge.   
                                                 
112In 1988-1998, the Amerit factor@ (cases where the investigation determined that an unfair 
labor practice occurred) ranged from 35 percent (1994) to 39.6 percent (1996). The merit 
factor in 1998 was 36.3 percent. See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, Chart 5, p. 9. 
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In some 90 percent of cases where the general counsel found merit in the 
charge, relief is obtainedCmost often back pay for a worker who suffered 
discriminatory reprisals.  In 1998 nearly 24,000 workers received back pay from 
employers because of discrimination for union activity.  Of these, almost 18,000 
received back pay under an informal settlement of their unfair labor practice case, 
while some 6,000 received back pay under an order by an administrative law judge, 
the NLRB, or a federal court.113  Total back pay paid to victimized workers in 1998 
was nearly $90 million.114   
While superficially these totals can appear to indicate an enforcement system 
that is working, other problems discussed in this report such as delays in 
reinstatement and the fact that very few workers awarded reinstatement actually 
return to work have a chilling effect on workers= exercise of the right to organize.  
Failure to swiftly remedy violations by the most determined anti-union employers 
signals to other employers that they can get away with similar conduct.  The 
dramatic rise in the frequency of discrimination against workers who try to organize 
(a four-fold increase since the 1960s) demonstrates that the labor law system has a 
rapidly diminishing deterrent effect on workers= rights violations. 
 
Administrative Law Judges 
Administrative law judges are independent of the board and of the general 
counsel.  A corps of experienced labor law experts, the approximately seventy-five 
NLRB judges preside over unfair labor practice hearings in much the same way that 
civil and criminal court judges preside over non-jury trials (there are no juries in 
NLRB proceedings).  The judges manage proceedings to give parties full 
opportunity to prosecute and defend while avoiding repetition and unnecessary 
prolonging of a hearing.  Applying rules of evidence, they decide on the 
admissibility of evidence and objections by counsel in the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses.  They also evaluate the credibility of witnesses.   
This last power is significant since most unfair labor practice hearings involve 
conflicting accounts of what happened.  In the most common cases involving the 
firing of worker activists, workers chargeCand the general counsel supports the 
charge in a complaintCthat they were discharged because of organizing activity 
while the employer claims that the worker was fired for another reason unrelated to 
such activity.  As a general principle, the NLRB or the courts do not overrule an 
                                                 
113See Ibid., Table 4, p. 137. 
114Ibid., Chart 9, p.13. 
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administrative law judge=s Acredibility@ findings because the findings rest on 
witnesses= demeanor at the hearing, something the reviewer of a written record 
cannot see. 
The median time lapse between the issuance of a complaint and a hearing 
before an administrative law judge is six months.115  Depending on the complexity 
of the case the hearing can last several months.  After a hearing ends, the judge 
reviews the evidence, the transcript of witnesses' testimony, and written briefs by 
the parties, and issues a written decision with findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on whether unfair labor practices occurred.  As noted above, the findings of fact 
often depend on the judge's determinations on witnesses' credibility, since much 
testimony involves disputes about who said what or did what to whom.  The median 
time between the close of the hearing and the judge=s decision is four to five 
months.116 
 
Appeal to the NLRB 
A party aggrieved by an administrative law judge's decision can appeal it to 
the NLRB in Washington.  The board reviews the evidence, the transcript, and the 
judge's written decision and opts to uphold it, reverse it, or modify it.  The NLRB's 
own written decision can adopt the judge's ruling without comment or offer the 
board's separate reasoning based on its reading of the case record.  The median time 
for the NLRB=s decision is ten months.  In complex or controversial cases the board 
often takes two or three years to issue its decision.117 
 
Appeal to the Federal Courts 
The NLRB's decision can be appealed to a U.S. federal circuit court of appeals 
in one of twelve geographically distinct parts of the country.  Each circuit is 
composed of several states except the District of Columbia Circuit, which handles 
many NLRB appeal cases.  Most appeals are decided by three-judge panels. 
                                                 
115See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, Table 23, p. 187. 
116Ibid. 
117Ibid. 
In the same way that the board reviewed the administrative law judge's 
decision, the court panel reviews the board's decision along with the hearing record 
and the judge's decision.  While there is a general policy of deference to the 
administrative expertise of the NLRB, appeals courts sometimes make their own 
Freedom of Association under U.S. Labor Law 87  
 
 
judgment on the merits of a case.  Some circuit courts are more deferential to the 
NLRB, while others are more prone to discount the board's reasoning in a case.  
Subsequently, if the board disagrees with the holding of a circuit court's decision, it 
will apply that holding only in similar cases arising in the states within that circuit 
and not in the rest of the country.  As a result, there are some conflicting 
applications of labor law in different parts of the country despite a general policy of 
uniformity under federal law. 
Only a small percentage of unfair labor practice cases reach the stage of a trial 
and decision before an administrative law judge or go farther, to appeal stages 
before the NLRB or federal courts.  But even these relatively few cases affect many 
workers.  In all, administrative law judges completed 779 initial unfair labor 
practice hearings in 1998.118  Also in 1998, 873 cases from earlier years were 
resolved in appeal stages that follow the administrative law judge=s hearing, either 
by the NLRB or by federal circuit courts of appeals.119  While unfair labor practice 
cases are not broken down by size of the employee groups involved, using as a 
proxy the average size of workplaces where NLRB elections were held (workplaces 
that most likely give rise to unfair labor practice cases)Csixty-six employees120Cit 
can be estimated that more than 100,000 workers in the United States were affected 
directly or indirectly by unfair labor practices cases that reached the stage of an 
administrative law judge hearing or beyond in 1998 alone. 
 
Rulemaking and Adjudication 
Unlike many federal agencies, the NLRB does not issue rules in the form of 
written regulations to supplement the basic content of labor laws governing labor-
management relations.  Instead, the board acts through adjudication of individual 
cases to set precedents for similar situations. 
Case-by-case NLRB decisions, as upheld or modified by the courts, create a 
"common law" for organizing, collective bargaining, and the right to strike in the 
United States.  Depending on an infinite variety of facts and circumstances in any 
situation, the same conductCfor example, a speech by a plant manager to workers in 
a captive-audience meeting, or the content of a leaflet issued by a unionCmight be 
lawful or unlawful.  A high level of expertise in "board law" is needed by advocates 
                                                 
118Ibid., Table 3A, p. 132. 
119Ibid. 
120Ibid., p. 12. 
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advising workers and employers about how to behave in union organizing 
campaigns, by regional directors deciding what makes up an appropriate bargaining 
unit or whether to issue a complaint in an unfair labor practice case, and by 
administrative law judges deciding cases. 
 
Remedies 
A common expression of U.S. labor law says that the NLRA is remedial, not 
punitive.  The NLRB cannot penalize an employer for breaking the law.  It can only 
order a Amake-whole@ remedy restoring the status quo ante as the remedy for unfair 
labor practices.  The non-punitive character of U.S. labor law was established soon 
after adoption of the Wagner Act.  In the Consolidated Edison case, the Supreme 
Court decided that punitive measures were not authorized by the NLRA.121  In the 
Republic Steel case, the court overturned a board order to the employer to 
reimburse the Works Project Administration, a federal jobs program, for the amount 
of wages subtracted from a back-pay remedy for workers who had been employed 
by the WPA while they were unlawfully discharged for union activity.  The board=s 
decision reasoned that the employer should not reap the benefit of the employees= 
interim earnings from public works employment.  The court held that A[t]he Act is 
essentially remedial . . . The Act does not prescribe penalties or fines in vindication 
of public rights.@122  Several commentators have observed that in neither case did 
the Supreme Court cite any statutory language or legislative history to support the 
distinction between remedial and punitive measures.123   
Not only are there no punitive measures for workers= rights violations.  
Employers can ignore orders by administrative law judges or by the NLRB and 
force the board to seek enforcement by a federal appeals court, adding years to the 
enforcement of its rulings.  The NLRB has no enforcement authority of its own. 
The standard remedy for an unfair labor practice is to have the employer post 
a notice at the workplace promising not to repeat the unlawful conduct.  
Discriminatory discharge cases are the most common category of charges filed with 
the NLRB.  Here the standard remedy includes an order to reinstate victimized 
workers with back pay.  However, any interim earnings fired workers received 
during the period of discharge are subtracted from the employer=s back-pay liability. 
  
                                                 
121Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). 
122Republic Steel Corp. v.  NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940). 
123See, for example, Jeffery A. Smisek, ANew Remedies for Discriminatory Discharges of 
Union Adherents During Organizing Campaigns, 5 Industrial Relations Law Journal 564 
(1983). 
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In practice, many discriminatory discharge cases are settled with a small back-
pay payment and workers= agreement not to return to the workplace.  At a modest 
cost and with whatever minor embarrassment comes with posting a notice, the 
employer is rid of the most active union supporters, and the organizing campaign is 
stymied. 
In the other most common unfair labor practice cases involving charges that 
employers refused to bargain in good faith with the workers= chosen 
representative,124  the remedy is an order to post a notice acknowledging the 
conduct and to return to the bargaining table and bargain in good faith.  There is no 
further remedy, so the same cycle can repeat itself indefinitely without an agreement 
being reached. 
 
10(j) Injunctions 
In unfair labor practice cases where the severity of an employer=s unlawful 
conduct makes standard remedies inappropriate, the NLRB is empowered under 
Section 10(j) of the NLRA to seek a federal court injunction to halt the unlawful 
conduct.  For example, a 10(j) injunction may be sought to obtain immediate 
reinstatement of workers fired for union activity.  However, this power is rarely 
invoked.  In 1998 the NLRB sought injunctions in only forty-five cases, and some 
of these included mandatory injunctions against unions to halt secondary boycott 
actions.125 
 
                                                 
124In 1998, 8,734 unfair labor practice charges were filed against employers alleging 
discrimination against workers exercising the right to freedom of association.  Refusal to 
bargain allegations gave rise to 7,187 charges.  Separately, a combination of discrimination 
and refusal to bargain were alleged in 2,113 charges.  Together, these charges accounted for 
more than 75 percent of the total number of unfair labor practice charges against employers.  
In comparison, 38 discrimination charges, 172 refusal-to-bargain charges, and 2 combined 
charges were filed against unions.  See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, Table 2, p. 130. 
125See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, p. 19. The report does not break down the nature of 
injunction proceedings and what type of unfair labor practices they entail. 
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Non-Self-enforcement 
Final orders of the NLRB are not self-enforcing.  That is, the board must 
obtain a federal court order to enforce its decisions.  In many cases, this adds 
months or years to the resolution of a case, leaving workers with no effective 
remedy while the case winds its way through the court system.  Even when workers 
prevail at every stage of the NLRB process, no final remedy takes place until a 
court orders it.  By that time, the remedy is often impotent. 
 
Delays 
The problem of delays is endemic in U.S. labor law practice.  Using NLRB 
data on median time lapses for reaching various stages of legal proceedings in 
unfair labor practice cases that are deemed meritorious (as distinct from the 60-65 
percent of cases that are not found to have merit, which are quickly disposed of), it 
takes nearly three months for an investigation to be wrapped up and a complaint to 
be issued.  It then takes six months to finish a trial before an administrative law 
judge.  Five more months go by before the judge issues his or her decision in the 
case.  If that decision is appealed to the NLRB, it takes ten more months for the 
board to issue a ruling.126  By now two years have passed, and appeals can then be 
made to federal courts, where further delays of up to three years can be expected. 
These are median time lapses.  That is, half of all meritorious cases take longer 
than the time frames just noted.  In general, these longer cases involve more 
complex disputes involving multiple unfair labor practices by employers that the 
NLRB found to be intent on preventing workers= organizing or preventing a contract 
being reachedCexactly those cases with the most serious consequences for workers= 
freedom of association.   
Over time, the slow unfolding of the legal mechanisms and the availability of 
appeal after appeal make workers= organizing efforts suffer from employee turnover 
and frustration and discouragement among workers who stay.  Such sentiments were 
expressed by many workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch for this report.  
The result is a frequent denial of workers= fundamental rights. 
                                                 
126Ibid., Table 23, p. 187. 
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V.  CASE STUDIES OF VIOLATIONS OFWORKERS= 
 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
Context: The Increase in Workers= Rights Violations under U.S. Law 
By the 1990s . . . one of every eighteen employees involved in union election 
campaigns was subjected to discharge or other discrimination to discourage union 
representation. 
CResearcher Charles Morris, based on NLRB records for 1992-1997 
 
The cases described in this section were selected for diversity of sectors, areas 
of the country, and kinds of workers.  The cases were not selected because they are 
exceptional.  According to Prof. Theodore St. Antoine, former dean of the 
University of Michigan School of Law and president of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators, the nation=s leading organization of labor-management neutrals, A[t]he 
intensity of opposition to unionization which is exhibited by American employers 
has no parallel in the western industrial world.@127   
Workers= rights violations in the United States are widespread and growing.  
The NLRB used to devote most of its work to running elections for workers to 
choose or reject representation.  Now the bulk of the agency=s work involves unfair 
labor practices, most having to do with employers= violations of workers= rights.128  
 The accelerating pace of violations is not a new phenomenon.  Myriad studies 
document the rising volume of workers= rights violations.  Congressional hearings 
                                                 
127See Theodore St. Antoine, AFederal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half 
Century@ (hereafter Federal Regulation), 61 Chicago Kent Law Review 631 (1985), 639. 
128See NLRB 1998 Annual Report, Chart 15, p. 20, showing that less than 40 
percent of its caseload in 1948 involved unfair labor practices, compared to more 
than 80 percent in 1998. The report, at p. 6, states that 80 percent of unfair labor 
practice cases involve charges against employers. 
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and reports in the 1970s revealed extensive employer violations and ineffective 
enforcement of laws supposed to protect workers= rights.  These revelations led to a 
significant movement for labor law reform in 1977-78.  Despite passing the House 
of Representatives and gaining majority Senate support, the reform legislation 
failed, halted by a minority filibuster in the Senate. 
More hearings, reports, and studies in the 1980s confirmed that violations of 
workers= freedom of association and rights to organize and bargain collectively were 
becoming more acute.129  While the numbers of workers fired for exercising these 
rights during the 1950s was measured in hundreds each year, by the 1980s 
thousands suffered such discrimination annually.   
Reviewing NLRB records, Prof. Paul Weiler at Harvard Law School found 
that unfair labor practice charges against employers increased by 750 percent 
between 1957 and 1980, while the number of NLRB elections (a measure of 
workers= organizing activity) increased by less than 50 percent.130 
Research in the 1990s continued examining workers= right violations in light 
of domestic legal principles and the original intent of the NLRA.  In 1994 a report 
by Prof. Richard Hurd of Cornell University documented one hundred recent cases 
of flagrant workers= rights violations by employers and the failure of U.S. labor law 
enforcement authorities to remedy the violations.  Hurd concluded that Athe right to 
an independent voice for workers has become a mirage.@131 
The Hurd report was prepared for a presidential commission on worker-
management relations chaired by John Dunlop, the dean of American industrial 
relations scholars and a former secretary of labor.  The Dunlop Commission issued 
its broad study in 1994, reporting these findings:132 
 
                                                 
129See Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., AReport on Pressures in Today=s Workplace@ 
(1980); Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, 98th Congress, AThe Failure of Labor Law: A Betrayal of American 
Workers@ (1984); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor-Management Relations, 
Report No. 134, AU.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation@ 
(1989). 
130See Paul Weiler, APromises to Keep: Securing Workers= Right to Self-Organization Under 
the NLRA,@ 96 Harvard Law Review 1769 (1983), 1779-80. 
131See Richard W.  Hurd, AAssault on Workers= Rights,@ a report for the Dunlop Commission 
(1994), p. iv.   
132See U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Commission on the Future 
of Worker-Management Relations (hereafter Dunlop Commission), Fact Finding Report 
(May 1994). 
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C The stagnation of real earnings and increased inequality of earnings is 
bifurcating the U.S. labor marker, with an upper tier of high-wage skilled 
workers and an increasing Aunderclass@ of low-paid labor. 
 
C The decline in collective bargaining in the private sector has created an arena 
for employee-management relations in which most employees have no 
independent organization to discuss issues with management. 
 
C Adjusted for the number of certification elections and union voters, the 
incidence of unlawful firing of workers exercising the right to organize 
increased from one in every twenty elections adversely affecting one in 700 
union supporters [in the early 1950s] to one in every four elections victimizing 
one in fifty union supporters [by the late 1980s]. 
 
C Most unlawfully fired workers do not take advantage of their right to 
reinstatement on the job, and most who are reinstated are gone within a year. 
 
C In a national poll, 59 percent of workers said it was likely they would lose 
favor with their employer if they supported an organizing drive.  And 79 
percent agreed that it was Avery@ or Asomewhat@ likely that Anonunion workers 
will get fired if they try to organize a union.@ Among employed nonunion 
respondents, 41 percent believed that Ait is likely that I will lose my job if I 
tried to form a union.@ 
 
A 1997 study by the Secretariat of the North American Commission for Labor 
Cooperation under NAFTA=s labor side accord reported that employers threaten to 
close the workplace in half of the organizing campaigns undertaken by workers in 
the United States, but rarely in Canada or Mexico.  Such threats are used even more 
intensively in U.S. industries where workers feel most vulnerable to shutdowns and 
relocations.  Employers threatened closings in nearly two-thirds of organizing 
efforts in manufacturing facilities and warehouses.133 
                                                 
133See Commission for Labor Cooperation, Plant Closings and Labor Rights (1997) 
(available at the web site of the Commission, www.naalc.org). The findings were based on 
research directed by Prof. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner of the New York State School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. 
94 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
Professor Charles Morris updated the inquiry into the accelerating volume of 
discrimination against workers who exercise freedom of association.  Using NLRB 
records showing that more than 125,000 workers received back pay because they 
suffered reprisal for associational activity from 1992 to 1997, Morris concluded that 
Aa substantial number of employers involved in union organizational campaigns 
deliberately use employment discrimination against employees as a device to 
remove union activists and thereby inject an element of fear in the process of 
selecting or rejecting union representation.@134  Morris estimated that by the late 
1990s, one out of every eighteen workers involved in an organizing campaign was a 
victim of discrimination for union activity.135 
A recent study by professors Richard Freeman of Harvard University and Joel 
Rogers of the University of Wisconsin found that 53 percent of managers said they 
would oppose any unionization effort in their workplace.  One-third said that it 
would hurt their advancement in the company if the employees they managed 
formed a union; more than half of these said it would hurt their careers a great 
                                                 
134See Charles J.  Morris, AA Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under 
the NLRA and RLA,@ 2 Employment Rights and Policy Journal 327 (1998), p. 331.  
Reaching back to 1990 and adding workers found by the NLRB to be victims of 
discrimination in 1998, the total reaches more than 184,000.  See ibid., NLRB 1998 Annual 
Report, Table 4, p. 137. 
135Ibid., p. 330. 
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deal.136  Freeman and Rogers noted that under U.S. law, managers who refuse to 
oppose their employees= organizing efforts can be summarily fired.137 
                                                 
136See Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers, What Workers Want (Russell Sage Foundation 
1999), pp.62, 88. 
137Ibid, p. 62. Freeman and Rogers reported that 15 percent of surveyed managers in non-
union firms stated they would welcome an effort to form a union among their employees, and 
that A[w]hen we reported these results to business leaders, they were . . . interested in the 15 
percent of managers who were pro-union >so we can get them fired immediately.=@ Ibid., p. 
88. See also Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc. v. Automobile Salesmen=s Union, 262 NLRB 402, 
petition for review denied sub. nom Automobile Salesmen=s Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d. 
383 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where a supervisor who protested management=s order to fire workers 
for union activity because he felt they were his best employees was himself fired. The NLRB 
upheld the firing on the grounds that supervisors are excluded from protection of the NLRA. 
The appeals court upheld the board=s ruling. 
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In preparing this report Human Rights Watch took into consideration 
viewpoints of analysts who take opposite views.  In general, these analysts view 
workers= efforts to form and join trade unions and their protection under the NLRA 
as an unwarranted interference with a free market in labor.  They point to favorable 
treatment for workers and unions in U.S. law, such as exemptions from some 
antitrust rules.138  They cite the ability to obtain recognition through Acard checks@ 
(more on this below) rather than elections.139 
Other analysts criticize union-backed proposals for labor law reform and 
defend Congress=s refusal to enact reforms.140  Some defend employers= ability to 
                                                 
138See Richard Epstein, AA Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of New Deal 
Labor Legislation,@ 92 Yale Law Journal 1357 (1983); AIn Defense of the Contract at Will,@ 
51 University of Chicago Law Review 947 (1984). Professor Epstein goes so far as to defend 
the Ayellow dog@ contract, outlawed in the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act, by which employers 
made workers promise not to join a union as a condition of hire. 
139See Daniel V. Yager, Timothy J. Bartl, and Joseph J. LoBue, Employee Free Choice: It=s 
Not In The Cards; How Organized Labor Uses Authorization Cards to Avoid Secret Ballot 
Elections on the Question of Unionization, Labor Policy Association (1998). 
140See, e.g., Daniel V. Yager, AHas Labor Law Failed? An Examination of Congressional 
Oversight and Legislative Proposals 1968-1990,@ National Foundation for the Study of 
Employment Policy (1990). 
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permanently replace strikers.141  Others see the decline of union representation as a 
result of market forces, not workers= rights violations.142 
The research and analysis of U.S. labor law and practice outlined above was 
undertaken entirely in a national context.  Neither critics nor defenders of the 
current system looked to international human rights standards to inform their work.  
What follows here is a series of case studies carried out by Human Rights Watch in 
a dozen states, covering a variety of industries and employment sectors, analyzing 
the U.S. experience in light of both national law and international human rights and 
labor rights norms. 
 
                                                 
141See, e.g., John S. Irving, APermanent Striker Replacements Should Not Be Banned,@ 
Government Union Review (Spring 1993). 
142See, e.g., Leo Troy, AIs the U.S. Unique in the Decline of Private Sector Unionism?@, 11 
Journal of Labor Research 111 (1990); AConvergence in International Unionism, etc.: The 
Case of Canada and the USA, 30 British Journal of Industrial Relations 1 (1992); ABeyond 
Unions and Collective Bargaining,@ Working USA, January-February 2000, p. 102. 
Service Sector Workers 
 
South Florida Nursing Homes 
The law gives you something with one hand then takes it away with the other 
hand. 
CMarie Sylvain, a nursing home worker fired for organizing in 1996 
 
Nursing homes fill the landscape of southern Florida serving the peninsula=s 
enormous senior citizen population.  To maintain a residential rather than 
institutional atmosphere, most nursing homes are relatively small facilities 
employing fewer than one hundred employees.  In all, hundreds of nursing homes 
employ tens of thousands of workers in southern Florida.  The largest single group 
of employees is certified nursing assistants (CNAs).  Most are women, many of 
them are immigrants, and nearly all work at or near minimum wage levels.  Benefits 
like health insurance are available only with a sharp pay deduction that few can 
afford.   
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Nursing home aides work in the third most dangerous job in the country, after 
mining and construction.143  Many CNAs make ends meet by working overtime, 
which is often required anyway because of severe understaffing in the homes.144  
But understaffing and long hours make for rampant health and safety hazards.  
Workers are frequently injured in lifting, pulling and pushing equipment, lifting and 
moving residents, and even in assaults by confused but still physically strong 
residents. 
                                                 
143See Lorraine Adams, AThe Hazards of Eldercare: Overexertion, Assault Put Aides at High 
Risk for Injury,@ Washington Post, October 31, 1999, p. A1. 
144Employers may impose mandatory overtime on workers in the United States and dismiss 
workers who refuse overtime, except where workers have negotiated limits or refusal rights 
in collective bargaining agreements. 
Responding to low pay, long hours, and health and safety hazards, nursing 
home workers often try to come together with a common voice.  The most acute 
violations of these workers= freedom of association arise during workers= efforts to 
form and join unions and to bargain collectively.  Examining several cases, Human 
Rights Watch found a pattern of threats, intimidation, and firings of nursing home 
workers trying to form and join unions and of employers= refusal to bargain when 
workers succeeded.  The casesCseveral of which have led to NLRB complaints 
against the nursing homes involvedCgrow out of a AUnite for Dignity@ union 
organizing campaign in the southern Florida nursing home industry cosponsored by 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the Union of Needletrades, 
Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE). 
 
Palm Garden: a Close Election Loss 
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At the Palm Garden nursing home in North Miami, the Unite for Dignity 
campaign narrowly lost an election, 35-32, in April 1996.  Palm Garden 
management resorted to massive unlawful means including repeated threats to cut 
pay and benefits if workers chose union representation.  Managers forged signatures 
on warning notices against Leonard ATed@ Williams, a key Unite for Dignity 
activist.  They backdated the notices, then fired Williams shortly before the 
election.145 
Palm Garden management did not disguise its bias against workers= forming a 
union.  Its personnel manual states: 
 
This is a non-union health center . . . If you are approached to join a 
union, we sincerely hope you will consider the individual freedoms you 
could give up, and the countless risks you could be taking.  We intend to 
protect those freedoms and prevent those risks for you by opposing 
unionization of this health care center by every lawful means 
available.
146 
 
Company officials unlawfully threatened loss of benefits and wage cuts if 
workers chose union representation.  One powerful threat was to stop helping 
workers fill out food stamp applications.147  With such low wages, many employees 
were eligible for food stamps and needed assistance with English-language forms.148 
                                                 
145These and other unfair labor practices described here were confirmed by the NLRB in its 
Decision, Order, and Direction of Second Election, Palm Garden of North Miami and 
UNITE, 327 NLRB No. 195 (March 31, 1999), pp. 6-8, 13-14. 
146Cited in ibid., p. 4 (emphasis in original). 
147The food stamp program is a feature of social assistance in the United States that provides 
food subsidies to low income persons in the form of vouchers, called Afood stamps,@ that can 
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be used only to purchase food or other essential items in stores that accept the stamps. Full-
time workers paid at or near the minimum wage are often eligible for food stamps. See, for 
example,  Ted Rohrlich, ALiving Wage Movement Targets County Government: Low-Paid 
Contract Workers Use Costly Public Benefits, Backers Say,@ Los Angeles Times, November 
4, 1998, p. B1; U.S. General Accounting Office, AWelfare Reform: State and Local 
Responses to Restricting Food Stamp Benefits,@ Report RCED-98-41 (1998). 
148See NLRB Decision, March 31, 1999, p. 12. 
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In a captive-audience meeting, two managers staged a Amock negotiation@ 
portraying a stubborn company proposing to cut pay down to the minimum wage 
and an inept union bargainer.  Then they told workers, AThat=s what will happen in 
negotiations,@ unlawfully communicating to workers that it would be futile to 
choose the union.149 
Marie Sylvain, another union supporter unlawfully fired by Palm Garden, gave 
voice to workers= concerns in an interview with Human Rights Watch.  Sylvain is a 
single parent supporting two children in Florida and two older children and an 
elderly parent in Haiti.  She told of low payCSylvain received food stampsCand 
health insurance too expensive to afford at more than $60 per pay period, every two 
weeks.150 
Sylvain spoke of severe patient overload, sometimes with a single CNA 
responsible for twenty residents in a single shift.  For each of these, she said, AWe 
have to sit up the patient, brush their teeth, feed them breakfast, take food trays back 
and forth to the kitchen, change sheets, dress them, take them to lunch, get them into 
their chairsCmost of the patients need total help walking, eating, going to the 
bathroom, everything.@151 
Sylvain said managers always accepted patient complaints against CNAs or 
accusations against CNAs from other nursing staff members without hearing the 
CNA=s side of the story.  AThey don=t have respect for us,@ she concluded.  AIf you 
had respect, it would be OK.@152 
Because AI saw so many bad things,@ said Sylvain, she became active in the 
organizing effort.153  AI talked to the other Haitian workers,@ she told Human Rights 
Watch.  She distributed and collected union cards and spoke up at organizing 
meetings.  She eagerly served as the union=s election observer during the NLRB 
ballot in April 1996.  Her dismay at the lost election was made worse, though, when 
                                                 
149Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
150Human Rights Watch interview, Miami, Florida, July 22, 1999. 
151Ibid. 
152Ibid. 
153Ibid. 
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the company fired her at the end of April, telling her that she had given Atoo much 
problem at this place@ and that she Abrought the union to the work place.@154 
                                                 
154The quoted statements are from Sylvain=s credited testimony in the unfair labor practice 
hearing.  See NLRB Decision (March 31, 1999), p. 14. 
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In January 1998, an administrative law judge ordered Palm Garden to offer 
Marie Sylvain and Ted Williams reinstatement to their jobs, with back pay from the 
date of their unlawful dismissal.155  The company refused to accept the ruling and 
appealed to the NLRB in Washington, D.C.  In March 1999, the NLRB upheld the 
judge=s order.  Palm Garden appealed to the federal court, where the case is still 
pending with more delays likely before any remedy takes hold.   
AWhy does it take so long?@ Marie Sylvain asked Human Rights Watch.  AI=ve 
been fired for more than three years@ (now four years).  AEverything takes too long.  
Where is the justice? Everything is at the boss=s advantage with all these delays.  
The law gives you something with one hand then takes it away with the other hand.@ 
Asked if she would accept reinstatement, Sylvain said, AI would like to come back 
for one week just to show them the union can win.@156 
A worker still employed at Palm Garden, who asked not to be identified, 
described conditions at the home while the NLRB case languishes in the courts.  
She makes $6.31 per hour for seventy-five hours= work every two weeks.  She has 
four children but does not take health insurance because it is too expensive, more 
than $60 per pay period.  She uses a cash-only emergency clinic for primary health 
care. 
 AEverybody is scared now,@ she explained to Human Rights Watch.  She said 
everyone knows Ted Williams and Marie Sylvain were fired for their union support. 
 AI would get fired if I took up for the union,@ she added.  She said that people still 
want a union, but Apeople want it to be automatic, not with a lot of trouble.@157 
The administrative law judge who ordered Williams and Sylvain reinstated to 
their jobs also ordered a second election at Palm Garden.  The company appealed 
that part of the ruling, too.  The NLRB upheld this order in its March 1999 decision, 
but Palm Garden appealed to the federal court where the case is awaiting a ruling.158 
 
                                                 
155The ALJ=s decision dated January 30, 1998 is incorporated in the NLRB Decision, March 
31, 1999. Under NLRB rules, back pay is Amitigated@ by any earnings the unlawfully fired 
worker obtains during the period after dismissal. 
156Human Rights Watch interview, July 22, 1999. 
157Human Rights Watch interview, Miami, Florida, July 22, 1999. 
158See ALJ Decision, January 31, 1998; NLRB Decision, March 31, 1999. 
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Villa Maria: a Spy-filled Election 
The Archdiocese of Miami operated the Villa Maria nursing home in Miami, 
where workers began an effort to form and join a trade union in 1995 and narrowly 
lost an NLRB election in May 1996.  AThe workload doubled in the five years 
before the election,@ a Villa Maria worker (who asked not to be identified) told 
Human Rights Watch.  AI have twelve or thirteen patients.@ While workload 
increased, benefits shrank, she said.  A Health insurance used to be free, but now it=s 
$30 a pay period [every two weeks].@159 
Despite extensive Catholic Church pronouncements supporting workers= 
freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively,160  Villa 
Maria management launched a concerted attack on the workers= attempt to form a 
union.  An administrative law judge found, for example, that a supervisor infiltrated 
a union meeting by signing a union card with a false name to spy on workers and 
report attendance back to management.161  In a series of captive-audience meetings 
                                                 
159Human Rights Watch interview, Miami, Florida, July 23, 1999. 
160See, for example, National Conference of Catholic Bishops/United States Catholic 
Conference, AA Fair and Just Workplace: Principles and Practices for Catholic Health Care@ 
(August 25, 1999), noting that AAll church institutions must also fully recognize the rights of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively with the institution through whatever 
association or organization they freely choose,@ and A[I]t is up to workersCnot bishops, 
managers, union business agents, or management consultantsCto exercise the right to decide 
through a fair and free process how they wish to be represented in the workplace 
 . . . Catholic tradition respects their decision.@ 
161This and other unfair labor practices recounted here were confirmed by an administrative 
law judge who conducted a hearing on the evidence. See Decision of Administrative Law 
Case Studies of Violations of Workers= Freedom of Association 105  
 
 
in January 1996, management told workers that if they signed any union papers Awe 
would lose our pension . . . we would lose our home.@162  The company assigned 
CNAs to additional weekend work to discourage union activity.163 
The administrative law judge found that Villa Maria management mobilized 
new armed security guards during the union organizing campaign to intimidate 
workers and spy on union activity.  In addition to newly hired security agents at the 
site, archdiocese administrators sent additional security forces from other facilities 
to Villa Maria during shift change times, when union advocates distributed flyers to 
coworkers.  Security guards held clipboards and appeared to write the names or 
license numbers of workers who accepted union flyers. 
                                                                                                             
Judge Robert C. Batson, Villa Maria Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, Inc. and the 
Service Master Company and UNITE! Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile 
Employees, Cases 12-CA-18137, 12-RC-7957, January 9, 1998, p. 6. 
162Ibid., p. 7. 
163Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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As found by the administrative law judge, management instructed some 
supervisors to stand on the roof of the nursing home to observe workers entering a 
nearby restaurant to meet with union representatives.  Other supervisors were told to 
follow workers to the restaurant and report back on those who met with union 
representatives.  Consultants hired by the company to direct its anti-organizing 
campaign also joined in the illegal surveillance scheme.164 
Security guards Awalked the floor@ in the weeks before the election, a Villa 
Maria worker who requested anonymity told Human Rights Watch.165  AYou didn=t 
know who they were.  They had walkie-talkies.  We felt like we were being watched 
all the time.@ Two consultants also Awalked the floor,@ the worker told Human 
Rights Watch, Atalking against the union.@ In captive-audience meetings 
management warned of strikes, lost pensions, lost insurance and other harm. 
The results of the NLRB election were 65-59 against union representation, 
although a majority of workers had earlier signed cards authorizing representation.  
An administrative law judge found Villa Maria guilty of unfair labor practices and 
illegal election campaign conduct and ordered a new election.166  The company 
refused to accept the judge=s ruling and appealed it to the NLRB in Washington, 
D.C., where the case is pending nearly four years after the first, tainted election. 
 
The Palace: Organizing Nipped in the Bud 
Some workers= organizing attempts are terminated at early stages by firing key 
worker activists.  AWhen I look for a new nursing home job, they tell me not to 
come back after they learn about the Palace,@ Jewel Parham told Human Rights 
Watch.167  Parham was a CNA making $5.50 per hour when she sought to form and 
join a union at this 200-employee Miami nursing home in late 1997.  As 
documented in an NLRB complaint, management retaliated by firing her and four 
other movement leaders in a single week in January 1998, crushing the organizing 
effort before it could reach an election.168 
                                                 
164Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
165Human Rights Watch interview, Miami, Florida, July 23, 1999. 
166Ibid., p. 15. 
167Human Rights Watch interview, Miami, Florida, July 23, 1999. 
168See NLRB Region 12, Complaint and Notice of Hearing, The Palace at Kendall and 
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Home Nurse Corp., Case 12-CA-19278, August 28, 1998. 
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She was not especially interested in unions at first, Parham told Human Rights 
Watch.  ABut I thought it was a good idea@ when another worker approached her, 
she said.  AWe needed something.  We had way too many patients each.  Health and 
safety was a big problem.  Our pay was low, but they paid part-time agency 
employees a lot more for the same work.@169  Citing one health and safety problem, 
she said the employer refused to furnish protective clothing for CNAs when they 
bathed residents, even with a scabies outbreak among those they were bathing.170 
Parham became active in the organizing movement, inviting coworkers to 
meetings, including one at her home in January 1998.  Management learned of the 
organizing effort.171  The first victim of what Parham called a Arampage@ was 
Dorothy Grace, another activist who had meetings at her home.  She was fired on 
January 26, 1998.  The following day, Jewel Parham and others distributed a letter 
protesting Grace=s dismissal.  The Palace fired Jewel Parham on January 28 and 
three other activists on January 29. 
AThey told me, >We no longer need your services,= with no other reason given,@ 
Parham told Human Rights Watch.  Revealing the fragility of workers= confidence 
in their rights, Parham sees the main injustice as management=s not giving her a 
chance to drop her union activity.  AI think it was unfair,@ she told Human Rights 
Watch, Abecause they never let me say, >I=ll stop what I=m doing if you let me keep 
my job.= I was just trying to see if the other people were interested in the union.  We 
wanted to make it better for the residents.@172 
Parham and her fired coworkers filed unfair labor practice charges with the 
NLRB.  The regional office found merit in their charges and issued a complaint 
several months later.173  The complaint noted that management supplemented the 
firings with threats of more discharges, lost benefits, and closing the home if 
workers selected union representation.  But by then management=s retaliation had 
worked.  AAfter the firings everybody clammed up,@ Parham told Human Rights 
Watch.  AThey were afraid . . . Even now I=m shunned by people who used to be my 
                                                 
169Human Rights Watch interview, July 23, 1999. 
170Ibid. 
171Ibid.; according to Jewel Parham, other workers A snitched on us.@ 
172Ibid. 
173See NLRB Complaint and Notice of Hearing, August 28, 1998. 
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friends there.  They=re afraid of losing their jobs.@174  Palace workers and the Unite 
for Dignity campaign abandoned the organizing effort. 
                                                 
174Human Rights Watch interview, July 23, 1999. 
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The Palace management settled the NLRB case with modest payments to the 
fired workers and their agreement to forego reinstatement.175  By then Aeverybody 
had other jobs and didn=t want to go back,@ said Parham.  But she herself had 
difficulty.  When she first applied for a new job she did not list The Palace as her 
prior employer, fearing a blacklist effect.  But, she told Human Rights Watch, the 
new home found out she had worked at The Palace and refused her a post for not 
properly completing the application.  However, she adds, after listing The Palace, 
she still was unable to find work even with a demand for experienced CNAs in the 
industry.  Parham said she is now going back to school and looking for work in a 
new field.176 
 
King David: an Election WonCand a Five-Year Wait 
The mostly Haitian CNAs and dietary workers at the King David Center in 
West Palm Beach voted 48-29 in favor of union representation in an NLRB election 
in August 1994.  AI had a determination to get respect,@ said Jean Aliza, the first of 
several workers fired for organizing activity at King David.  AI am a citizen, and I 
deserve respect.@177 
Union adherents prevailed in the face of a massive illegal campaign by 
management.  The campaign began with a common tactic: suddenly applying 
attendance rules harshly against union supporters after years of granting exceptions 
to accommodate employees= needs.  As the administrative law judge who heard the 
evidence found, AIt is abundantly clear that prior to the onset of union activity the 
strict provisions of these rules were seldom enforced and . . . that management and 
employees viewed the handbook more as a loose guideline. . . .@ However, said the 
judge, after workers began organizing, the company Adusted off its handbook and 
                                                 
175The settlement agreement contains a standard non-admission clause to the effect that 
settling the case and paying the workers do not constitute an admission of unlawful conduct. 
176Human Rights Watch interview, July 23, 1999. 
177Human Rights Watch interview, Palm Beach, Florida, July 24, 1999. 
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began to utilize it to harass and discriminate against its employees who supported 
the union.@178 
Workers openly began their organizing effort early in 1994.  In May 1994, 
King David management issued a new rule barring workers from speaking Creole to 
each other with residents in earshot, calling it Averbal abuse@ of patients.  
Management then proceeded to Awrite up@ key union supporters.  The administrative 
law judge found that King David Acreated the rule as a vehicle by which it could 
limit the employees= ability to engage in union activity.  It is clear that management 
considered the union organizing activity to be Haitian business.@179  
                                                 
178See NLRB Decision and Order, PVMI Associates, Inc.  D/b/a King David Center et.al.  
and 1115 Nursing Home Hospital & Service Employees Union-Florida, 328 NLRB No.  159 
(August 6, 1999), p. 10. 
179Ibid, p. 12. 
King David management proceeded systematically to fire active union 
supporters.  Jean Aliza, Lude Duval, Marie Larose, Marie Pierre Louis, Michelle 
Williams, Carline Dorisca, and Ernest Duval were all fired on trumped-up charges.  
They were ordered reinstated by the administrative law judge who heard testimony 
and reviewed documents, and the NLRB upheld the judge=s order. 
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Jean Aliza was Aset up@ by managers and fired early in the organizing effort, 
after a year-long Asatisfactory@ record suddenly became Aunsatisfactory@ based on 
warning notices he never saw.180  Lude Duval was fired next for not having a CNA 
certificate, though she had three years of college toward an RN degree and had 
passed a CNA test administered by King David (by contrast, another employee, 
opposed to the union, who lacked a CNA certificate, was given alternate work until 
she obtained a certificate).  Duval got her certificate a month after she was 
terminated, but King David refused to take her back.181 
Marie Larose was fired after she refused a supervisor=s peremptory order to 
take off a union button.182  Michelle Williams was fired for having fourteen Acall-
ins@ (calling in to say she would not come to work), while a leader of an anti-union 
employee group was untouched with twenty-two call-ins.183  Management 
Aconcocted@ a misconduct charge to get rid of Carline Dorisca.184 
King David Awas determined to rid itself of the most vocal union supporter 
from the beginning,@ said the administrative law judge=s ruling, referring to Ernest 
Duval.  Duval told Human Rights Watch he told a company manager, AI=m happy 
I=m in this country because I=m free, I can choose, I choose for union,@ after the 
union won the NLRB election in 1994, where he was a union observer.185  Just days 
later, Duval was fired on trumped-up misconduct charges Aclearly for this 
enthusiastic support for the union,@ said the judge.186 
Ernest Duval was still vocal about his union support when he spoke with 
Human Rights Watch in July 1999, but he was also frustrated.  AI see the 
                                                 
180Ibid., p. 13. 
181Ibid., p. 14. 
182Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
183Ibid., p. 21. 
184Ibid., p. 21. 
185Human Rights Watch interview, Palm Beach, Florida, July 24, 1999. 
186NLRB Decision, p. 18. 
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government protecting management,@ he said.  AIt=s been four or five years now, and 
I=ve got bills to pay.  Management has the time to do whatever they want.@187 
                                                 
187Human Rights Watch interview, Palm Beach, Florida, July 24, 1999. 
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Duval and other union supporters were illegally fired in 1994 when workers 
voted in favor of union representation.  On August 6, 1999, the NLRB upheld the 
administrative law judge=s decision.  Based on calculations of Duval=s interim 
earnings during the years he was unlawfully dismissed from King David, he was 
entitled to $1,305 back pay and $493 interest for a total of $1,798.  Jean Aliza, the 
first worker fired in the union organizing effort, was granted $1,207 back pay and 
$586 interest for a total of $1,793.188 
For such modest financial liability, company management has succeeded in 
preventing workers= exercise of freedom of association.  Even though King David 
workers had won their election, bargaining had ground to a halt.  The remaining 
workers feared for their own jobs if they became active in bargaining or acted as 
union stewards.  AI don=t know the people at King David now,@ said Ernest Duval.  
AA lot of the older people who voted for the union have left.  They hire all new 
people who hear a union gets you fired or they can=t get raises because of the 
union.@189  Union representative Dale Ewart told Human Rights Watch, A[W]e can=t 
even get a committee to the bargaining table.  People are absolutely scared.  
Everything they see is a disincentive to get involved.@190 
Duval returned to the nursing home in December 1999.  He was the only one 
of the unlawfully fired workers who returned.  AThe government told me to go 
back,@ he told Human Rights Watch.  AThey told me not to worry, my rights would 
be respected.@191  In March 2000 Duval left the workplace and filed a new unfair 
labor practice charge of discrimination for union activity.  Duval alleged that 
management assigned an employee to constantly watch him and report any potential 
                                                 
188See NLRB Region 12, Draft Settlement Agreement, Greenwood Rehabilitation Center 
(formerly King David Center), Cases 12-CA-16368 et.al., December 1999.  
189Ibid. 
190Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Miami, Florida, March 15, 2000. 
191Human Rights Watch telephone interview, North Miami, Florida, March 20, 2000. 
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infraction of work rules.  AI don=t feel safe,@ Duval told Human Rights Watch.  
AThey threatened to fire me.@192 
 
Avante at Lake Worth: Leaders Fired for Speaking Creole 
Thousands of Haitian immigrants have become certified nurse assistants in 
Florida nursing homes in recent years as they seek a foothold in the labor market 
and aspire both to provide for their families and advance in the health care field.  
The mostly Haitian-American workers at the Avante chain=s nursing home in Lake 
Worth, Florida voted overwhelmingly in favor of union representation by the SEIU 
by a 56-16 vote in March 1999. 
                                                 
192Ibid.  It must be noted that this new unfair labor practice charge is still at the allegation 
stage.  It is cited here for Duval=s perception of his treatment, and because it is consistent 
with the earlier finding by an administrative law judge that management Awas determined to 
rid itself of the most vocal union supporter.@ 
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The March vote was a second election, following an earlier 77-24 tally in 
favor of representation in November 1998.  Avante management had objected to the 
results of that first vote and gained a second election on the grounds that a Creole 
interpreter arrived late at the NLRB election.193  In management=s view, the delay in 
providing translation had deprived some Haitian workers of assistance with 
questions about the voting process.  The NLRB had agreed and held the second 
election, where workers repeated their overwhelming vote in favor of union 
representation. 
Avante challenged the second election now claiming, among other objections, 
that pre-election notices were not fully translated into Creole.194  The NLRB 
dismissed all the company=s new objections as unfounded, however, and ordered the 
company to bargain with the union.  The company has appealed that order and 
launched a process of legal appeals that may last for several years. 
But Avante management=s concern for the rights of Creole-speaking 
employees appears to be selective.  In December 1999, after promulgating a ANo-
Creole@ rule forbidding Haitian-American workers from conversing in their native 
language, Avante fired Marie Pierre,  Jean Reuter and Propheta Masse for allegedly 
violating the rule.  All three of these CNAs were active in the union organizing 
effort and in the continuing effort to hold their organization together while the 
company appealed the election results favoring union representation. 
Marie Pierre had been a union observer at the elections.  AAfter two elections 
they knew who are the leaders of the union,@ Pierre told Human Rights Watch.195  
She had worked at Avante for ten years when she was fired.  Pierre helped lead the 
organizing effort because, as she put it, A[W]e couldn=t take any more disrespect.  
                                                 
193In elections with significant numbers of workers who speak another language, the NLRB 
provides an interpreter to assist with procedural questions. 
194See NLRB Region 12, AHearing Officer=s Report on Objections to Rerun Election with 
Findings and Recommendations,@ Case No. 12-RC-8275, May 21, 1999. The hearing officer 
overruled all the company=s objections. 
195Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Lantana, Florida, March 8, 2000. 
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We needed somebody to represent us.  We know our job, we love our job, we love 
our patients, but management doesn=t respect us.@196 
                                                 
196Ibid. 
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Jean Reuter, a six-year employee, told Human Rights Watch in a separate 
interview,  AI was always outside at the union demonstrations.  Inside Avante I 
always defended other workers.  They came to me for help.  I talked to the 
supervisor for them.@197  Like Pierre, Reuter expressed his motivation for 
organizing: A[W]e needed dignity and respect.  They don=t respect people.@198 
Avante management also appeared to be selective in formulating rules about 
non-English languages spoken by employees.  According to Pierre and Reuter, most 
of the Haitian workers were supportive of the organizing effort.  A smaller group of 
Spanish-speaking employees was opposed to the union, they said, and management 
did not issue any rule prohibiting or limiting employees from speaking Spanish with 
each other at work.199 
Like the workers at King David who waited five years for a reinstatement 
order, and like other workers interviewed for this report in cases described below 
who have been out of work even longer after being unlawfully fired, Marie Pierre, 
Jean Reuter and Propheta Masse could be waiting several years for their firings to 
be resolved.  In the meantime, in a workplace where employees twice voted 
emphatically in favor or union representation, their right to organize and bargain is 
frustrated and their key leaders are fired. 
 
A Management View 
For every case study cited in this report, Human Rights Watch made written 
requests for interviews with owners or managers of companies where workers 
sought to exercise the right to freedom of association.  Of the Florida nursing home 
owners or managers asked for interviews, only one responded.  This senior manager 
offered key insights into management=s views on workers= self-organization in a 
telephone interview conducted September 7, 1999.  He asked that neither he nor his 
company be identified. 
The manager said that there is an important distinction between the nursing 
home industry and other service industries.  The nursing home industry is the 
second most regulated industry in the country, he said, after nuclear energy.  It is 
also heavily dependent on government reimbursement for its services.  Government 
                                                 
197Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Riviera Beach, Florida, March 8, 2000. 
198Ibid. 
199Human Rights Watch interviews, March 8, 2000. 
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payments make up more than 75 percent of the industry=s income.  The industry=s 
profit margins are only 1 to 2 percent if they make a profit at all. 
AWe are very pro-worker,@ the manager said, Abut when a union comes in they 
[the union] can=t do anything about the wage base or benefit base.@ He said that the 
biggest problem relates to state regulation.  AUnion facilities get poorer surveys 
from state regulators,@ he said, Abecause unions make it hard to get rid of bad 
employees.@ For example, he said, if a resident complains about mistreatment by a 
worker, Awe are obliged to discharge that employee.  The union makes it more 
difficult.  They make it hard to fire employees who underperform.  Unions defend 
the indefensible.@200 
Having a union Adoesn=t allow me to give bonuses subjectively to employees 
who do a really good job,@ said the manager, and Ait=s hard to make wage 
adjustments for certain groups without doing it for the rest.@ With a union, he added, 
Ait=s hard to get outside agency employees when we want to.  We have to offer 
overtime to union workers.@ In all, he concluded, Athe concern is more operational 
than financial.@ 
Regarding union organizing efforts, this manager said, AIt=s all sales and 
marketing.  The union comes in and promises everything.  They promise the 
worldC>I=ll make everything better, all you have to do is vote for it.=@ He said, AI do 
believe that most union reps are sincere and see it as a service,@ but added, AThey 
promise what they can=t deliver.@ He also criticized Aa significant ethnic bent that 
they put in their marketing@ by appealing to immigrant worker groups facing U.S.-
born owners and managers. 
AI=m bothered that the union can visit any employee=s home,@ the manager said. 
 AA couple of my people said they felt intimidated.  The unions exploit some of their 
rights.@ He acknowledged that Adelays typically do work to management=s 
advantage,@ but added, AWhen the union gets in, the NLRB works to the union=s 
advantageCthey can file charges willy-nilly and tie you up in court.@ 
Asked whether the right to form and join a union is a basic human right, the 
manager said, AI don=t know.  I=m not an expert.  It=s probably an important right.  
We as a pro-worker company support workers= rights.@ However, the official added, 
AIn a capitalist economy the benefits that a union gives are more contrived than real. 
 If you=re a good worker, you can get a good job.  I need to be competitive in terms 
of good workers.@ 
                                                 
200The official cited a personal experience of having to go through an arbitration proceeding 
in a union-represented facility in another state involving an employee who fell asleep while 
on duty.  The arbitrator upheld the discharge.  At the time of this interview, the manager=s 
company was facing charges of unlawfully firing several workers for union activity. 
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AThese people have very hard jobs,@ the manager told Human Rights Watch, 
speaking of CNAs in the nursing home industry.  AThe government has not done a 
good job to keep up reimbursement rates to keep wages up.@ Asked whether unions 
and employers in the industry could work together to press government for higher 
rates, he characterized this approach as Acreating a health care crisis to force the 
government to capitulateCit happened in Connecticut.@ He concluded, AIt=s all right 
if they want to play chicken with the government, but not with my body.@ 
The manager said that theoretically it might be a benefit for unions and 
managers in the nursing home industry to cooperate, but Ain practice in Florida we 
don=t have that kind of relationship with unions.@ The manager pointed to union 
campaign tactics giving information he saw as false and taking out full-page 
newspaper advertisements blasting company owners.  AThis doesn=t engender a 
spirit of cooperation,@ he concluded. 
 
San Francisco, California Hotels 
You gave up your right to express your opinions. 
CA San Francisco hotel manager to workers who chose union 
representation201 
 
In 1980, Marriott Corporation agreed with the Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees union (HERE) to abide by a "card-check" for workers' choice of union 
representation at a new hotel the multinational hospitality company was building in 
San Francisco.  Twenty years and a series of judges, mediators, and arbitrators later, 
all wrapped up in myriad unfair labor practices, the company's reneging on its 
agreement has never been redressed. 
A "card-check" is an alternative method for determining majority sentiment 
among workers for union representation.  Under a card-check agreement, an 
employer and a union set a period of time for workers to sign cards authorizing the 
union to represent them in collective bargaining.  A typical agreement contains 
safeguards to ensure that cards are signed voluntarily.  It also provides for a 
"check," hence the name, by a respected, neutral person or organization verifying 
the authenticity of the cards and the signatures, and certifying whether a majority of 
                                                 
201See NLRB Region 20, Settlement Agreement, Marriott International, Inc., Cases 20-CA-
28111 et.al., April 15, 1999. 
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workers have chosen representation.  The card-check method is an accepted, legal 
alternative means for workers to choose collective bargaining.202 
                                                 
202See NLRB v. C&C Packing Co., 405 F.2d 935 (9
th
 Cir. 1969). 
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HERE and many hotel and restaurant companies have made card-check 
agreements a viable method of determining workers= sentiment.  The card-check 
method has been applied at most new hotels and resorts in Las Vegas, allowing 
cleaners, bellpersons, cooks, servers and other workers to obtain good wages and 
benefits while avoiding labor strife.203  Other unions and employers with relatively 
stable bargaining relationships have made card-check agreements an accepted 
means of testing majority sentiment in other workplaces of the company, including 
the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) with Levi 
Strauss, the Communications Workers of America (CWA) with AT&T, and the 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) with several regional supermarket 
chains. 
In addition, in two of the important cases studied for this report (discussed in 
detail in New Orleans, Louisiana Shipbuilding and Washington State Apple 
Industry below), card-check agreements between unions and management resolved 
long, acrimonious disputes.  These cases are worth noting briefly here as examples 
of the benefits of a card-check mechanism, if it is mutually agreed upon and 
satisfies workers and employers.   
Apple workers seeking representation by the Teamsters union at the Stemilt 
Bros., Inc.  packing and shipping facility in Wenatchee, Washington agreed with 
management in April 1999 on a card-check procedure to settle an unfair labor 
practice case.  The settlement was reached near the end of a long hearing before an 
administrative law judge growing out of a 1998 NLRB election marred by threats, 
intimidation, and firings.204 
                                                 
203See, for example, Steven Greenhouse, ALabor Rolls On in Las Vegas, Where Hotel Union 
Is a National Model,@ New York Times, April 27, 1998, p. A10; Michelle Amber, AFirst Pact 
Between HERE, MGM Grand Calls for On-Site Child Care Facility,@ Daily Labor Report 
(Bureau of National Affairs, November 21, 1997), p. A-1. 
204 See NLRB Region 19, Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaints and Notice 
of Hearing, Stemilt Growers, Inc., Case No. 19-CA-25403 et.al. 
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Under the card-check agreement, Stemilt workers had four months to obtain 
signatures of a majority authorizing union representation.205  Both worker 
representatives and Stemilt management agreed not to make any references to 
immigration, raids, the INS or deportation as part of their campaigns.  While 
preserving the ability to communicate with its employees about its desire to have 
employees remain non-represented, the company agreed not to use an outside 
consultant.  Workers agreed that Teamster employees would not engage in 
organizing activity on Stemilt property.206  The parties agreed on safeguards for 
integrity of the cards, including the text of the card statement, non-coercion 
guarantees, even that signatures would be made in blue ink.  They also agreed on an 
arbitrator and an expedited mechanism for resolving disputes over the card-check 
agreement.207  In November 1999 the neutral arbitrator certified that a majority of 
Stemilt workers chose union representation.  Bargaining got underway early in 
2000. 
At the Avondale shipyard in New Orleans, a bitter dispute was resolved when 
new owner Litton Industries, which purchased Avondale in 1999, agreed on a card-
check procedure for determining whether a majority of workers desired union 
representation.208  Although the agreement allowed a one-year period for the union 
to obtain signatures, a substantial majority signed cards within a few weeks.  Litton 
accepted the outcome and began bargaining with the workers= union, putting an end 
to nearly a decade of turmoil and strife at the shipyard.209 
In contrast to these examples, Marriott refused to honor its card-check 
agreement with Local 2 of HERE when the new San Francisco hotel opened for 
business in 1989.  The company and the union had agreed earlier that a card check 
rather than an NLRB election would be used to determine workers= choice of 
representation, and that management would remain neutral while workers made 
their choice.210 
                                                 
205See NLRB Region 19, Agreement, Stemilt Growers, Inc. and International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, April 23, 1999. 
206Ibid. 
207Ibid. 
208See Keith Darce, ADeal Gives Union Good shot at Organizing Avondale Yard; New 
Managers Take Fresh Tack,@ New Orleans Times-Picayune, November 3, 1999, p. C1. 
209See Keith Darce, AAvondale to Become Union Yard; Long Labor Dispute Is Over,@ New 
Orleans Times-Picayune, December 1, 1999, p. A1. 
210The agreement is cited in HERE Local 2 v. Marriott Corporation, 961 F.2d. 1464 
(9
th
 Cir., 1992), p.3. This federal circuit court decision recounts the factual 
background used here. 
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Instead, management launched a campaign against union representation that is 
still being fought.  HERE had to sue Marriott for breach of contract to enforce the 
card-check agreement.  A district court ordered mediation, which led finally to a 
new card-check agreement in early 1996. 
 An independent arbitrator was picked to verify the cards.  In October 1996, the 
arbitrator certified that a majority of workers chose union representation. 
Marriott then intensified its campaign against the union.  A complaint issued 
by the NLRB found merit in unfair labor practice charges throughout 1997 and 
1998 that managers: 
 
C accused workers of being "union plants;"  
 
C ordered workers not to talk about the union under pain of discipline; 
 
C told workers that signing a union contract was against Marriott's company 
policy; 
 
C prohibited workers from distributing union flyers in non-work areas on non-
work time; 
 
C picked up union flyers and threw them in the trash; 
 
C told workers they would get no raises until the union was gone; 
 
C told workers "you gave up your right to express your opinions as soon as you 
chose Local 2 as your representative;" 
 
C granted raises to non-represented workers while withholding them from 
workers who chose union representation to punish them for choosing a union; 
 
C held captive-audience meetings to discuss bargaining issues without union 
representatives present; 
 
C fired key union activists because of their involvement with the union.211 
                                                 
211See NLRB Region 20, Settlement Agreement, Marriott International, Inc. The settlement 
agreement contains a standard non-admission clause that "the execution of this agreement 
does not constitute an admission by the Charged Party that it has violated the National Labor 
Relations Act, as amended." 
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Marriott reached a settlement with the NLRB with promises not to repeat the 
cited conduct and to pay union-represented workers the wage increases earlier 
granted to non-union workers.  However, the company refused to settle the firings 
of two workers active in the organizing and bargaining effort, and refused to settle 
another meritorious charge involving back pay for medical benefits denied to 
workers who chose union representation.  Based on these refusals, the union has 
appealed the settlement to the NLRB in Washington, where the case was still 
pending at the time of this report. 
Meanwhile, Marriott workers who chose union representation by a majority 
showing in the card-check method remain without a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Sporadic negotiations resumed in 1999 after no bargaining took place 
for twenty months, but they have not yielded results.  Key union leaders fired for 
exercising their right to freedom of association remain outside the workplace.   
One of the workers fired because of his union support, Grover Sanchez, told 
Human Rights Watch, AIt=s unfair that the company can fire people and let them 
wait and wait.@212 In the meantime, Sanchez has found a job at the new W Hotel in 
San Francisco.  Affiliated with the Starwood Hotel Co. group that includes Westin 
and Sheraton hotels, the W agreed in May 1999 to a card-check method for workers 
to choose representation by HERE Local 2.  The card-check agreement guaranteed 
workers= choice and contained a procedure for resolving any disputes over cards= 
authenticity.  Under the agreement, union advocates were granted access to the 
workplace to discuss worker organizing without affecting work operations.  A local 
Catholic priest chosen jointly by HERE Local 2 and W Hotel management verified 
that a majority of workers chose representation.  Workers and hotel management 
moved swiftly to completion of a collective bargaining agreement. 
Sanchez explains, AWith the contract, it=s better.  There=s no favoritism.  The 
worker is more respected.  One feels more secure.@ However, said Sanchez, he will 
return to the Marriott if he finally wins a reinstatement order Abecause I would have 
high seniority and with the union it would be respected.@ Sanchez said he was one of 
the first workers hired at the Marriott when it opened for business in 1989.213 
Marriott International, Inc.  declined to comment or respond to questions from 
Human Rights Watch about the San Francisco Marriott dispute.  Instead, a company 
                                                 
212Human Rights Watch telephone interview, San Francisco, California, January 12, 
1999.  Sanchez was fired early in 1998; his wait is still a short one compared with 
that of many other workers in this report. 
213Ibid. 
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official referred Human Rights Watch to a newspaper article for what he termed 
Ainsight into both parties= positions and the departure points.@214  
The article characterized the dispute as one Abetween two very different sets of 
workplace rules and cultures.@215  According to the article, Marriott Arejects ideas 
such as a seniority system and fixed job descriptionsCboth longtime practices in 
unionized hotels.@ In contrast, Local 2 Ainsists that traditional practices like seniority 
in assigning shifts are essential to a fair and dignified workplace.@ Both sides agree 
that Athe dispute doesn=t center on wages, which are about $1 per hour higher at the 
Marriott than at other union hotels.@216 
                                                 
214See letter from Senior VP George J.  Palladino to Human Rights Watch, February 10, 
2000, on file with Human Rights Watch. 
215See Hana DeWare, AWorkplace rules at core of dispute between Marriott and hotel union,@ 
San Francisco Chronicle, February 18, 1999, p. B1.  This article appeared before the NLRB 
found merit in workers= unfair labor practice charges and issued a complaint in the case. 
216Ibid. 
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Marriott management stated that Athey want us to implement work rules that 
we really believe would hurt our customers and are not in the best interest of our 
employees.@ A workers= representative replied that Awe=re not trying to take away 
their right to manage, but there=s no reason to require cooks to mop floors.@217 
The article cited by Marriott management contrasted views of two workers.  
Room-service waiter Ramón Guevara was quoted as saying Ahe wants a union 
contract with seniority provisions to prevent favoritism by management,@ adding 
A>managers put personality into the (staffing) decisions.  They penalize people who 
don=t look as good or who don=t speak as good English.=@ Guevara also cited 
overtime policy as a problem, saying that Marriott managers arrange workers= 
schedules to avoid overtime pay requirements.  A>I can work 10 days in a row and 
not get one single minute of overtime pay . . . You rarely get two days off in a row.=@ 
Cook Kenny Minnis told the reporter, A>we=re the highest-paid hotel in the city and 
we have a benefits package second to none.  It=s like a family.  In this town, there=s 
no better hotel to work for and be represented by.=@218 
Referring to the 1980 card-check agreement between Marriott and HERE 
Local 2, the article concludes, ABy now, the dispute between Marriott and Local 2 is 
almost as old as some of the hotel=s workers . . . Local 2 and Marriott spent years in 
court fighting over the interpretation of that agreement.  Finally, after a court ruling 
in its favor, Local 2 turned in union cards representing more than half of Marriott=s 
workers in 1996.  The two sides started bargaining for a contract.@219 
 
Food Processing Workers 
 
North Carolina Pork Processing 
It really hurt us that the people only heard one side. 
CA worker who sat through captive-audience meetings in a 1999 organizing 
campaign 
 
                                                 
217Ibid. 
218Ibid. 
219Ibid. 
Dominating the flat, sparsely populated terrain around it, where tobacco and 
sweet potato farms are giving way to hog growing, Smithfield Foods= incongruously 
immense hog-processing plant in Tar Heel, North Carolina draws more than 4,000 
workers each day from the eastern half of the state.  Smithfield is the largest pork 
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producer in the United States.  Its Tar Heel plant is the largest hog-killing facility in 
the country.  Workers there slaughter, cut, pack and ship more than 25,000 hogs a 
day.   
Not many workers stay long.  Low wages and hard working conditions 
contributed to a turnover of more than 20,000 employees at the plant between 1993 
and 1997.220  "Do you know what it's like to go home to your kids every day with 
your arms aching and you're smelling like hog blood and guts?" said one worker 
who stayed.  "You don't want to pick them up, and they don't want you to.  What 
kind of a life is that for eight dollars an hour?"221  He asked not to be identified, 
since he is active in trying to form a union at the Smithfield plant and is fearful of 
retaliation by company management. 
 
                                                 
220See hearing transcript for February 11, 1999, pp. 4748-49, The Smithfield Packing 
Company, Inc. Tar Heel Division and United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 
204, AFL-CIO, CLC, Cases Nos. 11-CA-15522/15634/ 15666/15750/15871/15986/16010/ 
16161/ 16423/16680/ 17636/ 17707/17763/ 17824, 1993-1998, on file at the Region 11 
Office of the NLRB, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. 
221Human Rights Watch telephone interview, White Oak, North Carolina, October 12, 1999. 
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A Pattern of Abuse 
Smithfield workers have sought union representation from United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW) Local 204 since soon after the plant opened.  Wages 
are substantially lower than pay at other Smithfield locations, including some where 
workers have formed UFCW local unions.  According to NLRB complaints, ten 
workers were fired between 1993 and 1995 for union activity at the Smithfield 
plant, and five more organizing leaders were fired in 1997 and 1998.222 
                                                 
222The regional director of the NLRB issued complaints finding merit in workers= charges 
that they were fired for union activity. Smithfield challenged these complaints. All these 
cases are still in litigation and face the prospect of many months, even years, until a final 
determination is made. An unfair labor practice hearing on many consolidated complaints 
against Smithfield was held in late 1998 and early 1999 by an NLRB administrative law 
judge. His decision in the case is later in 2000. His decision can then be appealed to the 
NLRB in Washington, D.C. After that, the board's decision can be appealed to a federal 
court of appeals. The appeals court decision can then be appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
 
Two NLRB elections were held at the Tar Heel plant, one in 1994 and one in 
1997.  The union lost both but has filed objections to the latest election based on 
alleged management misconduct in both campaigns.  Because the misconduct also 
involved unfair labor practice charges which the NLRB regional office found 
meritorious, the objections case has been consolidated with unfair labor practice 
cases in a single proceeding stemming from both organizing drives. 
Besides firing key union activists, Smithfield management opposed workers= 
organizing efforts with interference, intimidation, coercion, threats, and 
discrimination.  These unfair labor practices came so fast and furious that a hearing 
originally set for 1995 on complaints from the 1994 campaign did not take place 
until 1998-99 as new complaints were consolidated with earlier ones. 
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The NLRB complaints describe in detail Smithfield's offensive against union 
supporters.  In dozens of instances cited in the complaints, Smithfield managers and 
supervisors: 
 
C issued oral and written warnings and suspensions against union supporters; 
 
C threatened to close the plant if a majority of workers voted for the union; 
 
C threatened to deny pay raises if workers chose the union; 
 
C threatened to deny promotions to union supporters; 
 
C threatened to fire workers who supported the union; 
 
C threatened to fire workers if they exercised the right to strike; 
 
C threatened to force workers to strike if they chose the union; 
 
C threatened that workers who went on strike would be blacklisted from 
employment at other companies; 
 
C threatened to have workers arrested for distributing union flyers; 
 
C confiscated union flyers from workers; 
 
C asked workers to spy on other workers' union activity; 
 
C grilled workers about other workers' union activities ; 
 
C interrogated workers about their own union sentiments; 
 
C indicated to workers that management was spying on their union activities; 
 
C did spy on the activities of pro-union workers; 
 
C applied a gag rule against union supporters while giving union opponents free 
rein; 
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C applied work rules strictly against union supporters but not against union 
opponents; 
 
C offered benefits to workers if they would drop support for the union; 
 
C assaulted and caused the arrest of an employee in retaliation for workers' 
engaging in union activity. 
 
Testimonies: a Management-Recruited Worker and a Supervisor 
Most of these violations occurred not once but repeatedly before, during, and 
after the two elections at Smithfield's Tar Heel plant.  Some of the most compelling 
testimony to the NLRB about Smithfield's conduct came from a line worker active 
in management's campaign against workers= self-organization and from a supervisor 
who fired a union supporter.   
Sanitation department employee Latasha Peterson testified that shortly before 
the August 1997 election she was recruited by managers to distribute anti-union 
material during work time and to report employees' reactions, noting those who 
spoke favorably of the union.  Training in how to campaign against workers 
organizational efforts, and report-back meetings, took place while Peterson was "on 
the clock;" that is, supposed to be working.223 
Peterson testified that she attended training sessions with company lawyers 
and consultants.  Key workers in the company=s campaign against workers= 
organizing efforts were called Athe A-Team.@ Peterson said she also attended the 
company=s captive-audience meetings where management warned workers of dire 
consequences of organizing and collective bargaining.  Management stressed the 
company=s right to take away pay and benefits in bargaining and to permanently 
replace workers if the union Apulled them out@ on strike.  Management also showed 
a series of anti-union videos.224 
                                                 
223In the Matter of Smithfield Packing Company, Inc.CTar Heel Division and United Food 
and Commercial Workers Union Local 204, AFL-CIO (hereafter Smithfield hearing 
transcript), November 4, 1998, pp. 1609-1620. 
224Ibid., pp. 1621-1624. 
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Following these meetings, AA-Team@ members, as instructed by the company=s 
consultants, engaged co-workers in conversations about the meetings and videos 
and made lists of workers and their reactions.  They handed these lists to company 
personnel officials.  Peterson said that she received overtime pay while working on 
management's campaign that amounted to double her normal weekly pay.225 
Sherry Buffkin was a supervisor in Smithfield=s laundry department during the 
1997 election.  She testified that company officials and consultants instructed her to 
probe the union sentiments of employees under her and report her findings to 
management.226  Buffkin said supervisors were also told to apply disciplinary rules 
harshly against union supporters but not against union opponents and to deny 
overtime to union supporters but grant it to union opponents. 
AWe were told that we were no longer to give the leniency and leeway that we 
had given previously and to make sure employees knew that if the Union came in 
we would not do the things that we had done previously to help them such as being 
late and excusing it without writeups, things of that nature.@227  As for overtime 
opportunity, a benefit often desired by many employees to supplement their regular 
wages, Buffkin said Aovertime was subjective to the supervisor to allow the people 
who were pro-company at this time.  There was always overtime but it was given to 
employees who were active in the company stance.@228  Conversely, said Buffkin, 
pro-union employees who usually declined overtime because of family needs Awere 
instructed to work overtime.@229 Buffkin said top company officials and lawyers told 
supervisors to use these tactics. 
                                                 
225Ibid., pp. 1621-1631. Smithfield fired Latasha Peterson for alleged misconduct in 
February 1998. Management has claimed that her story is a false one motivated by the firing. 
Peterson replies that she testified against the company to make up for Amanipulating my own 
people" (ibid., p. 1659). 
226Ibid., p. 85. 
227Ibid., p. 22. 
228Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
229Ibid., p. 90. 
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Buffkin's account of what happened to Margo McMillan is a stark example of 
interference with workers= rights.  McMillan, a laundry room attendant under 
Buffkin=s supervision, was fired in 1997.  According to Buffkin, when the chief 
company attorney learned of McMillan's support for the union, AHe then looked me 
in the face and told me >fire the bitch.  I'll beat anything she or they throw at me in 
Court.="230  According to Buffkin=s testimony, AI told him we could not do that.  
There was no disciplinary action in her file.  I mean there was no grounds for it  
. . . Margo worked for me for years.  I knew Margo.  I knew her as an employee.  I 
knew from dealing with her that she had family problems.  She=s got kids.  She=s got 
bills she=s got to pay and I begged [management] not to do it. . . .@231 
Smithfield Foods president Joseph Luter testified that he considered the NLRB 
and the union Aone and the same@ and that he considered NLRB complaints Ato be a 
matter ofCto be frivolous, outrageous.@ Luter said, AI do not know of one business 
person in this country that thinks that the NLRB is impartial and neutral on these 
                                                 
230Ibid., p. 34. 
231Ibid., pp. 35-36.  Sherry Buffkin signed a statement as Margo McMillan=s supervisor 
stating grounds for termination.  She later said that she signed the statement knowing it was 
false Abecause I had a job, I had a family and I know that you don=t go against [the plant 
manager] or what I=ve been instructed to do by them.  That=s exactly where the statement 
come from.@ Ibid., p. 42.  Buffkin was fired by Smithfield Foods in September 1998 for 
taking medication during work time.  As with Latasha Peterson, management argues that 
Buffkin is a disgruntled ex-employee whose testimony is motivated by her firing.  Buffkin 
stated at the hearing that she was fired because management became aware of her sympathies 
toward the union and her feelings of guilt about her conduct during the union organizing 
campaign.  As a supervisor, Buffkin is excluded from coverage by the National Labor 
Relations Act and has no recourse for a dismissal based on union sympathy.  She cannot be 
reinstated to work at Smithfield. 
134 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
matters.  Not one.  We all believe, particularly in the business community, that the 
NLRB is certainly pro-labor. . . .@232  Luter did not respond to an August 1999 
written request from Human Rights Watch to discuss the union organizing 
campaign and management=s campaign against the union at the Tar Heel plant. 
 
State and Local Authorities= Role 
The 1997 union election campaign in Tar Heel involved not only abuses of 
workers' rights by management but also troubling actions by state and local 
authorities.  Instead of fulfilling the affirmative responsibility of government 
authorities to protect workers= rights, state power was used to interfere with workers' 
freedom of association in violation of international human rights norms. 
                                                 
232Smithfield hearing transcript, February 24, 1999, pp. 5992, 5998, 6024-25. 
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Smithfield's director of security, Daniel Priest, had been a local police officer 
and was still a deputy sheriff exercising police authority.  Priest supervised a 
contingent of twenty-four full-time security guards at the Smithfield plant.  In 
addition to the plant security force, local police officers were told to take 
instructions from Priest, who was authorized, in his words, to Ahandle all law 
enforcement type functions at the plant.@233 
According to union organizer Milton Jones, local police and sheriffs "turned 
up in force" during the pre-election campaign when union advocates attempted to 
distribute flyers to workers driving into the plant.234  Priest testified to the NLRB 
that police officers were Apatrolling around the plant, up and down 87 [the main 
road in front of the plant], which they would have been all week@ prior to the 
election.235  "It was hard seeing police cars lined up there every day when we went 
into the plant," one worker told Human Rights Watch.  "It scared a lot of people 
against the union, especially the Mexican workers."236  This worker asked not to be 
identified.  There was no record of prior incidents justifying such a wide police 
involvement in the lead-up to the election, nor the palpable police presence during 
the voting process.  In a departure from normal practice in an NLRB election, 
Smithfield management stationed security guards under instruction from company 
security chief Priest in the cafeteria where the 1997 voting took place.   
Several dozen Smithfield managers and supervisors packed the small cafeteria 
where NLRB agents counted the ballots.  When it became clear that the union was 
going to lose the election, these company officials began taunting the union 
representatives and workers who served as election observers for the union.  Union 
organizers testified that the taunts included racial slurs (the main UFCW staff 
organizers and key shop floor organizing leaders were African-American).  In 
testimony at the hearing before an administrative law judge, Smithfield president 
Joseph Luter characterized management conduct as rubbing Amud in their face, so to 
                                                 
233Smithfield hearing transcript, February 16, 1999, pp. 5188. 
234Human Rights Watch interview, Wilson, North Carolina, July 13, 1999. 
235Smithfield hearing transcript, February 16, 1999, pp. 5172. 
236Human Rights Watch telephone interview, White Oak, North Carolina, October 
12, 1999. 
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speak@ and likened it to Aduring NFL football games where a player would taunt 
another player if they had a victory play.@237 
                                                 
237Smithfield hearing transcript, pp. 5978, 5995.  Luter based his characterization on reports 
from local plant management. 
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When final results were announced, the large management contingent, joined 
by security guards and by local police officers summoned by Priest, began pushing 
union supporters toward the door out of the cafeteria.  In the confusion, police beat, 
maced, handcuffed and arrested Ray Shawn Ward, a worker active in the union 
campaign.238 
 
Prisoners Working at Smithfield 
North Carolina state officials were implicated in another element of the 
Smithfield case, involving prison inmates in a work-release program.  According to 
union officials, approximately forty-five workers were bused into the plant each day 
from the Robeson Correctional Center, a state prison.  They were bused into the 
plant premises without stopping to receive union flyers and boarded the bus at the 
same internal point so they could not receive flyers leaving the plant. 
Smithfield management denied union advocates= request to communicate with 
these workers, who qualified as "employees" under the NLRA and were eligible to 
vote in the union election.  However, management required these work-release 
employees to attend captive-audience meetings to hear its arguments against 
forming and joining a union. 
On August 6, 1999 union representative Chad Young called the superintendent 
of the Robeson prison to request meetings with inmates working at the Smithfield 
plant.  According to Young, the prison official said Ano way . . .  under no 
circumstances,@ and hung up the phone.239  The following day, a union attorney 
made a formal request to the Office of the Attorney General requesting permission 
                                                 
238Police and company witnesses testified that Ward struck a police officer first. Charges and 
countercharges were later settled. Police officials said Ward admitted guilt; Ward argued that 
it was a reciprocal agreement not to prosecute and not to sue for wrongful arrest. The issue 
of what happened to Ray Shawn Ward is still before the administrative law judge of the 
NLRB, who is to rule on the unfair labor practice charge related to the incident. 
 
239See letter of Carol L. Clifford to Dale Talbert, Esq., August 7, 1997, on file with Human 
Rights Watch. 
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to visit these workers in the prison to discuss the union organizing effort.240  The 
state attorney general's office did not respond to this request.  The union was never 
able to communicate with the work-release employees. 
 
Wilson, North Carolina: Same Company, Same Pattern 
                                                 
240Ibid. 
The experience of Smithfield Foods workers in North Carolina and their 
efforts to form and join a union do not begin and end in Tar Heel.  Smithfield ships 
pork parts one hundred miles north to Wilson, North Carolina, where a Smithfield 
plant employs some 300 workers who produce bacon, sausages, hot dogs and other 
retail pork items.   
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Workers at this smaller Smithfield plant tried to form a UFCW local union in 
early and mid-1999.  Many of the same tactics used in Tar Heel to thwart workers= 
organizingCfirings, threats, interrogations, spying Cwere repeated in Wilson.  
Accounts by workers who spoke with Human Rights Watch were borne out by an 
NLRB investigation that produced a complaint in January 2000 detailing repeated 
unfair labor practices by Smithfield managers in Wilson:241  
 
C threatening workers with plant closure if they voted in favor of collective 
bargaining; 
 
C threatening stricter enforcement of disciplinary rules if workers supported a 
union; 
 
C threatening that it would be futile to form and join a union; 
 
C threatening loss of business and resulting loss of jobs if workers chose a 
union; 
 
C interrogating workers about their organizing activities; 
 
C spying on workers involved in organizing activity; 
C prohibiting workers from discussing salaries with each other; 
 
C firing five workers because of their support for forming and joining a union. 
 
Recounting management=s captive-audience meetings with workers, shipping 
department employee Robert Atkinson told Human Rights Watch, AIt really hurt us 
that the people only heard one side.  It would be a lot fairer if the union could come 
in and talk to us.  The company has a big advantage, making people come to 
meetings and showing videos.  A lot of people don=t come to union meetings.  
They=re scared the company will know.@242 
                                                 
241These unfair labor practices are described in more detail in NLRB Region 11, Order 
Consolidating Cases, Complaint, and Notice of Hearing, Smithfield Foods, Inc.  and United 
Food & Commercial Workers, Case No.  11-CA-18316 (January 21, 2000). 
242Human Rights Watch interview, Wilson, North Carolina, July 13, 1999. 
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As in Tar Heel, a large number of workers in Wilson were single mothers 
eligible for one or more government benefit programsCfood stamps, child care 
subsidies, Medicaid.  Workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch estimated the 
number of employees in this condition at 25-30 percent of the total, although an 
exact number is not ascertainable.  Workers meeting with Human Rights Watch said 
that in the final days before the July 1999 election, company supervisors launched a 
targeted campaign to tell these workers that they would lose their benefits or never 
be eligible for government assistance again if the union came in and Apulled them 
out@ on strike (the argument that a union Apulls out@ workers is standard in 
management campaigns against workers= efforts to form and join a union, even 
though the UFCW=s constitution, like those of most unions, requires a membership 
vote to authorize a strike).  Wilson workers told Human Rights Watch that this 
tactic swayed many of the single mothers in the plant who need supplemental 
government benefits to make ends meet.243 
Atkinson told Human Rights Watch that the plant manager called in workers 
one at a time to ask them what they thought about the union.  AHe asked me if I 
signed a card.  I said yes but that I was going to vote against the union.  I told him 
that because I wanted to keep my job.@244  Another Wilson plant worker, Shaniqua 
Moore, said, AI did everything under the sun for the union.@ In a one-on-one 
meeting, she said, the plant manager asked her why she was Aso angry@ with the 
company and said he could Amake things better@ if she worked with him.245 
In captive-audience meetings, said Atkinson, AI saw about seven different 
videos on how the union just takes your dues, goes on strike, gets into fights and 
stuff.@246  Workers told Human Rights Watch that Wilson plant management used 
another common tactic in captive-audience meetings: separating active pro-union 
workers for a meeting apart from undecided coworkers to avoid disagreement with 
management=s views.247 
                                                 
243Human Rights Watch interview with four workers, Wilson, North Carolina, July 13, 1999 
(these workers asked not to be identified). 
244Ibid. 
245Ibid. 
246Ibid. 
247Ibid. 
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Latino Workers at Smithfield Plants 
A separate set of issues in the union organizing campaigns in Tar Heel and 
Wilson arose from the sizeable presence of Latino workers in both plants.  UFCW 
organizers estimated that 20 percent of the workers in the two plants were Latino.  
AWe never asked, and we tried to tell them it didn=t matter, but the truth is that most 
of them are probably undocumented,@ said union representative Jeff Greene.248  
Both UFCW staff organizers and workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch said 
that reaching out to Latino workers in the plants was Apractically impossible@ 
despite union efforts to involve Spanish-speaking organizers and attorneys to help 
in the campaign.  AThey just want to keep their heads down and not get noticed,@ 
said Greene.  AThis is North Carolina; it=s not southern California or New York City 
where they have some community support.@249 
Human Rights Watch was also unable to speak directly with Latino workers at 
either plant despite calls and assurances of anonymity.  However, one person, a U.S. 
citizen who had married a Central American immigrant working in the Wilson 
plant, told Human Rights Watch that, according to his wife, management segregated 
Latino workers for captive-audience meetings conducted by Spanish-speaking 
consultants in the weeks before the Wilson election.  Union representatives said the 
same consultants had appeared earlier in the Tar Heel election campaign, meeting 
separately in captive-audience sessions with the hundreds of Hispanic workers 
there.   
According to the husband, these consultants told Latino workers that the union 
was dominated by black workers and that the organizing drive was really an effort 
by African-AmericansCthe majority of employees at the plantCto get rid of Latino 
workers and take all the jobs for black people.  He said Latino workers were told 
Athe union will see to it that you get fired because you don=t have good papers@ and 
that Athe company will not bother you about your papers as long as you vote against 
the union.@250 
The problem of immigrant workers= status in union organizing drives was 
discussed in Human Rights Watch interviews with African-American workers at the 
Smithfield plant who were active in the union effort.  They expressed frustration 
                                                 
248Human Rights Watch interview, Wilson, North Carolina, July 14, 1999. 
249Ibid. 
250Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Wilson, North Carolina, August 17, 1999.   
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about a Abloc vote@ against the union by Latino workers.  Said one worker, AIt=s not 
fair that management can take them all aside and fill them up with lies about us and 
about the union, and we don=t know what they said and can=t explain what we 
believe.@251 
 
                                                 
251Ibid. 
Government Takes Sides 
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Local government partisanship against workers= self-organization emerged 
when the mayor of Wilson and two other city officials passed out leaflets before the 
vote urging workers to reject union representation.  The city officials were invited 
by management onto company premisesCaccess denied to union advocatesCto pass 
out flyers against workers= organizing.  The flyer detailed earlier closings of the 
plant and attributed them to union activity, suggesting that the same fate would 
befall Smithfield workers in Wilson if they chose union representation.  The flyer 
said, A[H]istory paints a bleak picture . . . Are you willing to risk your job and your 
future for a group of paid organizers? . . . If the plant did close, where would you go 
to work? . . . Unemployment in Wilson County is 11%.@252 
As in Tar Heel, the application of government presence and power on the side 
of employers seeking to prevent workers= forming and joining a union violates 
international humans rights norms.  The central obligation of government is to 
protect workers= right to choose, not to take sides on behalf of the employer, 
throwing the weight of the state to one side and destroying any semblance of 
balance. 
 
Detroit, Michigan Snack Foods  
A lack of respectCthat=s why we organized. 
CA Detroit food worker telling Human Rights Watch researchers what 
prompted a failed organizing drive 
 
Lodged alongside a small chemical plant in a residential area in northwest 
Detroit, the Cabana Potato Chips division of Jenkins Foods supplies snack food 
products, mainly potato chips, to a regional market under various brand names.  The 
company has been in business for over forty years and employs 120 workers. 
Nearly all the plant=s workers are African-American, and a majority are 
women.  Many live in the modest homes surrounding the plant and walk to work, 
                                                 
252See AAn Open Letter to the Employees of Smithfield Packing,@ characterized as AA 
message from the Wilson County Right to Work CommitteeCfellow citizens concerned for 
your future@ (on file with Human Rights Watch).  The mayor of Wilson did not respond to a 
written request from Human Rights Watch for an interview about his actions in connection 
with the union election at the Smithfield plant. 
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recalling an earlier pattern of work and home life in this era of suburban industrial 
parks linked by interstate highways.  Many workers do not own a car.   
The starting wage at Cabana in late 1998 was $5.50 per hour, or $220 per 
week.  Most workers in operator jobs earned between $6 and $7.25 per hour, $240-
290 per week.  A few workers in higher mechanical classifications made $9-10 per 
hour, up to $400 per week.  If they wanted health insurance, it cost $38 per week for 
individual coverage and more than $80 per week for family coverage.253  Workers 
had no pension plan or other retirement benefit and no sick pay for days of illness. 
Most workers were not directly employed by Cabana.  Instead, they were 
employed as Atemps@Ceven those with years of service at the plantCby a shifting 
series of temporary employment agencies.  In recent years, for example, the 
temporary agency that supplied Cabana with workers changed its name successively 
from ACreative Staff@ to ACrown Temps@ to ATotal Temp Connection@ to ASimplified 
Temps@ to AFuture Force Services.@254  Oddly, for an agency that was supposedly 
independent of Cabana, ACreative Staff@ and its successors maintained a permanent 
office inside Cabana=s plant. 
With each change, workers were notified that they worked for the new agency 
from which they now received their paychecks.  But over the years, they worked the 
same job under the same company management at Cabana.  Some workers 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch had up to twelve years of work at Cabana.  
Because they were Atemps,@ however, seniority did not count for much.  They 
accrued no pension benefit.  Workers reported that when some long-service Cabana 
employees sought to borrow money to purchase a car, the bank said they were 
ineligible for loans because they worked for a temporary agency.255  While the 
names changed, agency owners and staff continued operating from the office in the 
Cabana plant. 
                                                 
253These payments are employees= share of health insurance premium costs. Total premium 
costs are higher. 
254Human Rights Watch interview with Cabana workers, Detroit, Michigan, April 20, 1999.  
Workers interviewed ranged from one year to ten years= service with Cabana. 
255Ibid. 
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Workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch believe that the temp agency 
structure is meant to assure they will not be eligible for unemployment benefits in 
case of layoff.  Either they would not attain a Abase year@ with one employer (a 
standard requirement for eligibility) or, as some attested happened to them 
personally, the temp agency would offer them a position in a far-off suburb, then 
deprive them of unemployment benefits because they refused a job offer.256 
Among Cabana=s 120 workers, a significant number were former welfare 
recipients in Michigan=s AWorkFirst@ mandatory welfare-to-work program.  Human 
Rights Watch was not able to obtain a precise number of WorkFirst employees at 
Cabana.  Interviewed workers characterized it as Aa lot,@ but said that, on the job, it 
was a subject about which workers did not feel comfortable asking or telling one 
another.  None of the workers interviewed indicated if he or she was in this 
category.257   
 
The Organizing Drive 
Cabana workers= move to exercise the right to freedom of association began 
with a spontaneous protest in September 1998, when the company failed to include 
Labor Day holiday pay in their paychecks.  More than a dozen workers refused to 
leave the plant after their shift ended, going Aupstairs@ to demand holiday pay.  They 
received payment for the holiday, but workers remained upset about this and other 
instances of what they perceived as arbitrary treatment by management, along with 
low wages, lack of benefits, health and safety problems, and what several workers in 
interviews with Human Rights Watch called Alack of respect@ by management. 
                                                 
256Ibid. Workers who refuse a job offer can be denied unemployment insurance benefits. 
Employers gain when workers are denied benefits because unemployment insurance taxes 
are Aexperience-rated;@ that is, taxes are higher for employers who lay off workers who are 
eligible for benefits. 
257To respect confidentiality, Human Rights Watch did not press individual workers to reveal 
if they were WorkFirst employees. The company did not respond to requests from Human 
Rights Watch for interviews or other information on the number of WorkFirst employees and 
other issues. 
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Cabana workers called Local 326 of the Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco 
Workers union (BCT), which represents several thousand workers in food 
processing and related industries in Detroit and southeastern Michigan.  In general, 
BCT collective bargaining agreements in other snack food companies provide 
wages substantially higher than those at Cabana, along with comprehensive medical, 
pension, vacation, holiday, and other benefits not enjoyed by Cabana workers.   
Those Cabana workers most keenly interested in forming and joining a union 
began meeting with BCT local leaders Don Rogers and Mary Peterson, along with 
representatives of the national union and shop leaders from other BCT unions in the 
area.  Workers told Human Rights Watch that Afirst we met secretly, then more out 
in the open,@ sometimes in their homes, sometimes at fast food outlets.  Union 
adherents in the shop talked about the union with coworkers and invited them to 
meetings with union representatives away from the plant.  Union organizers made 
visits to workers= homes if they could locate their addresses and if the workers let 
them in.  All these are typical steps for workers seeking to organize and bargain 
collectively with their employer. 
One Cabana worker was fired by management when the campaign first began, 
but a charge filed with the NLRB resulted in a settlement of the charge and 
reinstatement.  By mid-November 1998, eighty-four workersC70 percent of 
Cabana=s hourly forceCsigned cards joining the BCT and authorizing the union to 
represent them in bargaining.  BCT representatives and shop floor leaders 
personally informed management that the union represented a majority of Cabana 
workers and requested recognition and bargaining.  Management refused.258  The 
workers then petitioned the NLRB to hold a secret-ballot election to determine the 
union=s majority status. 
 
                                                 
258Under U.S. labor law, management can technically claim a Agood-faith doubt@ of the 
union=s majority status even in the face of overwhelming evidence of majority support for the 
union. The union must then petition for a secret ballot election by the National Labor 
Relations Board.  
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The AVote No@ Campaign 
The NLRB set an election date of January 14, 1999, about eight weeks after 
the petition was filed.  On November 30, 1999, the union and company agreed with 
the NLRB on the composition of the bargaining unit and the workers eligible to 
vote, a total of 121 employees.  The relationship between Cabana and Future Force, 
the temp agency at the time of election, did not delay the election in this case, as it 
could have had the employer chosen to make an issue of it.  As NLRB regional 
director William C.  Schaub, Jr.  explained, AAs both Jenkins Foods L.L.C.  and 
Future Force Services Inc.  signed an election agreement as Joint Employers, there 
were no novel issues or complications in setting up an election due to the 
involvement of a temporary employment agency.@259 
                                                 
259Letter to Human Rights Watch, May 4, 1999, on file with Human Rights Watch. 
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Cabana management immediately engaged three full-time consultants to direct 
a Avote no@ campaign in the plant during the weeks before the election.  According 
to workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the consultants developed a 
campaign with two main themes.  One was the threat of closing the plant or Amoving 
south@ if a majority of workers voted for the union.  A former Cabana supervisor 
told Human Rights Watch that the company owner and the owner=s daughter, also a 
management official, repeated to the supervisor in separate conversations that they 
would Aclose the door@ before dealing with a union.260 
U.S. labor law prohibits open, direct threats to close a plant in retaliation for 
workers= choosing union representation.  Such threats are considered a violation of 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which says, AIt shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7."261  However, Section 8(c), the Aemployer free speech@ 
clause adopted as part of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,262 has been interpreted by 
the courts to allow a Aprediction@ of plant closing if it is Acarefully phrased on the 
basis of objective fact to convey an employer=s belief as to demonstrably probable 
consequences beyond his control.@263   
This fine distinction in the law is not always apparent to workers or, indeed, to 
anyone seeking common-sense guidance on what is allowed or prohibited.  
Unfortunately for workers= rights, federal courts have tended to give wide leeway to 
employers to Apredict@ dire consequences if workers form and join a union. 
One prediction a court found to be Acarefully phrased@ was made by the owner 
of an Illinois restaurant where workers sought to form a union and bargain 
collectively.  In a tape-recorded speech in a captive-audience meeting the owner 
stated, AIf the union exists at [the company], [the company] will fail.  The cancer 
will eat us up and we will fall by the wayside . . . I am not making a threat.  I am 
stating a fact. . . . I only know from my mind, from my pocketbook, how I stand on 
this.@ The NLRB found this statement unlawful.  A federal appeals court reversed 
                                                 
260Human Rights Watch interview, April 21, 1999. The former supervisor asked not to be 
identified. 
261Section 7 guarantees Athe right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection . . .@ 
262Section 8(c) of the NLRA states, AThe expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or 
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not 
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, 
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.@ 
263See NLRB v.  Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
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the board, finding the employer=s statement a lawful prediction that did not interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right to freedom of 
association.264   
                                                 
264See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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At an Illinois auto parts plant where workers began organizing, a supervisor 
told workers, AI hope you guys are ready to pack up and move to Mexico.@ Again, 
the NLRB found that the statement was a plant closing threat.  And again, the 
appeals court overturned the finding by the NLRB .  The court said the statement 
was Aa joke, not a threat,@265  apparently not noting the irony of federal judges with 
lifetime job security deciding what is funny to unprotected auto workers.266 
Another key theme at Cabana was the threat of permanent replacement if 
workers exercised the right to strike.  For example, a company letter to employees 
said: 
 
In a strike employees:  
1.  Lose their wages.   
2.  Lose their company-paid benefits.   
3.  Cannot collect unemployment compensation.   
                                                 
265See Hunter-Douglas, Inc.  v.  NLRB, 804 F2d.  808 (7th Cir.  1986). 
266These examples should not be taken to mean that courts always, or even in most cases, 
overrule the NLRB on employer threats. A majority of NLRB rulings are upheld by the 
courts. But the leeway afforded employers by court precedents means that the NLRB mostly 
prosecutes Aslam dunk@ cases where the employer=s conduct is so outrageous that a finding of 
violation is likely to be upheld on appeal. Cases that are closer to the borderline, or within 
the bounds of lawful conduct even when a common sense observer would hear a clear threat, 
rarely proceed. As a dissenting judge noted in another case where the court of appeals 
overruled an NLRB finding that the employer had unlawfully threatened workers, AAn 
employer can dress up his threats in a language of prediction. >You will lose your job,= rather 
than >I will fire you= (and fool the judges). He doesn=t fool his employees. They know 
perfectly well what he means.@ See NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967). The 
parenthetical remark is in the original citation. 
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4.  Can be permanently replaced if the strike is for 
economic reasons (a strike over wages, benefits, 
or working conditions). 
Question: Do you mean that non-strikers could be hired to take my job in 
an economic strike? 
Answer: YES.  Federal law gives the company the right to hire 
permanent replacements to continue to serve our customers. 
Question: Isn=t the company required to fire the replacements when the 
strike is over? 
Answer: NO.  The company is NOT required to fire the replacements by 
law.  Strikers are only entitled to get their jobs back when and if 
openings occur. 
Cabana management then reproduced a portion of the NLRB=s Guide to Basic 
Law and Procedures underlining a sentence saying strikers can be replaced by their 
employer, then wrote below: ARemember! >But they can be replaced by their 
employer.=@ 267 
Cabana management held a series of captive-audience meetings to fend off the 
organizing drive.  According to workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, 
leaders of the organizing effort and active supporters were segregated in one group. 
 Management gave them a perfunctory reading of a script prepared by the 
consultants and sent them back to work.  The larger group of workers, most of 
whom had signed union cards but were not union leaders and were fearful of 
management reprisals, were gathered separately for longer, more intensive sessions 
stressing plant closings and permanent strike replacements.268 
The solid majority in favor of union representation wilted in the face of 
management=s opposition campaign.  The union lost the NLRB election 68-44.  This 
result is not unusual.  Most often, workers wait until two-thirds of eligible voters 
have signed union cards before seeking an election, because experience shows a 
predictable fall-off in support after management=s campaign against the union.  
Employer representatives attribute the drop-off to workers= changed opinion after 
hearing the facts from management. 
When asked why the union did not raise objections to the election or pursue 
unfair labor practice charges about arguably unlawful plant-closing threats and 
pressures on WorkFirst employees, BCT local union president Don Rogers 
explained, "We just don't have the resources or staff time to put into legal cases that 
                                                 
267Letter to employees of January 7, 1999 from company president (on file with Human 
Rights Watch; all emphases in original). 
268Human Rights Watch interview, April 20, 1999. 
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take years to resolve.  We need to spend our time organizing and bargaining and 
handling grievances and arbitrations.  Sometimes we have to walk away and just try 
again later."269  Rogers added, "We would file for a worker who got fired.  We 
wouldn't leave the worker hanging out there with no help."270   
                                                 
269Under the NLRA, workers can seek another NLRB election after one year from the date of 
a previous election. 
270Human Rights Watch interview, April 20, 1999. 
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Rogers pointed to another common problem.  "The workers are often scared to 
give affidavits or to testify.  They figure they'll be on management's hit list if they 
do, that even if management doesn't fire them they'll get harassed or assigned to 
worse jobs or something else to make their lives miserable."271  Rogers's 
observation was echoed by union representatives in other Human Rights Watch case 
studiesCpointing up the personal courage it takes for workers to go public in 
complicated legal proceedings that require sworn statements and testimony against 
employers who control their economic fate. 
 
Welfare-to-Work Employees 
The results at Cabana may simply reflect the generalized fear among 
employees just noted, or in some cases a genuine change of opinion.  But another 
feature of the Cabana campaign may also have played a part.  Workers in the 
WorkFirst welfare-to-work program could lose their food stamps, medical 
insurance, child care subsidies or other benefits available from the state if they 
became active in the union and went on strike.  The special vulnerability of 
WorkFirst employees to the loss of vitally important benefits like medical insurance 
for their children could be a decisive factor in an NLRB election. 
Welfare reform and related Aworkfare@ programs are subjects of intense policy 
debate in the United States.  But workfare workers= freedom of association is often 
low on the agenda.272  In Michigan, a recipient of cash welfare assistance who joins 
a strike in the workplace ceases to be eligible for that cash assistance.273  ACash 
assistance@ refers to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which 
                                                 
271Ibid. 
272See, for example, Bettina Boxall, AHow Fair Is Workfare?: Rapid expansion of programs 
raises new questions about the rights of participants,@ Los Angeles Times, March 9, 1997, p. 
B1; Steven Greenhouse, AWages of Workfare,@ New York Times, July 7, 1997, p. B3. 
273Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alan Durkee, director, Office of Financial 
Assistance Programs, Family Independence Agency (FIA), Department of Social Services, 
State of Michigan, February 24, 2000; and AStrikers@ section of the Program Eligibility 
Manual of the FIA, numbered PPB 1998-003, 4-1-98. 
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replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program under the 
1996 welfare reform.  It is federal money given as block grants to the states. 
If a welfare-to-work employee in Michigan is fired for involvement in or 
sympathy with an organizing effort, the situation is equally bleak.  A state official 
told Human Rights Watch that, to his knowledge, the eligibility manual contains 
Anothing specific that speaks to union organizing,@ and a review of the eligibility 
manual confirms this.274  That is, if a welfare-to-work employee is in fact fired for 
organizing but the employer uses a pretext, such as incompetence, as the stated 
reason for discharge, the state has no mechanism in place to protect the welfare 
status and benefits of the employee.275 
A Michigan state official indicated that the NLRB would be the avenue of 
recourse for a welfare-to-work employee who suffers discriminatory reprisals for 
organizing activity.276  But a favorable NLRB ruling several months or even years 
later does nothing to serve the immediate needs of the worker.  According to the 
state official, a welfare-to-work employee losing a job under these circumstances is 
liable to lose benefits for one to two months before becoming eligible again.277  The 
firing also becomes part of her case history, which defines whether she has been 
deserving of assistance by genuinely seeking to get and to hold a job.  In Michigan, 
if a person Afails to comply@ with welfare requirements a second or third time, some 
benefits may be withdrawn for six months or more, while others may be reduced.278 
  
Similar rules apply in most states under federal rules imposing sanctions on 
individuals for noncompliance with work requirements.279  States may create Agood 
                                                 
274Ibid. 
275Federal law requires that a grievance procedure be available to determine whether a 
welfare-to-work employee had Ajust cause@ to fail to keep a job, but the just-cause provisions 
do not take firing for pro-union sympathy or activity into account. Failure to prove just cause 
leads to temporary loss of benefits.  A narrow exception applies to a food stamps-only 
recipient: where a worker Amust join, resign from, or refrain from joining a labor 
organization as an employment condition,@ food stamp benefits can be maintained if 
employment is not accepted. This exception is not applied for benefits besides food stamps. 
See AFailure to Meet Employment Requirements: FS-Only Cases,@ Program Eligibility 
Manual, FIA, PPB 1999-008, 10-1-99; AFailure to Meet Employment Requirements: FIP,@ 
Program Eligibility Manual, FIA, PPB 1999-008, 10-1-99. 
276Human Rights Watch Durkee interview. 
277Ibid. 
278 See AFailure to Meet Employment Requirements: FS-Only Cases@ and AFailure to Meet 
Employment Requirements: FIP,@ Program Eligibility Manual, FIA. 
279See 64 Federal Register 17776; 17793-97 (April 12, 1999). 
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cause@ exceptions for noncompliance with work requirements, including unjustified 
or unlawful discharge.280  However, the issue of whether an employer dismissed a 
worker unlawfully or not is precisely the issue litigated before the NLRB, often 
requiring many months or even years before a determination is made.  In any event, 
workers are likely too fearful to exercise organizing rights at the risk of losing vital 
benefits.   
                                                 
280Ibid. 
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The unique status and vulnerability of welfare-to-work employees are only 
beginning to interest trade unions and legislators.  The states have considerable 
latitude in determining eligibility for benefits, and obscure rules like those noted 
above are little known even to advocates and activists, let alone to workers who are 
directly affected by them.  What welfare-to-work employees do know is that their 
lives are precarious, and as they enter the national workforce by tens and hundreds 
of thousands, their vulnerability becomes a factor in workplace dynamics when they 
and coworkers exercise rights of organizing and collective bargaining.281 
 
Manufacturing Workers 
 
Baltimore, Maryland Packaging Industry 
Five years later I=ve got nothing to show for it. 
CA worker fired for organizing 
 
Another company in a similar urban factory setting, with low-wage workers 
exercising their right to freedom of association, offers an example of even harsher 
anti-organizing tactics.  In the mid-1990s, a new company called Precision 
Thermoforming and Packaging, Inc.  (PTP) employed more than 500 workers in a 
federal "empowerment zone" in a Baltimore, Maryland neighborhood called 
"Pigtown."  
The company received indirect state subsidies worth millions of dollars 
through a low-cost lease of manufacturing space in a converted warehouse bought 
by the state in 1994.  PTP also received a federal subsidy of $3,000 for each 
employee it hired who lived inside the empowerment zone.  It hired more than 250 
such workers.  Thanks to subsidies, the federal government=s empowerment zone 
designation is worth a lot of money to employers who set up operations in a zone.  
But the government does not use this financial leverage for conditioning 
empowerment zone benefits on fair treatment of workers. 
PTP ran a plastic packaging and shipping operation for flashlights, batteries, 
and computer diskettes.  Major customers included Eveready Battery and America 
Online (AOL).  AOL shipped millions of free diskettes to consumers from the PTP 
plant. 
                                                 
281For a survey of rules affecting welfare-to-work employees, see National Employment Law 
Project, AEmployment Rights of Workfare Participants and Displaced Workers@ (2000). 
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PTP's starting wage was $5 per hour.  Most workers after passing probation 
and staying with the company could get incremental raises to $5.25-7.00 per hour.  
Health insurance cost employees $36 per week from their paychecksCa benefit 
most of them declined, since they made only $200-$280 per week.  There was no 
pension plan. 
In mid-1995, a group of PTP workers began an effort to form and join a union 
in the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE).  The UE 
represented employees at other Baltimore-area manufacturing plants with better 
wages and benefits.  The UE also had a reputation for democracy and rank-and-file 
involvement that attracted PTP workers.  A leader in the PTP campaign, Gilbert 
Gardner, had worked in a UE plant years earlier and had been active as a union 
steward.  "I remember the UE was real democratic and close to the people," said 
Gardner.  "When I saw how things were going at PTP, I called the UE for help."282 
 
Abuses by Management 
A complaint issued by the NLRB finding merit in unfair labor practice charges 
filed by the union tells what happened next.283  PTP management fired Gilbert 
Gardner and eight other workers active in the union organizing effort.  In addition 
to the firings, PTP managers and supervisors: 
 
C threatened to close the plant if a majority of workers voted in favor of union 
representation; 
 
C threatened to move work to Mexico; 
 
C threatened to move the AOL production line to another country; 
 
C threatened that Eveready Battery would pull its business from PTP; 
 
C threatened to fire workers who attended union meetings; 
 
C threatened to fire anyone who joined the union; 
 
C threatened to replace American workers with foreigners if the union came in; 
                                                 
282Human Rights Watch interview, March 19, 1999. 
283See NLRB Region 5, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing, Precision 
Thermoforming and Packaging, Inc. and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of 
America, 5-CA-25642, 25699, 25802, 25805, 25853, April 7, 1997. 
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C threatened to transfer workers to dirtier, lower-paying jobs if they supported 
the union; 
 
C told workers not to take union flyers from union organizers; 
 
C told workers upper management was going to "get them" for supporting the 
union; 
 
C asked employees to report to management on the activities of union 
supporters; 
 
C stationed managers and security guards with walkie-talkies to spy on union 
handbilling and report on workers who accepted flyers; 
 
C interrogated workers about their union sympathies and activities; 
 
C denied wage increases and promotions to workers who supported the union. 
 
"I'd say I was the one who got the union going," said Gardner, who began 
working at PTP in April 1993.  "Then they fired me the day after I went to a hearing 
at the NLRB to set up the election," he told Human Rights Watch interviewers.  
"Earlier they wrote me up for smoking during working hours, which I did ever since 
I started.  I would step outside when I caught up with my work to have a smoke with 
my supervisors.  They never said anything about it until I started supporting the 
union."284 
As for his firing, Gardner explained, "On the day after the hearing they 
demoted me from shipping to production associate, with a fifty-cent cut in pay.  
When I said I thought it was because of my union work, they fired me for 
                                                 
284Human Rights Watch interview, Baltimore, Maryland, March 19, 1999.  In a separate 
proceeding, the Maryland unemployment compensation commission held a hearing on the 
circumstances of Gardner's dismissal.  The commission found no evidence of misconduct, 
and awarded him unemployment benefits. 
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threatening a supervisor."285  When he was fired, Gardner made $6.25 per hour; 
management wanted to cut his pay to $5.75. 
Union supporters lost the NLRB election by a vote of 226-168.  Before the 
vote, 60 percent of the workers signed union cards to join the UE and authorize the 
union to represent them in collective bargaining. 
 
The Immigrant Factor 
                                                 
285Ibid. 
Approximately 25 percent of the hourly workforce at PTP was composed of 
Vietnamese immigrant workers placed with the company by a social services 
agency in Silver Spring, Maryland, a suburb of Washington, D.C.  thirty miles from 
Baltimore.  Most of these workers were bused to the PTP plant each day. 
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"PTP has been a constant customer," Phu Le, a director of the agency, told a 
reporter.  "They like having a lot of refugees, especially Asian."286  Le's agency 
received $1400 from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for each 
Vietnamese immigrant placed at PTP.  He placed nearly 150 people there in 
1995.287 
"We have come out of hell," said PTP worker Thi Nguyen, "so we are pleased 
with anything at all.@ Nguyen, his wife, and four adult children were placed at PTP 
by Le's agency in September 1995 while the union organizing effort was underway, 
just eighteen days after they had arrived in the United States.  "It is important to 
work and not complain," Nguyen told a reporter.288 
Accompanied by Gilbert Gardner, a Vietnamese-speaking union representative 
tried to visit Vietnamese workers in the suburban Washington apartment where they 
lived.  According to Gardner, ANone of them would let us in to talk to them.  They 
were too scared.  They didn=t want to get in trouble with the company.@289 
Gilbert Gardner told Human Rights Watch that PTP management held 
separate captive-audience meetings for Vietnamese workers.  On the afternoon 
before the election, the union held a rally at the plant gate for workers leaving the 
day shift and arriving on second shift.  According to Gardner, managers told 
Vietnamese workers that African-American union supporters were "rioting" at the 
entrance, and made Vietnamese workers board their bus in the rear of the plant to 
leave through a rear gate where they could not see the union rally.290 
 
Aftermath: Justice Delayed and Denied 
                                                 
286See Joe Matthews, @ Opportunity and Disillusionment in Pigtown,@ The Baltimore Sun, 
November 7, 1996, p. 1A. 
287Ibid. 
288Ibid. 
289Human Rights Watch interview, March 19, 1999. 
290Human Rights Watch interview, March 19, 1999. Gardner told Human Rights Watch he 
saw Vietnamese workers being taken to separate captive-audience meetings, and was told by 
Vietnamese workers about management=s Ariot@ claims. 
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UE=s charges of massive unfair labor practices by PTP were upheld by the 
NLRB's regional director, who issued a wide-ranging complaint on management 
conduct described above.  Company president William Hartley wrote a letter to the 
mayor of Baltimore complaining that "PTP is an employer who invested millions of 
dollars in the empowerment zone, only to find itself subjected to a slanderous 
campaign by a renegade union aided by public officials."291 
The NLRB found PTP's conduct so egregious that the regional director 
announced he would seek a Gissel bargaining order, an unusual remedy in U.S. 
labor law based on a 1969 Supreme Court decision.292  Under the Gissel doctrine, a 
union that has obtained majority support from workers who sign cards joining the 
union and seeking bargaining can be certified as the bargaining agent even if it loses 
an election.  The Gissel remedy is available when an employer's unfair labor 
practices have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or have undermined a 
union's majority and caused an election to be set aside.  Many workers= organizing 
efforts match these conditions.  However, an employer who resists a Gissel order 
can obtain years of delay by appealing the order to federal courts. 
The Supreme Court in Gissel said that the bargaining order remedy is not 
limited to "exceptional" cases marked by "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor 
practices.  The court said that a bargaining order can also be applied "in less 
extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have 
the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process." 
However, in practice, the NLRB and the federal courts have applied the Gissel 
remedy sparingly, effectively undermining the right of many workers to bargain 
collectively. 
The NLRB also sought reinstatement and back pay ranging from $6,000 to 
$21,000 for workers fired for union activity, with Gilbert Gardner due to receive the 
highest amount.  In March 1997, however, PTP shut its Baltimore plant and 
declared bankruptcy, citing a legal dispute with America On Line and AOL's failure 
to pay $2 million in accounts receivable.  AOL countercharged that PTP committed 
                                                 
291See Matthews, AOpportunity and Disillusionment.@ 
292See Complaint and Order of Hearing, Precision Thermoforming and Packaging, Inc. and 
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 5-CA-25642 et.al., August 8, 
1996; NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
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postal fraud and overcharged AOL for mailing expenses.293  With no employer to 
order to bargain with the UE, the NLRB fashioned a settlement of the unfair labor 
practice case before it went to hearing.  Under the settlement, PTP acknowledged 
the actions outlined in the complaint, promised not to repeat them, and promised 
back pay to the fired workers in the amounts sought by the NLRB. 
                                                 
293See Kevin L. McQuaid and Joe Matthews, ABaltimore employer of 600 to close,@ 
Baltimore Sun Arundel Edition, March 20, 1997, p. 1A.  
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Since then, Gilbert Gardner and the other fired PTP workers have waited in 
vain to receive the first penny of back pay for their unlawful firings.  "What kind of 
a system is this?", Gardner asks.  "PTP got millions of dollars from the government. 
 They fired me and the other strong union people.  They scared other people into 
voting against the union.  They settle a case promising to pay me $20,000.  And five 
years later I've got nothing to show for it." 294 
With PTP out of business, Gilbert Gardner=s first concern now is the back pay 
that is due him.  The Gissel remedy is meaningless with no employer for Gardner 
and his coworkers to bargain with.  However, had the NLRB been empowered to 
act quickly to initiate bargaining, workers might have been able to negotiate over 
severance pay, continued medical insurance, and other conditions in a bankruptcy-
related closing, or indeed to offer steps to avoid closing.   
 
Northbrook, Illinois Telecommunications Castings 
When we won the election we thought, AFinally we can start making things 
better.@ 
CA worker with no contract and no union, twelve years after winning an 
NLRB election 
 
In the flush of an NLRB election victory, workers= hopes are high for a rapid 
move to the bargaining table to tackle the issues that gave rise to organizing.  Some 
employers honor workers= choice and join a good-faith bargaining effort to solve 
problems in ways that meet workers= needs while respecting the needs of the 
business.  However, other employers view workers= election victories as just 
temporary setbacks in a long-term campaign to rid themselves of unions.  A 
governmental commission found that only about one-third of workers= unions are 
able to achieve a first collective bargaining agreement after winning an NLRB 
election.295 
                                                 
294Human Rights Watch interview, March 19, 1999. 
295Based on data covering 1986 through 1993. See U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Commission on the Future of Labor-Management Relations, Fact 
Finding Report (May 1994), p. 74. 
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Under the NLRA, refusal to bargain in good faith is an unfair labor practice.296 
 But as discussed earlier, good-faith bargaining does not require agreement to any 
proposal from a bargaining counterpart.  Instead, the obligation simply requires 
meeting at reasonable intervals and exchanging proposals with Aa sincere desire to 
reach an agreement.@297  By appearing to do so, employers can avoid a finding by 
the NLRB or the courts of bad-faith bargaining.  If they slip up, the remedy is 
merely an order to return to the bargaining table, where the cycle can repeat itself at 
little cost to the employer, who now knows from their decisions what the NLRB and 
the courts are looking for to indicate sincerity in bargaining. 
 
What Happened at Acme 
The bargaining history at one facility in suburban Chicago illustrates how 
delays and loopholes in the law can be exploited to punish workers for choosing 
representation and to avoid giving them the satisfaction of a collective agreement.  
Acme Die Casting, a division of Lovejoy Industries, makes a variety of small 
aluminum and zinc castings, mainly for the telecommunications industry.   
Jorge ANico@ Valenzuela is still working at the suburban Chicago company, 
where he began in 1977.  In October 1987, Valenzuela and coworkers Tony 
Aguilera, Arturo Ramirez and other Acme employees, most of them immigrants in 
Chicago=s large Mexican-American community, voted in favor of representation by 
the United Electrical Workers union (UE).  AWe lost another election with a 
different union earlier,@ Valenzuela explained, Awhen the company promised to 
make things better.  At first I didn=t want to get involved again.  But the UE seemed 
more democratic; it involved more workers in the leadership.@298 The company 
employed about 120 workers in 1987, when an NLRB election was held at the 
plant.  Workers voted 69-39 in favor of union representation. 
A natural leader, Nico Valenzuela became the head of the organizing 
committee and then the president of the shop union in 1987.  Antonio Ramirez and 
Tony Aguilera also became leaders.  AWhen we won the election we thought, 
>Finally we can start making things better.= We elected a negotiating committee and 
asked management to start bargaining, @ said Valenzuela.  He and the other Acme 
workers did not know that years would go by before any bargaining would begin 
and that, when it did, bargaining would be futile. 
After the election, the company filed objections to the election so unfounded 
that the NLRB dismissed them without a hearing.  But Acme refused to accept the 
                                                 
296NLRA Section 8(a)(5). 
297See NLRB v.  Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.  1943). 
298Human Rights Watch interview, July 8, 1999. 
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decision, leading the union to file refusal-to-bargain charges and a new round of 
labor board and court proceedings.  While the NLRB and the courts pondered 
Acme=s claims, workers tried to maintain their organizational activity.  They 
mounted community support campaigns in Chicago=s labor and Latino communities 
and traveled to Washington, D.C.  to meet with members of Congress and NLRB 
officials. 
In a letter-writing campaign to the NLRB, one Acme worker said, AWe 
expected that after the election we would negotiate with the company and it would 
be all over.  But we have received so many humiliations.@ Another wrote, AWe won 
the election.  We want our contract.  We can=t take the company=s abuses any 
longer.@ A third wrote, AI don=t think it=s fair, this country being a free country where 
everybody has rights.@299 
Acme management launched a campaign of reprisals after the NLRB election. 
 The vote took place on a Friday; on the following Monday, the company issued 
new rules reversing longstanding practices.  For example, management told workers 
to ask permission to use the bathroom and stopped allowing coffee and soft drinks 
in work areas.  The company cut off access to microwave ovens during lunch time.  
A wash-up period was eliminated.  Under the new rules, management began issuing 
warning notices and suspensions.300 
Valenzuela, the leader of the organizing drive and of the workers' negotiating 
committee, was a skilled mechanic popular throughout the plant.  His job took him 
to all parts of the facility keeping machinery operating.  After the election, 
management assigned him to a rote grinding job isolated from other workers and far 
below his skill level.  This took him out of circulation among coworkers and served 
                                                 
299Letters signed by Acme workers to NLRB General Counsel James K.  Stevens, March 
1988, on file with Human Rights Watch (Spanish originals translated by Human Rights 
Watch). 
300These and other reprisals were the subject of numerous unfair labor practice complaints 
issued by the NLRB that were later settled by the company. See Acme Die Casting, To the 
Employees of Acme Die Casting, company memorandum announcing settlement and 
restoration of past practices, March 29, 1989 (on file with Human Rights Watch). 
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as a constant reminder that support for the union carried serious consequences.  
Since his pay was not cut, the NLRB did not treat the move as discrimination, 
saying management has the right to assign work.301 
                                                 
301Human Rights Watch interview with Terry Davis, UE representative, July 5, 1999. 
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After workers voted for representation, management halted salary increases for 
over a year.  A judge found that, while refusing to bargain with the union, the 
company president told a group of workers who requested a pay increase, AI told 
you guys not to bother with the union because that was going to happen, no raises . . 
. You want the union, go to the union.@302  However, when a smaller group of 
workers promising to decertify the union asked for pay increases, they were granted 
raises within two weeks.  The administrative law judge who heard the evidence 
found that Acme=s president fraudulently backdated a letter authorizing the pay 
increases to a date prior to the meeting with anti-union workers to make it appear 
that the decision was not motivated by bias against pro-union workers.303 
 
Ten Years of Appeals and Fruitless Bargaining  
In 1998, eleven years after the election, Acme ran out of appeals and had to 
pay $900,000 in cumulative back pay to workers unlawfully denied their pay 
increases.304  But the back-pay case involved discriminatory retaliation against 
workers for forming and joining a union.  It did not address the collective 
bargaining process.  Negotiations had been going on intermittently since 1990 when 
the company exhausted appeals in the earlier refusal-to-bargain case.305   
In negotiations after 1990, Acme was again found guilty of refusal to bargain 
in good faith.  The company subcontracted work without either notifying the union 
or bargaining, a move the administrative law judge called Aan example of 
subcontracting during negotiations over an initial contract by an employer who 
spent years trying to avoid any obligation to bargain at all.@306  Acme gave Amerit@ 
increases to certain high-paid employees who opposed the union while refusing to 
bargain on general salary increases with the union, which was seeking to improve 
the status of lower-paid workers.   
To the company=s argument that a bargaining Aimpasse@ permitted such moves, 
the judge ruled that Athe Respondent [Acme] has been guilty of repeated violations 
of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act going back to 1987 . . . In light of this history, it cannot 
                                                 
302See Acme Die Casting, a Division of Lovejoy Industries, Inc.  v.  NLRB, 26 F.3d 162 
(D.C.  Cir.  1994). 
303Ibid. Under NLRB rules, no particular penalty attaches to such fraudulent behavior. It is 
just another piece of evidence of an unfair labor practice. No punitive measures against 
workers= rights violations are permitted under U.S. law. Remedies consist only of cease-and-
desist orders, reinstatement orders, bargaining orders, and the like. 
304See Francine Knowles, AAcme Die workers to get $900,000,@ Chicago Sun-Times, March 
3, 1998. 
305See NLRB v. Lovejoy Industries, Inc., 904 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1990). 
306See Acme Die Casting and United Electrical Workers (UE), 315 NLRB 202 (1994). 
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claim benefit of any impasse in bargaining since its own intransigent and illegal 
behavior . . . would have contributed to any stalemate.@ The judge concluded that 
the company=s violations Aare repeated and pervasive and evidence on its part an 
attitude of total disregard for its statutory obligations.@307   
                                                 
307Ibid. 
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In an April 1993 decision, the administrative law judge ordered Acme to 
Acease and desist@ from refusing to bargain and to return to the table and bargain in 
good faith.  The NLRB upheld the judge=s decision in September 1994.  Thus 
admonished, Acme management shifted to a strategy of appearing to bargain by 
making proposals and counterproposals to the workers on minor subjects.  
However, the company "made demands they knew would be suicidal for the union" 
in other areas, said UE representative Terry Davis.  Acme proposed small wage 
increases and demanded enormous hikes in employee payments for health insurance 
that would far exceed any pay increase.308  However, a careful employer can nearly 
always couch such demands as Ahard bargaining,@ which is legal, as long as it makes 
proposals and counterproposals in other areas. 
Bargaining went nowhere.  In 1996, nearly a decade after he played a key role 
in helping coworkers win their election and serving on the workers= bargaining 
committee, Antonio Ramirez died.  The loss of Ramirez=s leadership was 
compounded, said Davis, when management took advantage of the supervisory 
exclusion in the NLRA to entice several activists from the bargaining unit by 
making them supervisors and giving them pay raises.  Union chief steward Tony 
Aguilera was one unionist tapped for a supervisor=s post.309 
In March 1999, the UE sent a letter to Acme and to the NLRB disclaiming 
representation rights.  Under NLRB rules, a certified union may inform the board in 
writing that it relinquishes representation.310  Although rarely invoked, this step is 
the only one left to unions that have exhausted all possibilities of achieving a 
collective agreement even after the application of labor law remedies against prior 
unfair labor practices by employers.  AAt this rate,@ said union negotiator Davis, Athe 
company would still have deal-killers on the table twenty-five years from now.@311  
 
A Manager Speaks 
                                                 
308Human Rights Watch interview, Chicago, Illinois, July 5, 1999. 
309Ibid. 
310See NLRB, ANLRB Casehandling Manual,@ Part Two, section 11120. 
311Ibid. 
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A top Acme official, while denying a request for an interview at the plant, told 
Human Rights Watch "[W]e worked long and hard for years to convince our 
employees that they=re better off with us than with a union.  The union did nothing 
but lie about us.  People now believe they=re better off with us than with a union.@312 
                                                 
312Human Rights Watch telephone interview, July 8, 1999.  The manager quoted did not 
agree to an interview but did, without prompting and without conditions, offer the statement 
cited here.  Most company managers in other cases studied for this report refused to speak 
with Human Rights Watch. 
These were years when, under the law, the company was supposed to be 
bargaining in good faith with the workers with a sincere desire to reach an 
agreement.  The manager=s statement to Human Rights Watch shows how far from 
sincere the company=s bargaining was.  Yet in the end, its methods prevailed against 
workers= right to bargain collectively.  Acme outlasted the life of one organizer and 
the endurance of others, and the legal structure supposed to protect workers= rights 
proved no impediment to these tactics. 
The Acme Die Casting case is a dramatic example of profound weakness in 
U.S. labor law and its inability to deal with a determinedly intransigent employer 
intent for over a decade on denying workers= right to bargain collectively.  Over this 
time, authorities repeatedly found the employer guilty of interference, restraint, 
coercion, discrimination, and bargaining in bad faith; that is, without a sincere 
desire to reach an agreement.  But the only remedy was an order to cease and desist 
such conduct.  In effect, by repeated findings of unlawful behavior with no punitive 
remedies, the NLRB and the courts simply gave the employer a road map to 
minimally lawful-appearing conduct.  In fact, as the Acme manager=s statement 
makes clear, the company harbored no desire to reach an agreement.  Instead, it 
acted to Aconvince@ employees to abandon the union at the same time the company 
was supposed to be bargaining in good faith. 
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New Orleans, Louisiana Shipbuilding 
[Y]ou better make sure these whiners, malcontents and slackers don=t even 
come close to winning this election. 
CCompany president in a captive-audience meeting before a 1993 NLRB 
election 
 
Seen from the Huey P.  Long Memorial Bridge just up the Mississippi River 
from New Orleans, the cranes, drydocks and hulls of ships being built at the 
Avondale Industries, Inc.  shipyard rise from the flat riverside plain like giant 
stalagmites.  With more than 6,000 workers, Avondale Industries is Louisiana's 
largest private sector employer.  It is also the site of one of the largest workers= 
organizing efforts in the United States during the 1990s. 
Up close, sounds of surging motors and clanging metal envelop workers who 
build and repair ships for the U.S. Navy.  The Navy is Avondale's biggest single 
customer, accounting for more than three-quarters of its businessC$3 billion in 
Navy contract awards in the past decade.  Avondale also makes oil tankers for 
petroleum firms.  It is seeking to expand its base of private commercial customers, 
including cruise ship companies. 
In August 1999, Avondale Industries was purchased by California-based 
Litton Industries.  Along with Avondale assets, though, Litton inherited a 
longstanding labor dispute rife with a decade=s worth of workers' rights violations. 
"We didn't get a raise for almost ten years.  The pension was a joke.  People 
were getting hurt and killed.  There was a lot of discrimination.  The foremen 
treated you like dirt.  We needed respect.  We needed a union bad," said machinist 
Joseph Johnson, a leader in the movement to form a union at the yard in 1993.  He 
had also been active in earlier unsuccessful organizing tries.  When Johnson retired 
in 1996, after nearly thirty years of service at Avondale, his monthly pension was 
$270.313 
In 1993, Johnson and others among the nearly 4,000 hourly paid Avondale 
workers launched an effort to form and join a union in the Metal Trades Council of 
the AFL-CIO.314  The council represents workers at many large U.S. shipyards, 
gathering the specialized crafts of welders, pipefitters, machinists, electricians, 
painters and others to bargain collectively with shipbuilding employers.  The union 
represents more than 10,000 workers at Litton Industries' Ingalls shipyard in 
                                                 
313Human Rights Watch interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 11, 1999. 
314The rest of the Avondale labor force is salaried supervisory, managerial, 
engineering and technical personnel not part of the bargaining unit sought by the 
Metal Trades Council. 
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Pascagoula, Mississippi, along the Gulf Coast some 200 miles east of New Orleans. 
  
 
AEgregious Misconduct@ 
Avondale management unleashed a massive campaign to deter the workers' 
organizing effort.  "They called in each craft to talk down the union" in captive-
audience meetings, said sheet metal worker Bruce Lightall, who has worked at the 
plant since 1979.  "They told us they'd shut the door if the union came in, that we'd 
lose Navy contracts."315 
In a speech to assembled Avondale workers at a captive-audience meeting 
before the 1993 election, company president Albert L.  Bossier, Jr.  said: 
 
                                                 
315Human Rights Watch interview, May 11, 1999. 
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You know, those of you who are for Avondale already understand how 
serious this is.  Those of you who are undecided need to think, and really 
think, about what this union is doing to Avondale . . . [T]hey want their 
dues money and if they don't get it they don't give a damn what happens 
to Avondale.  Now those of you who are for this union I can only 
conclude that you hate this company so much that you don't give a damn 
if the Union takes action to destroy us . . . If you really want to destroy 
Avondale you oughtta go and support and vote for the damn union.  You 
know, those of you who don't want to destroy Avondale, you better make 
sure these whiners, malcontents and slackers don't even come close to 
winning this election . . . Secure your future by rejecting this union and 
its bosses.316 
 
The findings of an NLRB administrative law judge provide a more systematic 
description of Avondale management's violations of workers' freedom of 
association.  The judge issued his 700-page decision in February 1998 after an 
unfair labor practice hearing that lasted from July 1994 to July 1996.  The hearing 
required 165 days of hearings and resulted in a hearing transcript thousands of 
pages long.317  The judge found that Avondale management: 
 
C applied stricter enforcement of work rules against union supporters than 
against union opponents; 
 
C transferred union supporters to more difficult and dirtier jobs; 
 
C threatened to withhold wage increases if a majority of workers voted for the 
union; 
 
C threatened to close the yard if a majority of workers voted for the union; 
                                                 
316Quoted in NLRB, Decision of administrative law judge David L. Evans in Avondale 
Industries, Inc. and New Orleans Metal Trades Council, Cases 15-CA-12171-1 et.al., 
February 27, 1998. It should be noted that Bossier's statements were found by the judge not 
to contain unlawful threats or promises. The judge found Bossier's calling pro-union 
employees whiners, malcontents and slackers "only simple name-calling" (Ibid., p. 27). 
However, the judge did rely on Bossier=s speech, which he termed Aa diatribe toward 
prounion employees,@ as Araw evidence of animus toward the employees= protected activities@ 
that supported other unfair labor practice findings, particularly those involving 
discriminatory discharges (Ibid., p. 51). 
317Ibid. 
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C interrogated and spied on union supporters; 
 
C threatened to fire union supporters; 
 
C fired twenty-eight union supporters. 
 
These labor rights violations took place in a one-year period before and after 
the June 1993 NLRB election at Avondale.  Years of legal proceedings followed the 
workers= election victory.  In his 1998 decision, the judge ordered Avondale to 
reinstate fired workers and to pledge not to repeat the unlawful conduct.318  
Avondale did not comply with this order, and the cases remain on appeal. 
The administrative law judge characterized Avondale=s behavior as Aegregious 
misconduct, demonstrating a general disregard for employees= fundamental rights." 
In these extreme circumstances, he ordered the extraordinary remedy of having 
company president Bossier read the NLRB's remedial notice to assembled 
employees (or, if Bossier refused, to be present while a board agent read the 
notice).319  This remedy, too, was never implemented. 
 
Defying the NLRB 
In June 1993, despite management's tactics, a majority of Avondale workers 
voted in favor of bargaining collectively with the company.  The original vote count 
was 1,804 favoring representation by the Metal Trades Council of the AFL-CIO, 
and 1,263 opposed to representation.  After adjusting for challenged ballots, the 
union ultimately prevailed 1,950 to 1,632.  Avondale management refused to accept 
the results and began a series of appeals to the NLRB.  In April 1997Cnearly four 
years after the electionCthe NLRB certified the results and ordered Avondale to 
bargain with the union.  The company still refused, appealing the board's order to 
the federal courts. 
                                                 
318This is the standard NLRB remedy for unfair labor practices. Reinstated workers are 
entitled to back pay for time off the job, "mitigated" by subtracting all interim earnings the 
worker was able to obtain. 
319Administrative Law Judge decision, February 27, 1998,  pp. 106-107. 
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Frank Johnson, an Avondale machinist with twenty-five years in the yard, told 
Human Rights Watch in May 1999, "After the election I thought we'd sit down after 
a week or so and start bargaining.  Now it's six years later, and we're still 
waiting."320  Echoing Johnson, Bruce Lightall said, "I thought we'd sit down after 
the election and negotiate a contract like reasonable people, to get some justice, 
respect, dignity.  In time I found out how the law doesn't work for workers.  It just 
helps the companies.  They can appeal forever.@321  Pipefitter Harry Thompson, 
another leader of the organizing drive who has since retired from Avondale, put it 
even more bluntly, "The law stinks."322 
In the separate unfair labor practice case involving threats, discrimination, and 
firings of twenty-eight workers, Avondale appealed the administrative law judge's 
1998 decision to the NLRB in Washington.  In the meantime, another massive 
unfair labor practice case labeled "Avondale II" has begun, consolidating NLRB 
complaints upholding union charges of a new round of threats, coercion, 
discrimination, firings of union supporters and other unlawful conduct by Avondale 
management taking place between 1994 and 1998.  Several of these cases involve 
acts of retaliation against the union's health and safety activists and their efforts to 
publicize and halt the company's failure to obey occupational health and safety 
laws.  Between 1990 and 1997, seven workers were killed in accidents at the 
Avondale yard, more than any other major shipyard in the country.323 
On November 10, 1999 the NLRB upheld virtually all of the findings and 
orders of the administrative law judge in the AAvondale I@ unfair labor practice case. 
 The NLRB cited Athe quantity and severity of the unfair labor practices committed@ 
by Avondale and supported most of the judge=s extraordinary remedies.  However, 
the NLRB only required a senior company manager, not necessarily Albert Bossier, 
Jr.Cnow the ex-president of AvondaleCto read the NLRB=s order to assembled 
workers.324  Avondale appealed the order. 
 
A Fired Worker Speaks 
A sandblaster and spray painter at the yard since beginning work in 1985, 
Donald Varnado is a worker fired in April 1993 who is still waiting for a final 
                                                 
320Human Rights Watch interview, May 11, 1999. 
321Human Rights Watch interview, May 11, 1999. 
322Human Rights Watch interview, May 11, 1999. 
323See Frank Swoboda, AAvondale Faces Fine of $537,000 by OSHA,@ Washington Post, 
April 6, 1999, p. E2. 
324See NLRB Decision and Order, Avondale Industries, Inc. and New Orleans Metal Trade 
Council, 329 NLRB No. 93 (November 10, 1999). Avondale=s new owner, Litton Industries, 
has appealed the NLRB=s decision. 
176 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
ruling in the "Avondale I" case.  With the case now pending before a federal court 
in Washington, Varnado will have to wait years more. 
"I was an activator, a supporter.  I went to union meetings and talked to the 
guys.  We needed more of a voice, more respect.  The foremen and supervisors 
were always watching me and the other union guys, just looking to get rid of us," 
Varnado told Human Rights Watch.325 
                                                 
325Human Rights Watch interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 11, 1999. 
The administrative law judge who heard the evidence ruled that Varnado was 
fired for his union activity, ordering himClike twenty-seven other 
workersCreinstated with back pay minus interim earnings.  While waiting for final 
action, said Varnado, "It's been a struggle.  I had one steady job in construction for 
a couple of years.  The rest were on and off, contractor jobs with no benefits." 
Like many precariously employed workers, Varnado had no health insurance 
during most of his years away from Avondale.  "I had Avondale's family medical 
for $25 a week out of my pay, but I lost that coverage when they fired me," he 
explained.  "Since then, I had a lot of medical expenses that I had to pay for me and 
my family." 
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"I hope I get some reward for all my suffering from Avondale," said Varnado. 
 "But it's not about the money.  It's about what the union can do for you to get some 
respect from the company."326 
 
Government Subsidies Against Workers= Rights  
During the years between the 1993 election and Litton Industries= acquisition 
of the company in 1999, the federal government effectively paid Avondale its legal 
expenses for violating workers= rights.  The Department of the Navy reimbursed 
Avondale for more than $5 million in expenses for campaigning against workers= 
self-organization and resisting unfair labor practice charges.  As Avondale's biggest 
customer, providing more than three-quarters of its business, the U.S. Navy has 
enormous influence over events at the company.  "Why doesn't the U.S. government 
say 'You can't do this!'?" asked union supporter Bruce Lightall in an interview with 
Human Rights Watch.327 
Responding to an inquiry from Human Rights Watch, a Navy representative 
explained, "The costs of legal services, including those associated with Avondale's 
NLRB and Court of Appeals litigation, are generally allowable as an indirect cost 
(as part of overhead rates) . . . Avondale's overhead costs for Fiscal Years 1993 
through 1998 have included approximately $5.4 million for legal fees related to the 
labor dispute . . . [T]he total costs for legal services that may be reimbursed . . . 
have not yet been finally determined."328   
                                                 
326Ibid. 
327Human Rights Watch interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 11, 1999. 
328See letter to Human Rights Watch from G.H.  Jenkins, Jr., rear admiral, SC, U.S. Navy, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and Acquisition, July 29, 1999, 
on file with Human Rights Watch. 
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This response did not address the underlying issue for human rights 
consideration.  The federal government is supposed to be a guarantor of rights 
protection.  It cannot weigh in on the side of a rights violator without becoming 
itself complicit in human rights abuses.  Where the support involves public funds, 
the complicity is even more serious.  Avondale worker Bruce Lightall put it 
succinctly, AWe pay taxes.  That's our money.  They're making us pay to hang 
ourselves."329 
 
Aftermath: Recognition from a New Employer 
In July 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld 
Avondale's objections to the 1993 election, reversing the NLRB decision and 
ordering a new election.330  The appeals court overturned the election because the 
voter lists used in the election contained the first initial, middle initial, and last 
name of the employee, rather than the full first name, middle initial, and last name 
of the employee.  No NLRB election had ever been overturned on such grounds 
before.  The court called the board's conduct of the election "unthinking adoption of 
'standard practice.'"331 
In a tone of scorn for the union and the federal agency charged with upholding 
the law, the court=s ruling stated that the NLRB and the union, "parroting the 
hearing officer's allocation of responsibility . . . attempted to saddle Avondale with 
the blame for any failure in voter identification."332  Just as astonishing in its one-
sided view of the case, the court said full name voter lists should have been used 
because "electioneering was hostile and bitter," without any acknowledgment that 
                                                 
329Human Rights Watch interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 11, 1999. 
330See Avondale Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 97-60708, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15036, 
July 7, 1999. It should be remembered that the case involving Avondale=s objection to the 
election is separate from the unfair labor practice case involving threats, coercion, 
discrimination, firings and other company abuses. That case is still awaiting a decision by the 
NLRB in Washington on Avondale=s appeal from the ruling of the administrative law judge. 
331Ibid., p. 14. 
332Ibid., p. 18. 
Case Studies of Violations of Workers= Freedom of Association 179  
 
 
the administrative law judge in the separate unfair labor practice case had already 
found Avondale guilty of massive threats, discrimination and firings in the period 
leading up to the election. 
Despite this ruling, a rapid series of developments after the late 1999 sale of 
Avondale to Litton Industries brought the decade-long dispute over representation 
rights close to a conclusion.  With a longstanding relationship with the Metal Trades 
Council at its other major shipbuilding locations, Litton agreed to a card-check 
method of certifying majority support for the union among Avondale workers.   
Although the card-check agreement called for a one-year period in which the 
union could obtain cards signed by workers, a large majority signed cards within 
five weeks.  A private arbitrator commissioned by the company and the union to 
certify results confirmed the union=s majority status.  Collective bargaining finally 
began early in 2000.333 
Avondale workers demonstrated patience and determination during a decade-
long attempt to form and join a union to bargain collectively.  Litton Industries 
deserves credit, too, for moving quickly to resolve the dispute by acknowledging 
workers= free choice rather than interfering with that choice.  But the new 
developments are not all favorable for workers.  While it is willing to bargain with 
the workers= union, Litton has launched an appeal against the NLRB=s November 
1999 ruling upholding the administrative law judge=s order to reinstate all fired 
workers. 
Agreement to recognize a union based on voluntary card-signing is still 
exceptional in U.S. labor law and practice.  It took an extraordinary turn of events 
and a willing employer for workers to achieve a goal that government authorities 
had so far failed to afford.  It seems clear that without the sale to Litton, Avondale 
workers would have gone far into the new century before they could effectively 
exercise their right to freedom of association.  And still, twenty-eight workers 
including Donald Varnado, who suffered the ultimate workplace reprisal as long as 
eight years ago for exercising their right to freedom of association, have a long wait 
ahead. 
 
New York City Apparel Shops 
We didn=t know what our rights were, so we just accepted it. 
CAntonia Arellano, a sweatshop worker who organized . . . for two weeks 
 
                                                 
333See Keith Darce, AAvondale To Become Union Yard: Long Labor Dispute Is 
Over,@ New Orleans Times-Picayune, December 1, 1999, p. A1. 
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The resurgence of sweatshops in America reflects a Arace to the bottom@ on 
labor rights and labor standards more often attributed to export processing zones in 
Third World countries.  For workers in the United States, as is often the case in 
Central American or East Asian sweatshops, freedom of association is the first 
casualty. 
Researching violations of workers= freedom of association in U.S. sweatshops 
posed a sharp challenge.  Workers trapped in the sweatshop system are so 
victimized in every aspect of their working lives that an open exercise of the right to 
organize and associate is an extraordinary event.  Most sweatshop workers are so 
burdened by the need to make it through another day that forming a union is beyond 
their energies.  Moreover, as Human Rights Watch found in other, non-sweatshop 
sector cases, immigrant workers= problems with authorization papers and fear of 
deportation also prevent efforts to organize in sweatshops. 
Sweatshop workers turn to collective action as a last resort, usually when they 
realize that their employer has no intention of paying them even their subminimum 
wages for weeks of work already performed.  Minimum wage violations, overtime 
pay violations, health and safety violations, sexual harassment and other problems 
in the garment industry are an accepted fact of working life, especially in the two 
largest urban regions in the country, New York and Los Angeles. 
A 1994 report by the federal government=s General Accounting Office found 
that sweatshops were widespread in the garment sector.  The report noted declining 
resources for labor law enforcement by federal and state authorities and concluded, 
AIn general, the description of today=s sweatshops differs little from that at the turn 
of the century.@334 
One year after the release of that report, a shocking exposé of sweatshop labor 
in El Monte, California put a human face on the GAO=s findings.  Seventy-two 
workers from Thailand were discovered toiling in conditions akin to slavery.  These 
workers were forced to work seventeen hours a day for seventy cents an hour.  They 
had to eat and sleep where they worked, with ten workers in bedrooms built for two 
persons.  Armed guards threatened to kill them if they tried to leave.  They were not 
                                                 
334See U.S. General Accounting Office, APrevalence of Sweatshops,@ GAO/HEHS-95-29, 
November 2, 1994. 
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allowed to make unmonitored phone calls.  Supervisors censored their letters home. 
 They had to buy food and other necessities at inflated prices from their 
employer.335  American consumers had become aware of conditions in Central 
American and other foreign sweatshops following network television exposure.336  
Now they saw similar conditions in their own front yard. 
                                                 
335For an account of the El Monte case, see Julie Su, AEl Monte Thai garment workers: slave 
sweatshops,@ in Andrew Ross, ed., No Sweat: fashion, free trade, and the rights of garment 
workers (New York, Verso Press, 1997). 
336See 60 Minutes, AHiring Rosa Martinez,@ CBS television broadcast, September 27, 199; 
Nightline, APaying to Lose Our Jobs,@ ABC television broadcast, September 29-30, 1992. 
The Thai workers in El Monte made no attempt to form and join a union or to 
bargain collectively.  Their concern was survival.  In the same way, most sweatshop 
workers are afraid to complain about conditions or treatment.  Because their work is 
underground and unauthorized, they accept exploitation in silence, fearful that filing 
complaints with labor law authorities or seeking to form and join a union will cost 
them their jobs and subject them to deportation. 
Apparel manufacturing is a multibillion-dollar industry employing more than 
700,000 workers in the United States.  While most of them work in the formal 
sector of the economy for registered places of business, an unknown numberCat 
least in the tens of thousands, and possibly moreCwork in an underground, off-the-
books sector of the industry. 
Nationally, there are fewer than 1,000 manufacturers serving a relative handful 
of well-known retail and private-label brand name companies, but more than 20,000 
contractors and subcontractors, most of them small shops with fewer than thirty 
workers.  It takes only a few thousand dollars to open a sewing shop consisting of 
little more than sewing machines and space rented by the month.  It costs almost 
nothing to close one. 
The garment sector is the biggest manufacturing industry in New York and 
Los Angeles, where in each region more than 100,000 workers labor in some 5,000 
contracting and subcontracting sewing shops.  Women who have recently migrated 
to the United States from Asia and Latin America are a significant majority of the 
workforce.  These small shops compete fiercely for business from the 
manufacturers.  Violating wage and hour laws is the quickest and easiest way to 
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gain a competitive advantage, particularly when workers are not likely to complain 
or to organize for improvements.   
U.S. Labor Department studies in 1997 and 1998 indicated that nearly two-
thirds of garment industry shops in New York violate minimum wage and overtime 
laws.337  A comprehensive private study of the Los Angeles garment industry 
concluded in 1999 that Athis important industry is plagued by substandard working 
conditions . . . There is widespread non-compliance with labor, health, and safety 
laws.@338  
                                                 
337See Steven Greenhouse, ATwo-Thirds of Garment Shops Break Wage Laws, U.S. Says,@ 
New York Times, October 17, 1997, p. A37. 
338See Report, Los Angeles Jewish Commission on Sweatshops (January 1999); Patrick J.  
McDonnell, AJewish Group Urges Reform of Sweatshops,@ Los Angeles Times, February 1, 
1999, p. B1. 
Case Studies of Violations of Workers= Freedom of Association 183  
 
 
Under current law, retailers and manufacturers who profit from sweatshops= 
race to the bottom on labor standards are not held responsible for labor law 
violations committed by contractors or subcontractors, including violations of 
workers= organizing rights.  The large companies are insulated by the hierarchical 
structure of the industry and the reliance on one-job, quick-turnaround, 
unpredictable subcontracting arrangements that have largely displaced traditional 
longer-term, stable contracting relationships.  One study of Los Angeles= 184 largest 
manufacturers found that they accounted for close to 3,000 overlapping sewing 
contracts, providing an enormous amount of control, but no direct responsibility for 
conditions, in factories that provided them with contracted labor.339 
Human Rights Watch examined two cases of sweatshop workers= organizing 
efforts in New York City: 
 
MK Collections 
In 1997 a group of workers at a mid-town Manhattan sewing shop called MK 
Collections formed a union in UNITE, the principal labor organization in the 
apparel industry.  UNITE maintains two workers= rights and service centers in New 
York, one in Manhattan and one in Brooklyn, to assist both union and non-union 
workers with wage claims, workers= compensation claims, health and safety 
complaints and other work-related problems.  The union also provides educational 
programs in English as a second language, skills training, immigration rights, and 
citizenship. 
Mario Ramírez told Human Rights Watch that workers acted because they 
were owed seven weeks= pay for work performed and Abecause the owners screamed 
at people.@340  He came to the UNITE workers= center to seek assistance.  With the 
union=s advice, Ramírez and a group of coworkers formed an organizing committee. 
Eduardo Rodríguez, who like Ramírez came to New York from Puebla, 
Mexico, was another union adherent.  AWe would talk outside before work and at 
lunchtime, but never in big groups,@ he explained.341  Rodríguez estimated union 
                                                 
339See Richard P. Appelbaum, AGlobal Commodity Chains, Emigrant Communities, and 
Labor in the Globalized Economy,@ UC MEXUS Global Migration Conference, Riverside, 
California, October 24-25, 1997, cited in Report, Los Angeles Jewish Commission, p. 13. 
340Human Rights Watch interview, New York City, June 15, 1999. 
341Human Rights Watch interview, New York City, June 15, 1999. 
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support at about forty workers, a solid majority of the sixty-five to seventy people 
working at MK Collections. 
In January 1997, MK workers brought their organizing effort to a head with a 
work stoppage demanding back pay for work performed.  At first, their movement 
bore fruit.  Seven members of the organizing group signed a handwritten agreement 
with the owner recognizing UNITE, setting a just cause standard for disciplinary 
action, promising to maintain clean bathrooms, andCbesides paying wages on 
timeCto pay an additional $50 per week until full back pay was reached for each 
worker. 
The agreement held up for only four months.  The employer fired two 
committee members, who did not want to protest because of immigration fears.  In 
early May 1997, the company closed down, claiming that a manufacturer had 
canceled a production contract.  According to Ramírez and Rodríguez, the owner 
reopened at a new location and hired a new workforce just weeks later.342 
Their experience left its mark on Ramírez and Rodríguez.  AI=ve thought about 
organizing in my new job,@ said Ramírez, who found other work in the garment 
industry.  ABut I need to be guaranteed that I won=t be fired.@343  Rodríguez, who 
took a new job in a restaurant, said, AAs long as there is no law to protect us better, I 
don=t think it is likely that I will organize again.@344 
 
YPS 
According to UNITE representative Bertha Wilson, herself a former garment 
worker, employees from a Manhattan sewing shop called YPS came to the union-
sponsored workers= center in 1997 because they were owed back wages, even 
though YPS subcontracted production for brand-name companies like Lord & 
Taylor, Ann Taylor, and Express.345  One of the workers, Antonia Arellano, told 
Human Rights Watch that workers were not being paid on time, that managers 
mistreated workers, that drinking fountains did not work, and that workers got no 
rest or lunch breaks.  AWe were aware that we were illegal,@ she said, Aso we were 
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345Human Rights Watch interview, New York, June 15, 1999. 
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kind of like slaves.@346  She said that women workers were especially mistreated.  
AOne of the managers would touch the women,@ she said.  AIf they complained they 
were fired.  A few women were actually fired, and others just took it.  We didn=t 
know what our rights were, so we just accepted things.  Some people said, >I=m just 
here to work, so I=ll ignore the rest.=@ With four to five weeks= back pay owing to 
workers, said Arellano, AThe boss wanted to pay us with clothes.  But how were we 
going to sell them for money?@347  
                                                 
346Human Rights Watch interview, New York, June 15, 1999. 
347Ibid. 
In November 1997, YPS employees stopped work and demanded union 
recognition and four to six weeks of back pay.  According to Bertha Wilson, the 
owner said he would recognize the union as long as the union did not contact Ann 
Taylor.  In December, the owner signed an agreement calling for an end to sexual 
harassment, a forty-five-minute lunch break, and incremental back-pay 
disbursements each week. 
The YPS agreement held up only for two weeks.  The owner again halted 
back-pay disbursements, and employees stopped work.  YPS shut its doors and went 
out of business.  UNITE organized a workers= demonstration at the headquarters of 
brand-name companies that had contracted for work with YPS.  Those companies 
agreed to make workers whole for lost wages, but by now workers had scattered to 
other locations.  Many failed to collect their pay, fearing to come forward, said 
Wilson, because they were undocumented and were afraid of INS action. 
 
Migrant Agricultural Workers 
 
Washington State Apple Industry 
You have thirty minutes to get back to work or you=re all fired. 
CAn anti-union consultant to a group of striking farmworkers 
 
The brown, treeless mountains framing the Yakima Valley of central 
Washington belie the rich soil below.  Vineyards, hop fields, and orchards run 
uphill from the river as it cuts through the valley.  This is the center of the states=s 
multibillion-dollar agricultural industry and its crown jewels, the Fuji, Granny 
Smith, Golden and Red Delicious, and other apples filling fruit bowls in homes 
around the world.   
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Washington is the world's most prodigious grower of the popular fruit.  
Washington apples feed 60 percent of the domestic U.S. consumer market (New 
York state apples are second, far behind with 10 percent of the domestic market).  
Forty percent of Washington=s apple crop goes overseas. 
For more than 50,000 workers in the Washington apple industry, freedom of 
association is less bountiful.  Workers who want to exercise rights to organize and 
bargain collectively to improve wages and conditions continue to be stymied by 
employer violations and by the government=s failure to protect their rights.   
Like all agricultural workers, Washington apple pickers are excluded from 
coverage by the National Labor Relations Act because they are not defined as 
Aemployees@ meriting the law=s protection.348  As noted above, the United States 
argued to the U.N.  in its report on compliance with the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights that this exclusion Ameans only that they do not have 
access to the specific provisions of the NLRA . . . for enforcing their rights to 
organize and bargain collectively.@349  But farmworkers= lack of access to 
enforcement  authorities leaves employers a free hand to threaten and to carry out 
reprisals against workers who seek to form and join a union to bargain collectively. 
At high harvest, more than 40,000 pickers work in apple orchards in 
Washington.  Although the Supreme Court of Washington has recognized the right 
of an agricultural worker to join a union, a worker who is fired for doing so must 
file a private lawsuit to vindicate the right.350  That is, a worker can seek redress 
only by getting a lawyer and bringing an expensive and risky private lawsuit.  The 
employer will usually assert that the worker was fired for cause.  Such a dispute has 
to be litigated in court.   
Most farmworkers fired for organizing are not likely to take their cases to 
court.  Many are migrants who speak no English.  They have no money to pay 
lawyers.  They have no time to find witnesses who can testify on their behalf or to 
prepare for examination and cross-examination in court to pursue their case.  They 
usually have to look immediately for work elsewhere, or follow the harvest to the 
next crop. 
Similarly, most private lawyers are not likely to take such cases.  Finding 
witnesses is difficult.  So is overcoming employer testimony about the worker's 
alleged misconduct, the usual pretext for a discriminatory discharge.  The testimony 
of a confident, bilingual supervisor on the employer=s behalf is more polished than 
                                                 
348NLRA, Section 2. 
349See U.S. Department of State, A Initial Report to the U.N.  Human Rights Committee@ 
(July 1994), p. 166. 
350See Bravo v. Dolssen Companies, 125Wn.2d 745; 888 P.2d 147 (1995). 
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that of a little-educated, frightened worker struggling to explain what happened 
through an interpreter.  The possibility of punitive damages is small, so even if the 
case is won there is no payoff for the lawyer.   
The costs associated with this, along with the fact that many of the workers are 
undocumented and want no brushes with the legal system, make the use of such 
lawsuits unrealistic.  Employers know this.  As a result, employers may violate 
apple workers= right to freedom of association with effective impunity. 
The 15,000 workers in the Asheds@ sector of the industry who sort, pack and 
ship apples are covered by the NLRA.  However, they have encountered serious 
violations of their right to freedom of association by employers and consultants 
exploiting weaknesses in the law and  ineffectual remedies for violations.  The shed 
sector was once highly unionized, but strikes broken by replacement workers and 
closures of facilities where workers had chosen union representation effectively 
ended collective bargaining by the 1970s. 
Many apple workers are employed year-round.  In the orchards, they tend 
older trees and plant new trees.  In the sheds, they sort and store apples in 
temperature-controlled areas and ship them to wholesale and retail outlets in the 
United States and to overseas markets.  Most of these year-round workers have 
settled permanently in the area.  Increasingly, seasonal apple workers are also 
settling in the area and working on other crops that come to harvest at different 
times, like cherries and asparagus. 
In the past two decades the demographics in the Washington apple industry, 
like those of many other regions and industries throughout the United States, have 
shifted from a labor force made up mostly of U.S.-born citizens to one heavily 
populated by immigrants.  A majority of workers now employed in the Washington 
apple industryCall the orchard workers, in fact, and a majority of workers in 
shedsCare immigrants from Mexico.  Many have been here for many years and are 
now citizens or hold legal work authorization.  Many others are undocumented.  
Coincidentally, Mexico is the largest foreign customer for Washington State apples. 
 According to an industry newspaper, AMexico has become the core of the U.S. 
apple industry=s export strategy.@351  
Many apple workers live in poverty, often in squalid company housing or, 
when growers fail to provide housing (which is not a requirement), on the banks of 
nearby streams.  Low wages, intermittent work, dangerous pesticides, hazardous 
working conditions and inadequate medical attention make the lives of Washington 
apple industry workers precarious.  Under optimal conditions, apple pickers told 
Human Rights Watch, they can earn up to $10 or $12 an hour in the orchards.  But 
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optimal conditions are not always present in the few weeks of harvest time each 
autumn.   Workers often make closer to the minimum wage, with $6 or $7 per 
hour.  In the sheds, the average salary is less than $15,000 per year.  The average 
wage in the Yakima and Wenatchee areas, the centers of apple-growing activity, is 
30 percent below the statewide average.  Over 20 percent of the Yakima County 
population, and more than 30 percent of its children, live below the poverty level.  
 The lack of housing for migrant workers reached scandalous proportions in 
1999 when employers closed workers= barracks instead of complying with 
Department of Labor housing standards on such items as solid floors, enclosed 
areas for cooking and eating, refrigerators, stoves, lighting, and toilets.  After the 
closures, thousands of workers lived in forests and on riverbanks in cars, tents and 
cardboard boxes.352 
                                                 
352See Lynda V. Mapes, ACrisis in the Camps: Harvest without Housing,@ The Seattle Times, 
June 22, 1999, p. A1. 
Overall, conditions here bear out the conclusions of a study prepared for the 
U.S. Department of Labor that found: 
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Most migrant farmworkers live a marginal existence, even after they stop 
migrating and settle in one location . . . The poor living and working 
conditions of migrant farmworkers are the result of farm labor practices 
that shift production costs to workers [and] reduce employer costs at the 
expense of worker earnings.  As a result, migrant workers, their families 
and communities, rather than producers, tax-payers and consumers, bear 
the high costs of agriculture=s endemic labor market instability.353 
 
A high-ranking apple industry employer representative blamed migrant 
workers for not leaving the area after the harvest is done.  AWe do need people for a 
relatively short period of time.  But when the apples are picked, they=re picked.@ 
Asked whether this meant that farmworkers Ashould never be more than migrants, 
following harvests from Texas through California and Oregon to Washington,@ the 
growers= representative said, AYes.@354   
 
Action under NAFTA 
In 1998, conditions for workers in the Washington apple industry prompted 
one of the first complaints filed under the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC), the labor side agreement to NAFTA, involving workers= 
rights violations in the United States.  Most earlier complaints filed under the 1993 
agreement involved violations in Mexico. 
                                                 
353See U.S. Department of Labor, AMigrant Farmworkers: Pursuing Security in an Unstable 
Labor Market,@ Research Report No. 5 (May 1994). 
354See Don McManman, ATemporary workers put strain on schools, welfare,@ Tri-City 
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The NAALC apple workers= submission was the broadest case filed 
under the NAALC, citing labor law violations and inadequate enforcement in 
areas encompassed in seven of the NAALC's eleven labor principles.  Most 
earlier cases addressed only union organizing issues.  The Washington 
apple industry complaint covered the right to organize, collective bargaining, 
minimum labor standards, non-discrimination in employment, job safety and 
health, workers' compensation, and migrant worker protection.  The filing 
generated a burst of publicity calling attention to conditions of migrant 
workers and the opportunity for advocacy presented by the NAALC.
355
 
Mexico accepted the Washington apple case for review in August 
1998.  In December 1998, Mexico held its first-ever hearing on a NAALC 
complaint.  It was not a public hearing in the quasi-legal style of the United 
States and Canada in their handling of NAALC cases, but rather an 
Ainformative session@ under Mexico=s procedural guidelines conducted in 
private in a roundtable setting.  A delegation of workers from packing sheds 
and orchards in Washington attended the hearing and presented direct 
testimony about pesticide poisoning, discharge for union activity, minimum 
wage violations, discrimination in the workers compensation system, 
discrimination against migrant workers, and other violations of workers 
rights.   
The hearing provoked widespread publicity in the news media of both 
the United States and Mexico.
356
  In August 1999, Mexico=s secretary of 
labor formally requested ministerial consultations with the U.S. secretary of 
labor in the apple workers= case.  This development sparked a new round of 
publicity and related attention to the conditions of migrant workers in the 
industry.
357
  As this report goes to press, a program of conferences and 
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workshops was being fashioned by the secretaries of labor of the two 
countries.   
 
Apple Pickers: the Consequences of Organizing 
                                                                                                             
accusation that Washington tolerates abuse of farm workers will be debated . . . but 
there=s no debating that some agricultural sectors owe their success to systematic 
exploitation of migrant workers.@). 
Washington apple pickers interviewed by Human Rights Watch gave detailed 
accounts of violations when they tried to exercise rights to freedom of association, 
organizing, and collective bargaining to address poor conditions.  As noted above, 
these workers are not protected by federal labor law prohibiting discrimination for 
union activity (see Chapter VI., Defenseless Workers: Exclusions in U.S. Labor 
Law  for more discussion of workers excluded from organizing protection).  
Without resources to bring individual lawsuits against employers, they have no 
redress if they are fired, and growers can spurn any request to bargain collectively. 
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"I was a ranch foreman for a big apple grower," said Luis Castañeda, a young 
farmworker who began in the apple orchards in 1993.  "I had about twenty guys 
under me.  We were close.  I tried to help them however I could, and they gave me 
good production."358  When workers at the ranch began contacting the United Farm 
Workers of America (UFW) in 1997 for help in organizing to improve wages and 
conditions, said Castañeda, his employer brought in a California-based consultant to 
train foremen and supervisors in combating workers' self-organization.  "He told us 
to tell workers that growers in California plowed under the crops and left them with 
no work when the union came in,@ said Castañeda.  "He told us to fire the leaders, 
that getting rid of the leaders would end the organizing."359 
Management fired Castañeda himself for being too close to the workers, he 
said.  Taking work as a picker at other ranches, he became active in farmworker 
efforts to form and join unions through the UFW.  "I've been fired twice since 
1997," he said, "when I signed up union members and we tried to get better 
wages."360 
Rogelio Alvarez told a similar story.  In several years of apple ranch work, "I 
was always speaking up for the people," he said.  At one ranch, "the managers let it 
go until I started talking about the union.  First they put me in a new job working by 
myself, where I couldn't talk to anybody.  When they found out I was bringing 
people to UFW meetings, they fired me."361 
"We need the union for job security, a grievance procedure, seniority, respect, 
not just for higher wages," said Arnulfo Ramírez, another long-time farmworker in 
the valley.  "But when I say this, the foreman threatens me.  He says there are 
twenty people waiting to take my job."362 
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José Godines reported suffering another kind of discrimination.  The starting 
time at the orchard where he worked in 1994 was 7:00 AM.  The manager told 
workers that those who came early would be assigned to easy, low-lying trees where 
they could quickly fill their bins.  Godines protested.  Family needs made it difficult 
for him to come early.  He tried to organize coworkers to come at the regular 
starting time, with easy picking to rotate equitably.  Management retaliated by 
assigning him to the highest, most difficult trees.  Godines fell from a ladder and 
broke his arm.  He missed the rest of the season and was not rehired the next 
year.363 
Samuel Vallejo gave similar accounts.  A Washington apple worker since 
1983, he and coworkers protested a pay cut at one of the industry's largest ranches 
in 1993.  When management learned that workers had contacted the UFW, Vallejo 
and three other leaders of the effort were fired.  "The company spread my name 
around with other big companies not to get hired," he told Human Rights Watch.364 
 
Intimidation of Striking Apple Pickers 
José Nevare and his brother Vicente were involved in a widely publicized 
dispute at Auvil Fruit company, one of the largest apple growers in the state.  
Protesting the sudden firing of eight coworkers accused of bruising apples, 150 
Auvil farmworkers stopped work on Labor Day in September 1997 and began 
picketing the entrance to the ranch.  "The next day the company brought in the 
consultant that was telling them how to beat the union," said José Nevare.365 
The consultant, California-based Stephen D.  Highfill, specializes in telling 
agricultural employers how to defeat union organizing efforts.366  He directed 
employer campaigns against workers' efforts to form unions in Yakima and 
Wenatchee, Washington throughout late 1997 and early 1998.  In a videotape made 
by workers during the strike at Auvil and reviewed by Human Rights Watch, 
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Highfill, a large, burly man, approaches the workers, taps his wristwatch, and shouts 
in Spanish, "You have thirty minutes to get back to work or you're all fired." 
Local and state police officials responded to the strike at Auvil with a show of 
force.  Twenty-six police cars from three counties and the state highway patrol 
carrying heavily armed officers massed at the ranch entrance where workers were 
peacefully picketing.  Officers with high-powered rifles flanked the workers in a 
military-style deployment.  "Our picket was totally peaceful," said Vicente Nevare, 
"but they acted like we were criminals."367   
A convoy of police cars escorted trucks and vans full of replacement workers 
sent by other growers to break the Auvil workers' strike.  The strike ended after four 
days.  Twenty-eight workers were fired, assigned to lower-paying jobs, or evicted 
from company housing. 
UFW representative Guadalupe Gamboa protested the police action in a letter 
to the chief of the Washington State Patrol.368  The state rejected his protest.  An 
official report by the Washington State Patrol characterized the strikers' parking 
their cars partially on the lightly traveled county road as "unlawful behavior" and 
said "the chanting and enthusiastic cheering from the strikers were perceived by law 
enforcement officials to be threatening in nature."369  On the videotape made by 
workers and reviewed by Human Rights Watch, workers chant "El pueblo unido 
jamás será vencido" (The people united will never be defeated) and "Sí se puede" 
(Yes, it can be done) enthusiastically, but with no words or action that could be 
even remotely construed as threatening. 
The state report cites police perception of a "threat of violence should police 
attempt to arrest Gamboa for inciting riotous behavior among strikers" as grounds 
for armed intervention.  "Based on their threat assessment," said the report, state 
troopers "should provide cover for the arresting officers from outer perimeter 
positions.  They decided to carry their AR-15's while functioning as cover officers . 
                                                 
367Human Rights Watch interview, November 6, 1999. 
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1997, on file with Human Rights Watch. 
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with Human Rights Watch. 
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. . at no time did the sergeants point their muzzles at anyone."370 At no time did the 
police move to arrest Gamboa, either, he told Human Rights Watch.  In his view, 
the police never intended an arrest because, in fact, no violence occurred or was 
threatened.  He saw the police action as one meant to intimidate workers exercising 
the right to freedom of association.371 
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Gamboa also pointed to the show of force when police vehicles escorted 
trucks and vans filled with strikebreakers past the Auvil workers= picket line.  Any 
chance of peacefully persuading potential strikebreakers to respect the picket line 
was lost, he explained, in the face of such Ablitzkrieg@ tactics.  The Washington 
State Patrol=s report said troopers had "minimal involvement" in escorting 
strikebreakers past the picket line.  "The allegation that WSP 'led a caravan of 
strikebreakers' is inaccurate," the report concluded.  "Their actions were limited to 
providing back-up security as two WSP units trailed behind the convoy."372  The 
report was silent, however, on the role of local and county police who led the 
convoy. 
 
Shed Workers 
Thousands of workers are employed in the warehouse or shed sector of the 
Washington apple industry.  Many seasonal workers in the sheds are migrants from 
Mexico, and many year-round workers are resident Mexican and Mexican-
Americans who have put down roots in the communities of the apple region.  Many 
Anglo workers long resident in the region are also employed in the sheds. 
Apple shed workers are not defined as agricultural workers.  They are covered 
by the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice to threaten, coerce, or 
discriminate against workers for union organizing activity.  But when workers at 
two of the largest apple processing companies sought to form and join a union in 
1997 and 1998, they suffered severe violations of the right to freedom of 
association.   
As detailed in complaints issued by the NLRB and workers= and employers= 
testimony at the unfair labor practice hearings, management of Stemilt Bros.  in 
Wenatchee and Washington Fruit Co. in Yakima responded to workers= organizing 
efforts with dismissals of key union leaders, threats that the INS would deport 
workers if they formed a union, threats to discharge and blacklist workers who 
supported the union, threats to close the plants if workers voted for union 
representation, and threats to permanently replace workers who exercised the right 
to strike.373 
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Here is how one worker described the company=s tactics before a January 1998 
NLRB election at Stemilt Bros.  in Yakima:  
 
                                                                                                             
Teamsters, Case Nos.19-CA-25403 et.al.; Washington Fruit and International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Case Nos. 25702 et.al. (1998). 
I had to attend many anti-union meetings at Stemilt after we filed for a 
union election.  At almost all of them, a consultant hired by the company 
[Stephen D.  Highfill] was there [with various managers].  At the 
meetings they talked a lot about dues and strikes, but they talked the 
most about the INS . . . [Highfill] said the Union gets rid of 
undocumented workers so that it can keep their dues and get initiation 
fees from new workers. . . . I assume that the company keeps talking 
about INS because they know a lot of workers on the night shift are 
undocumentedCI would guess at least half. 
I myself started working at Stemilt as an undocumented worker in 
1991.  [In May 1994] I was advised that there was a problem with my 
papers and didn=t return to work.  Later, around August of 1994, 
someone told me that Stemilt was taking back those of us who had left 
work because of problems with our papers if we came back with new 
papers . . . I applied for work with a new name and social security 
number and was given work in the same department with the same 
supervisors. 
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When I started work again, I realized that many of the same people 
were working again, but with different names . . . The reason I bring this 
up is because it shows that before we started organizing Stemilt didn=t 
mind if we didn=t have papers.  It is only now that we have started 
organizing that they have started looking for problems with people=s 
papers, like they did with [names omitted].  And it is only now that they 
have started threatening us with INS raids . . . They know that we are 
afraid to even talk about this because we don=t want to risk ourselves or 
anyone else losing their jobs or being deported, so it is a very powerful 
threat . . . The fact that . . . the consultant was always talking about how 
the union was going to cause the INS to come made many workers very 
afraid.  I know this because many of the workers would talk to me about 
how afraid they were about what the consultant said.374 
 
Not just workers= testimony, but also the testimony of consultant Stephen D.  
Highfill in the unfair labor practice hearing on these complaints paints a vivid 
picture of the management=s tactics against workers= self-organization.  Highfill said 
he held captive-audience meetings with hundreds of workers in groups of twenty to 
twenty-five at a time.375 
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Highfill testified that he and colleagues from his consulting firm told 
employees that there was an agreement between the U.S. Department of Labor and 
the INS that no raids would be conducted in a workplace where an NLRB election 
was pending, but that Athe only time this accord applies is during the pre-election 
period@ and as soon as the election was over Athey=re going to do their business as 
usual@Cmeaning the INS could conduct raids.376  Then they told workers that if the 
union won the election, the union would gain a $100 initiation fee from each new 
worker hired to replace a worker removed in a raidCAthe only ones that appear to 
have any monetary gain at all, are those who collected an initiation fee . . .@377 [i.e., 
the union]. 
In another tactic used in a captive-audience meeting, Highfill presented a 
Hispanic woman associated with his firm who claimed to be a former worker 
involved in a strike in Watsonville, California, some years earlier.  According to 
Highfill, the woman Amentioned that after the strike that she=d been involved in, 
there had been a raid on that place . . . a full-blown raid . . . where they showed with 
the enforce (sic) and just took employees . . . grabbed people as they went in and 
out . . . a number of people were taken away who were new hires as well as some of 
the old hands.@378 
Highfill also testified that the same woman told workers that because of her 
union support she Ahad been blacklisted by area employers and she found it hard to 
get a job.@379  Meanwhile, according to Highfill=s testimony, a second Hispanic 
woman associated with Highfill=s consulting group also claimed to have been a 
union activist in California Afor over 20 years, and when she attempted to find work 
outside the place where she had been employed as a union employee, she felt that 
she was being blacklisted. . . .@380 
On prospects for collective bargaining, Highfill testified that he told Stemilt 
workers in the same series of captive-audience meetings: 
 
                                                 
376Ibid., p. 2886. 
377Ibid., p. 2987. 
378Ibid., pp. 2877, 3007. 
379Ibid., p. 2875. 
380Ibid., p. 2878. 
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Very often, people have the idea thatCthat when you win an election, 
youCjust right after that, you get a contract.  But that the process itself 
can be a matter of just a couple of days or it can be months and 
sometimes years . . . the process can go on and on . . . And there are 
times, under those circumstances, when wages can be frozen and 
benefits can be frozen, you just never know . . . somebody asked if it 
went on forever and I remember we cited a company inCin California 
where it=s been going on since =76. . . . We told them there have been 
circumstances under whichCthere have been times when wages were 
lowered . . . We told them that there have been occasions when people 
wound up making less than minimum wage. 
Q.  Did you give them some specific examples? 
A.  No. 
 
Just before the election, Highfill=s consulting firm issued a flyer titled AAn 
Important Piece of Advice@ that said: 
 
. . . none of the swindlers that the union has hired in this campaign has 
lived here before.  They came here for only one thingCthe money.  If 
[Stemilt=s owner] said that he could work with the union, it is because he 
could not say anything else under the law . . . remember that the growers 
are not wedded to StemiltCthey can put their fruit wherever they like if 
Stemilt had to charge them more . . . If the employers want the 
Teamsters like you want to be infected with AIDS, it is for the same 
reasonCa possibly catastrophic result.381 
 
In January 1998, although a majority of workers in each location had 
signed union cards, the Teamsters union lost NLRB elections at Stemilt and 
Washington Fruit. Stephen D.  Highfill directed the employers= campaigns against 
workers= organizing attempts.  The union filed unfair labor practice charges in both 
cases, and the NLRB regional office issued complaints detailing widespread 
violations of the law. 
In Stemilt, the company agreed in August 1999 to settle the case and to accept 
the results of a card-check verification of worker sentiment in a process overseen by 
                                                 
381Undated company flyer, AUn Consejo Importante,@ on file with Human Rights Watch. 
Translation by Human Rights Watch, emphasis in original. 
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the judge.  In October, the judge certified that a majority of Stemilt workers desired 
union representation, and bargaining had begun on a contract at Stemilt as this 
report goes to press.   
Washington Fruit has refused similar settlement proposals by the union and 
the NLRB.  The unfair labor practice hearing in that case concluded in November 
1999, and the parties are awaiting the decision of the administrative law judge.  His 
ruling can be appealed to the NLRB in Washington, and after that further appeals to 
federal courts are available. 
 
North Carolina Farmworkers and the H-2A Program  
H-2A workers are unlikely to complain about worker protection violations, 
fearing they will lose their jobs or will not be hired in the future. 
CU.S. General Accounting Office, 1997 
 
More than 10,000 workers in North Carolina=s burgeoning agriculture industry 
hold H-2A visas legally authorizing them to work temporarily in the United States.  
But they share with undocumented migrant workers an acute fear of retaliation and 
deportation if they exercise the right to organize and bargain collectively.  
Reflecting other important aspects of freedom of association, the prospect of 
seeking legal counsel or taking legal action to vindicate their rights inspires similar 
fears. 
This report focuses on workers= freedom of association.  It does not dwell on 
conditions that give rise to workers= acting in association.  But workers= exercise of 
freedom of association does not take place in a vacuum.  Workers act in response to 
concrete needs and often harsh conditions.  In North Carolina=s fields, high heat, 
short pay, long hours, little drinking water, sparse toilet facilities, dilapidated 
housing, unsafe pesticides, and other realities of agricultural labor prompt a natural 
response of workers= coming together to make things better.382 
Some North Carolina farmworkers seek to form and join a union.  Some seek 
legal counsel to try to vindicate their rights through the courts.  But they do so in the 
face of huge obstacles.  From the time H-2A workers arrive in North Carolina, 
growers= association officials harangue them about dangerous Aenemies:@ union 
organizers and Legal Services attorneys devoted to farmworker rights advocacy.  H-
2A workers= standard employment contract with growers denies them basic rights of 
                                                 
382For recent, extensive treatment of the plight of migrant agricultural workers in the United 
States, see Daniel Rothenberg, With These Hands: The Hidden World of Migrant 
Farmworkers Today (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999). 
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tenancy to receive visitors.  The U.S. Department of Labor approves the ban, and 
local police enforce it. 
H-2A workers in the United States have a special status among migrant 
farmworkers.  They come to the United States openly and legally.  They are covered 
by wage laws, workers= compensation, and other standards.  They ought to have 
fewer problems, compared with undocumented migrant workers, exercising the 
right to freedom of association. 
But valid papers are no guarantee of protection for H-2A migrant workers= 
freedom of association.  As agricultural workers, they are not covered by the 
NLRA=s anti-discrimination provision meant to protect the right to organize.  If they 
try to form and join a union, the grower for whom they work can cancel their work 
contract, putting them Aout of status@ and liable to deportation.  In effect, H-2A 
workers are caught in the antithesis of a free labor system, unable to exercise rights 
of association but also unable to move to another employer to seek better terms.  
This case demonstrates that any movement to strengthen workers= freedom of 
association in the United States will have to address the special problems of H-2A 
workers. 
 
Government Responsibility 
The H-2A program is named after a section of immigration law which allows 
agricultural employers to hire temporary foreign workers when not enough U.S. 
farmworkers are available.383  The program is administered by federal and state 
authorities, creating a direct government responsibility to see that international 
human rights norms are respected. 
H-2A workers can remain in the United States until completion of their 
employment contracts with sponsoring employers.  When they finish, workers must 
return to their home countryCusually MexicoChoping to be recalled to work the 
following year. 
Being recalled often depends on being submissive.  Human Rights Watch 
found widespread fear and evidence of blacklisting against workers who speak up 
about conditions, who seek assistance from Legal Services attorneys, or who 
become active in the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC).   
Human Rights Watch also found evidence of a campaign of intimidation from 
the time they first enter the United States to discourage any exercise of freedom of 
                                                 
383See Secs. 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) and 218 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as 
amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; U.S. Department of Labor, 
Office of Audit, AConsolidation of Labor=s Enforcement Responsibilities for the H-2A 
Program Could Better Protect U.S. Agricultural Workers,@ March 31, 1998, p. 4. 
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association by H-2A workers.  Most pointedly, growers= officials lead workers 
through a ritual akin to book-burning by making them collectively trash AKnow 
Your Rights@ manuals from Legal Services attorneys and take instead employee 
handbooks issued by growers.384 
                                                 
384See affidavit of Juan Carlos Vieyra Ornelas, intern with Farm Worker Project of Benson, 
North Carolina, (hereafter Vieyra affidavit), August 10, 1999, on file with Human Rights 
Watch. 
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About 26,000 foreign migrant workers with H-2A visas entered the United 
States legally in 1999.  More than 10,000 of them went to North Carolina, making 
growers there the leading employers of H-2A workers in the United States.385  North 
Carolina=s H-2A workers are mostly Mexican, single young men, who harvest 
tobacco, sweet potatoes, cucumbers, bell peppers, apples, peaches, melons, and 
various other seasonal crops from April until November.386 
At home Athere=s no work,@ workers told Human Rights Watch as their main 
reason for emigrating.387  Many of the workers come from rural villages in Mexico. 
 Some spoke Spanish with difficulty, as in their village at home people mainly speak 
Misteco, a local Indian language.  In most cases earnings in U.S. dollars from their 
H-2A employment are the only source of income for their families and for their 
communities. 
While not protecting the right to organize and bargain collectively, the H-2A 
program on paper provides benefits not afforded to undocumented workers.  
Workers in the H-2A program are supposed to earn at least the U.S. minimum wage 
of $5.15 per hour or a higher H-2A progran rate, which is based on farmworkers= 
average wages at the local and state levels.  Besides a wage guarantee, the program 
requires free housing that meets Department of Labor standards, free transportation 
to and from Mexico, and coverage under state workers= compensation programs for 
work-related injuries and illnesses.  H-2A workers are entitled to legal 
                                                 
385Sandy Smith-Nonini, AUprooting La Injusticia,@ Institute for Southern Studies, March 
1999, pp. 5, 7 (hereafter Smith-Nonini, AUprooting,@; Leah Beth Ward, AN.C. Growers= 
Trade in Foreign Farm Workers Draws Scrutiny,@ Charlotte Observer, October 30, 1999, p. 
1 (hereafter Ward, AGrowers= Trade@). 
386Human Rights Watch interview, Lori Elmer and Alice Tejada, staff attorneys of Legal 
Services of North Carolina, Farmworker Unit , Raleigh, North Carolina, July 13, 1999 
(hereafter AElmer-Tejada interview@); Ward, AGrowers= Trade.@ 
387Human Rights Watch interview with migrant H-2A workers, near Mt. Olive, N.C., July 
14, 1999. 
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representation by federally funded Legal Services attorneys.  However, H-2A 
workers are specifically excluded from the principal federal labor law for 
agricultural workers, known as AWPA.388  Among other gaps, this exclusion means 
that H-2A workers seeking recourse for violations of their work contracts may not 
go to federal court but instead must go to local state courts, where many worker 
advocates believe growers exert significant influence. 
                                                 
388See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. '1802 
(10)(B)(ii). 
206 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
Even the H-2A program=s modest benefits are precarious.  Workers 
interviewed by university researchers, Legal Services attorneys, church-based 
delegations and reporters have said that they often are underpaid compared with 
promised piecework earnings.  They described cramped, unsanitary housing that 
fails to comply with space, flooring, and sanitation standards.  They said that they 
have to pay large fees to local recruiters in Mexico; and that they are afraid to file 
workers= compensation claims or seek legal help for any other problem because they 
will be sent home and never recalled to work in the United States.389 
 
H-2A Entrepreneurship 
Growers are required to file paperwork and comply with procedural steps, like 
advertising for U.S. workers, to be eligible to secure H-2A workers.  In 1989, to 
facilitate the employment of H-2A workers by assisting with the administrative 
details of the program, Craig Stanford Eury, Jr.  founded the North Carolina 
Growers Association (NCGA).  Eury was a former state labor department official 
familiar with H-2A requirements.390 
The overwhelming majority of the approximately 10,000 H-2A workers in 
North Carolina are employed by the 1,050 members of the NCGA.  These growers 
                                                 
389Elmer-Tejada interview; Smith-Nonini, AUprooting@; Ward, AGrowers= Trade@; see also 
National Farm Worker Ministry, AHarvesting for Mt. Olive: A National Farm Worker 
Ministry Delegation Report,@ ( July 29, 1999), p. 10 (on file with Human Rights Watch; 
hereafter ANFWM Report@). The ministry is a national coalition of church-based farmworker 
advocates headquartered in Chicago, and the delegation was headed by a representative of 
the North Carolina Council of Churches. 
390See Esther Schrader, AWidening the Field of workers: North Carolina man is among 
leaders seeking to expand program that lets U.S. farms hire foreign employees on temporary 
visas. But officials who oversee it cite problems,@ Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1999, p. 
A1. 
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pay a fee to the NCGA for securing H-2A workers.391  In an interview with Human 
Rights Watch, NCGA head Eury called the H-2A program Athe Cadillac of guest 
worker programs,@ citing Atransportation, insurance, housing and housing 
inspections@ and adding that he Acan=t figure out what more advocates want.@392  
                                                 
391Ward, AGrowers= Trade.@  
392Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Vass, North Carolina, May 8, 1999. 
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Many farmworker advocates, however, find serious flaws in the H-2A program 
that violate workers= freedom of association.@393  H-2A workers are forced to remain 
with their sponsoring employers for the duration of an agricultural season.  They 
cannot leave their employers if conditions are intolerable or if their rights are 
violated without losing their legal status.  At the same time, employers can 
terminate workers at will.  Dismissal revokes their authorized work status, and they 
must immediately return to their country of origin.  In sum, the H-2A program 
generates a climate in which the H-2A workers Alabor under the realistic fear that if 
they stand up for their rights, join a union, or do not work at the limits of human 
endurance, they will be fired and deported immediately.@394   
 
Organizing Among Pickle Workers 
Approximately half of the 10,000 H-2A workers in North Carolina harvest 
cucumbers processed by the Mt. Olive Pickle Company in Mount Olive, North 
Carolina.  The Mt. Olive company was founded in 1926 and is the fourth-largest 
pickle producer in the United States.  It is the largest independent pickle company 
(that is, not owned by a conglomerate) and markets the number one brand of pickles 
in the southeast and the second-ranking brand of non-refrigerated pickles in the 
country.395   
Separate from the migrant workers who pick cucumbers for growers that 
supply Mt. Olive, the company employs directly some 500 full-time year-round 
employees and over 800 employees during peak processing season.  The company 
uses five local grading stations in North Carolina to contract with about fifty local 
cucumber farmers to provide the company with cucumbers.  Mt. Olive contracts 
with these growers for delivery of a specified number of bushels, at a specified 
purchase price, grown in compliance with Mt. Olive=s requirements and 
standards.396  These growers, in turn, employ thousands of cucumber pickers during 
the harvest.  Most of the growers are members of the NCGA. 
In May 1997 FLOC announced a union organizing drive to obtain better 
working conditions for the estimated 5,000 workers who harvest cucumbers for 
growers that supply Mt. Olive.  FLOC is an Ohio-based migrant farmworkers= union 
created and led by current and former farmworkers and affiliated with the AFL-
                                                 
393See, for example,  "The H-2A Program in a Nutshell,@ Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc., 
November 1999. 
394Ibid. 
395Human Rights Watch interview, Bill Bryan, CEO of Mt. Olive Pickle Company, Mt. 
Olive, North Carolina, June 11, 1999; Our Pickled History, 
http://www.mtolivepickles.com/history.html (visited 10/23/99). 
396Ibid. 
Case Studies of Violations of Workers= Freedom of Association 209  
 
 
CIO.397  FLOC argues that processors like Mt. Olive protect their product=s quality 
by influencing the way farmers cultivate and harvest cucumbers, so they should also 
use their influence to affect the way farmworkers are treated. 
                                                 
397See Farmworker Justice Fund (Washington, D.C.), "FLOC Organizing Carolina Pickles,@ 
Farmworker Justice News, Summer 1997. 
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Mt. Olive has not agreed to recognize and bargain with FLOC, saying AWe 
believe union representation on the farm is a decision for the farmer and the farm 
workerCa decision we will honor but not influence.@398  Mt. Olive has explained 
that Asince Mt. Olive Pickle company does not employ farmworkers. . . . it is unfair 
and inappropriate for us to interfere by trying to influence the decisions of farmers 
and/or the workers they employ.@399  The company contends that AMt. Olive Pickle 
Company is targeted solely because we have a well-known name in North Carolina, 
and we declined FLOC=s demand to assist in unionizing farm workers.@400  
Company president Bill Bryan told Human Rights Watch AWe do not have 
integrated operations.  If we put too much burden on the growers, they can go to 
other crops.  We do not have economic leverage over the growers.@401 
A decade ago, FLOC reached a landmark three-party agreement with 
Campbell=s Soup company and Ohio tomato growers for a contract covering terms 
and conditions for farmworkers who supply Campbell=s tomato products.402  The 
                                                 
398See Mt. Olive Pickle Co., AFLOC Position Statement,@ at the company=s web site, 
http://www.  mtolivepickles.com (last visited March 9, 2000). 
399Ibid. 
400Ibid. 
401Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Mount Olive, North Carolina, March 6, 2000. 
402Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Baldemar Velásquez, Toledo, Ohio, March 23, 
1999; See Craig Whitlock, AUnion targets pickle plants: Mount Olive migrant workers focus 
of organizing,@ News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), May 29, 1997, 1A; Ned Glascock, ARally 
calls for union on farms,@ News & Observer, June 27,1998.A full account of FLOC=s 
Campbell=s Soups campaign can be found as a case study at the University of Pennsylvania=s 
Wharton School of Business at http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~ethics/cases/soup.htm. 
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union is trying to replicate the Campbell=s model with Mt. Olive by building a broad 
support coalition within North Carolina.403   
There is no evidence that Mt. Olive Pickle Co. has directly interfered with 
farmworkers= organizing among its growers.  The central question from a human 
rights perspective, however, is whether the economic benefits derived by Mt. Olive 
from the denial of workers= freedom of association at farms that supply the company 
create a moral responsibility, absent a legal one, to use its influence to promote 
respect for farmworkers= associational rights. 
                                                 
403See, e.g., Patrick O=Neill, ABishop takes up fight, calls pickers= cause just,@ National 
Catholic Reporter, July 17, 1998, 1. 
FLOC maintains that farmworkers= organizing rights are frustrated when large, 
centralized food processing firms refuse to meet workers in a bargaining 
relationship to improve wages and conditions in field operations that supply the 
large firms.  Organizing individual-grower-by-individual-grower is practically 
impossible with a mobile labor force rotating through short crop cycles.  To provide 
stability in an enduring employment relationshipCeven one marked by migrant 
labor that returns each year from MexicoCFLOC argues that large food processing 
firms should be open to new collective bargaining models that include workers, 
growers, and processing companies.  The broader public policy question is whether 
such an obligation should be created by law if, in fact, it is the only practical way to 
give effect to workers= right to freedom of association in the agricultural setting. 
  
Fencing Out Workers= Advocates 
Among growers there is broad resistance to workers= organizing efforts in 
North Carolina agriculture.  Both the NCGA and its member growers have undercut 
workers= associational activity with the union as well as with other workers= rights 
advocates, such as attorneys from the farmworker unit of Legal Services.   
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During a June 1999 visit to North Carolina, a delegation from the National 
Farm Worker Ministry, a church-based group, confirmed that cucumber growers in 
the state customarily refuse to grant union organizers and Legal Services 
representatives access to the farmworker camps located on their property.  They 
often erect ANo Trespassing@ signs around the farmworkers= living quarters and 
require all visitors to be approved and accompanied by the growers.404 
The employment contract that is standard for H-2A workers in North Carolina 
contains a clause restricting workers= access to legal advisors or union organizers.  
The clause says, ANo tenancy in such housing is created; employer retains 
possession and control of the housing premises at all times. . . .@405  Tenancy would 
give workers the right to have visitors of their own choosing, including union 
representatives, legal advisors, medical outreach personnel, religious counselors, 
and others.  Despite this clear breach of the principle of freedom of association, the 
U.S. Department of Labor has approved the NCGA=s contract containing this 
clause.406  Similarly, the AWork Rules@ issued by the NCGA states that A[T]he 
employer reserves the right to exclude any person(s) from visiting housing 
premises.@407 
                                                 
404See NFWM Report, p. 2. 
405NCGA Agricultural Work Agreement, on file with Human Rights Watch. 
406Under H2-A regulations, all work contracts must be approved by the Department of 
Labor. 
407NCGA AWork Rules,@ paragraph 12 (Vass, North Carolina, rev.1/27/97). 
The contract is known as the Agricultural Work Agreement, and it is standard 
for all NCGA members.  In a letter of March 25, 1999 to Lori Elmer of Legal 
Services, Stan Eury stated that the new language of paragraph 6 adds a waiver 
provision establishing that AAny eligible individual wishing to exempt themselves 
from this tenancy condition can exempt themselves from this requirement by filing a 
request of waiver in writing with the North Carolina Growers Association prior to 
inhabiting the housing facility and beginning work.@ A farmworker in Mexico would 
have to be able to read and understand a dense legal contract and then muster the 
courage to write a Arequest of waiver@ to avoid its restrictions, something that in 
practice is simply not going to happen. 
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NCGA official  Eury said that Athe tenancy clause . . . is designed to protect 
the rights, privacy, and privileges@ of the farmworkers residing in the labor 
camps.408  He further stated that although the farmworkers employed by the NCGA 
members do not enjoy a right of tenancy in their employer-provided housing, 
nonetheless Aour employees are not being denied the right to freely associate with 
persons of their choosing at their employer-provided housing.  We welcome all true 
friends and advocates of farm workers to our camps who do not come in the 
disguise of self righteousness, while intending malicious harm.@409  
FLOC union organizer Vicente Rosales told Human Rights Watch that he and 
two other FLOC representatives visited the farmworker camp of an NCGA member 
employer.  The employer was Aannoyed by our arrival . . . [and] threatened us that if 
we did not leave, she would call the police, and she told us that we were on her 
property and that if we wanted to speak with her, we should call her beforehand so 
that she could be ready for us and that she would also have to be present during the 
interviews with the workers.@410  
                                                 
408Letter from Stan Eury, president of the NCGA, to Lori Elmer, staff attorney of Legal 
Services, March 25, 1999, p. 5. 
409Ibid., p. 2. 
410Human Rights Watch interview, Vicente Rosales, FLOC organizer, June 30, 1999. 
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On August 13, 1998, FLOC national president Baldemar Velásquez and three 
other FLOC organizers visited a labor camp operated by another member of the 
NCGA.  About one hour after FLOC advocates entered the premises, two police 
officers arrived and broke up the meeting they were holding with approximately 
twenty residents of the camp.411  After FLOC organizers refused to leave the 
premises voluntarily, the officers arrested them on charges of trespass, based on the 
tenancy clause in paragraph 6 of NCGA=s standard agricultural work agreement.412  
Although the case was later dismissed, the local sheriff told FLOC organizers that 
he would continue to arrest anyone accused by North Carolina growers of 
trespassing.413   
FLOC organizers also told Human Rights Watch that even when they 
successfully enter farmworkers= camps and speak at length with workers, they find 
those workers Avisibly afraid@ of union organizers.414  One farmworker told a 
delegation from the National Farm Worker Ministry that the workers Ahad been told 
many things about the unionCone thing was that the union was trying to get rid of 
the H-2A workers because they do not qualify for a union contract.@415  When 
                                                 
411See Sandy Smith-Nonini, AUprooting La Injusticia,@ Institute for Southern Studies, March 
1999, at 29; Letter from Robert J. Willis, attorney for FLOC, to Stan Eury, president of the 
NCGA, June 1, 1999, p. 1. 
412Letter from Robert J. Willis, attorney for FLOC, to Stan Eury, president of the NCGA, 
June 1, 1999, p. 1. 
413Ibid. 
414 Human Rights Watch interview, Baldemar Velásquez, president of FLOC, Matt Emmick, 
Farmworker Ministries, Ramiro Sasrabia, FLOC organizer, Faison, North Carolina, June 9, 
1999. 
415See ANFWM Report,@ p.10. 
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Human Rights Watch asked NCGA=s Eury to comment on the FLOC organizing 
drive, he stated, AThe union is attempting to line their own pockets at the expense of 
the workers.  We give the workers everything that the union says it wants.@416   
 
Denying the Right to Legal Assistance 
Lori Elmer and Alice Tejada of Legal Services told Human Rights Watch that 
in June 1998, when they visited an NCGA member=s labor camp, they received 
treatment similar to that received by FLOC organizers.  In June 1998, the staff 
attorneys received a call from a farmworker client at the camp.  When they arrived 
in response to the call, they were invited to enter the premises by other farmworker 
residents.  The grower called the sheriff, however, whose deputies arrived and 
instructed the attorneys to leave and threatened them with arrest if they failed to 
obey.417   
                                                 
416Human Rights Watch interview, Stan Eury, president of the NCGA, Vass, North Carolina, 
June 10, 1999. 
417Human Rights Watch interview, Lori Elmer and Alice Tejada, staff attorneys of Legal 
Services, Raleigh, North Carolina, July 13, 1999. 
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When asked to comment on the incident, NCGA official Eury told Human 
Rights Watch that Ait was an individual farmer who had been sued by Legal 
Services who didn=t think it was right for them to go door to door soliciting 
complaints.  He asked his workers if they wanted the people there.  They said no.  
So the owner kicked them out.  We did not deny access to Legal Services or the 
union.@418   
In a March 25, 1999 letter to Lori Elmer, Stan Eury asserted that Ano NCGA 
member has ever denied you, or any other attorney the right to meet with a 
client.@419  He added: 
 
Everyone knows, in reality, that your visits do not result from 
specific requests or outreach activities, but rather are a systematic 
attempt on your unit=s part to destroy the H-2A program by 
soliciting law suits and encouraging fraudulent workers 
compensation claims from our impressionable employees . . . It 
has become increasingly apparent that instead of trying to do 
meaningful things to improve the lives of farm workers, like the 
staff and members of the NCGA, you focus most of your energy 
and resources on trying to cause problems for the most compliant 
agricultural producers in the nation!420 
   
The National Farm Worker Ministry delegation also encountered growers= 
antipathy toward unmonitored visitors in the camps.  When the ministry delegation 
visited the camp of one of Mt. Olive=s growers in June 1999, they found that Athe 
grower, who knew in advance that we would be coming, stayed with us throughout 
the entire visit, except for a brief interval.  We were told that we were free to visit 
his workers, but only if we checked with him first.@421  During the Farm Worker 
                                                 
418Human Rights Watch interview, Stan Eury, president of the NCGA, June 10, 1999. 
419Letter from Stan Eury, president of the NCGA, to Lori Elmer, staff attorney of Legal 
Services, March 25, 1999, pp. 2-3. 
420Ibid. 
421See ANFWM Report,@ p. 3. 
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Ministry delegation=s visit, Athe grower monopolized the conversation, answering 
questions that had been addressed to the workers.@422   
One month later, Human Rights Watch met the same pattern.  When Human 
Rights Watch researchers arrived at a labor camp near Mount Olive, a bilingual 
Mexican supervisor with a cell phone asked, AAre you with Legal Services? Are you 
from the union?@ Only after negative responses were Human Rights Watch 
researchers permitted to speak with workers, but under close monitoring by the 
supervisor.423 
                                                 
422Ibid., p. 4. 
423Human Rights Watch interview, near Mt. Olive, N.C., July 15, 1999. 
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The supervisor remained with Human Rights Watch researchers as workers 
responded to questions about working conditions and associational rights.  All 
responses were positive until one Human Rights Watch researcher asked to see the 
housing conditions.  The supervisor accompanied this researcher into the barrack-
style housing, offering a window of opportunity for workers to speak with another 
Human Rights Watch researcher outside the supervisor=s presence.  AThey don=t let 
us talk to Legal Services or the union,@ one worker whispered.  AThey would fire us 
if we called them or talked to them.@424 
 
Trashing Books 
NCGA=s hostility to Legal Services is a focal point in orientation sessions and 
the accompanying materials provided to newly arrived H-2A workers.  Juan Carlos 
Vieyra Ornelas, an intern with the Farm Worker Project of Benson, North Carolina, 
stated in a sworn affidavit that when he attended the NCGA orientation for 500 
newly arrived H-2A workers from Mexico in Vass, North Carolina, in mid-1999, 
Jay Hill of the NCGA Aspoke at length about the Farmworker Unit of Legal 
Services of North Carolina . . . He told the workers that Legal Services was their 
>enemy.= He told the workers they should avoid Legal Services.  He told the workers 
to contact only the NCGA, and not Legal Services, if they had any problems.@425  
Vieyra Ornelas further stated, AMr.  Hill then held up a copy of the >Know 
Your Rights= booklet produced by Legal Services.  He ordered workers to toss the 
>Know Your Rights= booklet into the trash can.  He told the workers that after 
throwing away the >Know Your Rights= booklet, they could have a copy of the 
NCGA Employee Handbook.@426  Following Hill=s admonition, workers discarded 
their booklets en masse. 
The handbook that NCGA gives to workers after they discard their AKnow 
Your Rights@ booklets is titled AUnderstanding the Work Contract@ and warns: 
 
                                                 
424Ibid. 
425Vieyra affidavit, p. 1. 
426Ibid. 
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FLS [Farmworker Legal Services] has a hidden motive when they 
approach you.  They say that they are your friends and they are 
concerned about your rights and well being, but in reality their motive is 
to destroy the program which brings you to North Carolina legally   . . . 
FLS discourage the growers with excessive suits which are for the most 
part without merit.  The history of FLS shows that the workers who have 
talked with them have harmed themselves.  Don=t be fooled and allow 
them to take away your jobs.427 
 
AUnderstanding the Work Contract@ accuses Farmworker Legal Services of 
eliminating the H-2A programs in Idaho, West Virginia, Maryland, and Florida.  It 
states that the 10,000 H-2A workers in Florida were Aleft with no hope of working 
again in the United States@ and calls the Florida H-2A workers Awitnesses of the 
danger of speaking to FLS.@428 
                                                 
427North Carolina Growers= Association, Inc., AUnderstanding the Work Contract,@ pp. 12-
13. 
428Ibid.  Florida H-2A workers employed in the sugar cane industry were replaced by 
mechanized harvesting equipment.  Here and in other states cited, growers argued that 
aggressive legal advocacy forced them to leave the H-2A program and move to mechanical 
harvesting.  More often, growers moved to employ undocumented workers who have no 
access to legal services.  Farmworker advocates respond that growers abandoned H-2A 
workers rather than comply with the law.  For more on the Florida events, see Robert 
McCabe, AFirms Cutting Cutters,@ Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, April 28, 1993, p.1D; for 
Idaho, see Warren Cornwall, ABusinesses seek help in immigration roulette,@ Idaho Falls 
Post Register, May 19, 1997, p. A1. 
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Mary Lee Hall, managing attorney in the Farmworker Unit of Legal Services 
of North Carolina, wrote to Eury about reports from H-2A workers that NCGA 
officials told workers Aif they keep our booklets or if they are ever seen with one of 
our booklets, they will be fired or have serious problems with the Association.  Jay 
Hill conveys this message to the workers and then watches as they, feeling 
compelled not to give NCGA a reason to fire or retaliate against them, throw the 
booklets in a trash can provided by NCGA.@429   
Eury responded by asserting, AOur worker orientation includes information 
about the Legal Services attack on our program and the H-2A workers that have lost 
their jobs in Florida and West Virginia and other areas as a direct result of Legal 
Services attacks on the H-2A program.  Our workers freely choose whether or not to 
associate themselves with you.  Many workers choose to trash your propaganda 
after they learn the truth about your motives . . . Your shameless representations that 
you want to help H-2A workers are reprehensible.@430   
                                                 
429Letter from Mary Lee Hall, managing attorney of Legal Services, to Stan Eury, president 
of the NCGA., July 2, 1999. 
430Letter from Stan Eury, president of the NCGA, to Mary Lee Hall, managing attorney of 
Legal Services, July 6, 1999. 
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Eury=s NCGA highlights its hostility to legal services by posting a large banner 
across an entire wall at its Vass, N.C.  orientation site for newly-arrived H-2A 
workers.  The banner proclaims AServicios Legales Quieren Destruir El Programa 
H2-A@ (ALegal Services Want to Destroy the H-2A Program@), and declares 
underneath this banner ADon=t be a puppet of Legal Services,@ ADon=t believe what 
Legal Services tells you about the NCGA,@ and other admonitions against legal 
services.431 
 
Blacklisting 
On paper, H-2A workers can seek help from Legal Services and file claims for 
redress for violations of H-2A program requirements (but not for violation of the 
right to form and join trade unions, since they are excluded from NLRA protection). 
 However, in this atmosphere of grower hostility to Legal Services, farmworkers are 
reluctant to pursue legal claims that they may have against growers.  In December 
1997, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that A>H-2A workers . . . 
are unlikely to complain about worker protection violations fearing they will lose 
their jobs or will not be hired in the future.=@432  The fear of blacklisting is well-
founded, according to a 1999 Carnegie Endowment study, which based its findings 
on interviews conducted in Mexico with current Mexican H-2A workers.  The 
Carnegie study found that A[b]lacklisting of H-2A workers appears to be 
widespread, is highly organized, and occurs at all stages of the recruitment and 
employment process.  Workers report that the period of blacklisting now lasts three 
years, up from one year earlier in the decade.@433 
                                                 
431A photograph of the banner and admonitions is on file with Human Rights Watch; Human 
Rights Watch translation of text. 
432Ward, AGrowers= Trade,@ p. 30. 
433See Demetrios G.  Papademetriou and Monica S.  Heppel, Balancing Acts: Toward a fair 
bargain on seasonal agricultural workers, International Migration Policy Program, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (1999), p. 13.   
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Mary Lee Hall of Legal Services, speaking from the experience of 
conversations with hundreds of farmworkers, confirms that the existence of a 
blacklisting system against workers who complain Ais known to every H-2A worker, 
and I have yet to meet one who did not take this threat seriously.@434  The National 
Farm Worker Ministry delegation also reports being told by farmworkers that 
A[a]nyone who had dared to speak up in the past had been blacklisted . . . Word is 
spread of any H-2A workers who have spoken up about their working or living 
conditions, and those workers are sent back to Mexico and do not get rehired.@435  
                                                 
434Letter from Mary Lee Hall, managing attorney, Legal Services, to Stay Eury, president of 
the NCGA, July 2, 1999, p. 3.   
435See "NFWM Report,@ pp. 4-5. 
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Legal Services attorneys and others involved with H-2A workers and the H-2A 
recruiting process have reported concrete instances of blacklisting.  Ventura 
Gutierrez, a labor organizer in California, told Human Rights Watch that he went to 
an H-2A recruiting office in Tlaxcala, Michoacan, Mexico, and saw a list of names 
posted on the wall, entitled Alista negra@ (Spanish for Ablack list@), indicating which 
workers were not to be recruited as H-2A farmworkers.  Gutierrez reported that a 
woman named Juana writes on a blackboard the names of people who are 
Ablacklisted and therefore shouldn=t get visas.  Workers have to pay to get off the 
blacklist.@436  
 
Contingent Workers 
We=re in the orange ghetto. 
CA Microsoft Apermatemp@ involved in worker organizing 
 
Temporary work, part-time jobs, contracted and subcontracted employment, 
on-call employment, day labor and other forms of atypical, nonstandard, contingent, 
and often precarious work have shifted the ground workers stand on in the past 
decade.  Nearly one-third of the U.S. labor force, or some forty million workers, are 
in what the Bureau of Labor Statistics calls alternative work arrangements.  The 
widespread denial of associational rights for workers in these new forms of 
employment relations and the failure of authorities to protect them raise serious 
concerns under international human rights standards. 
American labor law covering workers= freedom of association lags behind the 
reality these workers face.  U.S. law presumes a stable employment relationship 
between a worker and a clearly identified employer.  The paradigm was set in the 
                                                 
436Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Ventura Gutierrez of the Farmworker Network, 
California, July 19, 1999. 
224 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
1930s, 1940s and 1950s with passage of the 1935 Wagner Act,437  the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act,438  and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act.439   
                                                 
437National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. '' 151-69.  See Chapter III., The U.S. Legal 
Framework for Workers= Freedom of Association.  above for a full description. 
438Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. '' 141-97.  See Chapter III., The U.S. Legal 
Framework for Workers= Freedom of Association. 
439Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. '' 401-531. See Chapter 
III., The U.S. Legal Framework for Workers= Freedom of Association. 
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While regular full-time work for one employer is still the norm for most 
workers in the United States, millions of othersCand their number is growingCfit a 
variety of atypical molds.  The largest group, some eighteen million, are regular 
part-time workers.  About thirteen million are independent contractors and 
temporary, leased workers.440  Employment in temporary agencies doubled between 
1982 and 1989 and doubled again between 1989 and 1997 to some three million 
workers.441 
Many nonstandard workers prefer their arrangements to full-time work with 
one employer.  For many, alternative work arrangements fit their family, education, 
and lifestyle needs where regular full-time work would create conflicts.  Flexible 
work arrangements can also provide a helpful dynamism in the larger economy, 
with the ability to rapidly shift human resources to their most productive uses. 
But workers pay a price for these alternatives.  Health insurance for workers 
and their families, for example, is usually tied to full-time or near-full-time 
employment.  Two-thirds of all regular full-time workers have both health insurance 
and pension benefits through their employer.  Just one-third of workers in 
alternative arrangements have these benefits; less than 5 percent of those who work 
for temporary agencies enjoy them.442  Moreover, as the federal government=s 
Dunlop Commission found: 
 
Whether voluntary or involuntary, part-time workers are lower paid per 
hour than full-time workers; have higher turnover rates; are 
                                                 
440See Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schmitt, The State of Working America 
(Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1998), 243 ( based on Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1995 and 1997 contingent work supplements to the Current Population Survey, 
the basic BLS guide to labor market data). 
441Ibid., pp. 246, 249. 
442See, e.g., Nina Munk, AThe Price of Freedom: In the much-romanticized free-agent nation, 
workers are liberated from routines, dress codes and office politics. As well as benefits, 
vacations and regular paychecks,@ New York Times Magazine, March 5, 2000, p. 50. 
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disproportionally young and female; and are more likely to work for 
employers who do not offer pensions or health insurance.  Perhaps seven 
million part-timers work fewer than 1000 hours per year and are exempt 
from Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) benefits.  Unemployment insurance 
state earnings and requirements to be available for full-time work 
exclude most part-timers from UI benefits.443   
 
                                                 
443See U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Commission on the Future 
of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report (May 1994), 21. 
Nothing in these kinds of contingent work arrangements inherently violates 
workers= freedom of association.  Concerns about lack of health insurance or 
pensions, precarious job security and other problems of atypical workers are matters 
of social and economic policy.  They might be implicated in a human rights report 
on social and economic rights.  They might prompt recommendations for reforms 
like pro-rated benefits for part-time workers or universal health care for all workers. 
 But atypical work cannot be said to violate workers= freedom of association in and 
of itself. 
At the same time, problems associated with contingent employment often 
inspire workers to try to address them through collective action.  Here is where the 
human rights issue involving freedom of association emerges.  Workers engaged in 
nonstandard employment relationships often face employer violations of labor laws 
and regulation and legal impediments when they exercise the right to freedom of 
association.  Either they are not Aemployees@ as defined in labor laws, or the 
proprietor of the place where they work is not their Aemployer@ under the law.  
Some employers take advantage of these loopholes. 
A prominent example of blocked freedom of association for workers in 
nonstandard employment is found in the office cleaning industry.  Tens of 
thousands of workers are employed by janitorial service agencies in all parts of the 
United States.  Most of the workers are immigrants making the minimum wage or 
slightly more, with few benefits.  Many cleaning workers have attempted to form 
and join unions in recent years through a AJustice for Janitors@ campaign mounted 
by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU).   
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But where workers successfully organize their cleaning agency, building 
owners often retaliate by cutting off the service contract with the agency.  Workers 
are left without a job and without a union, expressly because they exercised the 
right to freedom of association.  Yet labor law remedies that are supposed to protect 
this right do not reach the building owners who punished the workers, because the 
owners are not the Aemployer@ against whom unfair labor practice charges can be 
laid.444 
                                                 
444See Harry Bernstein, AWhile Building Owners= Profits Soar, Janitors Get Poorer,@ 
Los Angeles Times, August 15, 1989, Part 4, p.1; Stuart Silverstein, AJanitors= Union 
Vows To Turn Up Organizing Heat,@ Los Angeles Times, March 26, 1997, p. D1. 
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Exclusion from labor law protection affects both workers at the absolute 
bottom of the labor market and workers near the top.  At the bottom, many workers 
made to take public works jobs under various state and city Aworkfare@ programs are 
defined as Atrainees,@ not employees.  While some steps have been taken to apply 
the Fair Labor Standards Act to such workers, they are not covered by the NLRA.  
They have no protection against retaliation for exercising rights of association.445 
Workfare workers= lack of protection pits them against ordinary workers.  By 
1997, workfare participants made up 75 percent of the New York City Parks 
Department labor force, and almost one-third of city sanitation workers were in the 
state=s workfare program, called the Work Experience Program (WEP).446  WEP 
workers have frequently protested working conditions and have sought greater 
protections, and organized workers have expressed concerns that good jobs are 
being eliminated to make room for exploited WEP workers, and that over time this 
will depress wages more widely.  Some welfare recipients have even been recruited 
to serve as strikebreakers.447 
A classic example involves Hattie Hargrove, a fifty-year-old custodial worker 
who was laid off by the Mineola (Long Island, New York) County Department of 
Social Services in 1992.  Unable to find other work, she went on welfare.  In 1993 
she returned to her former job, but as a WEP worker earning not her former salary 
but $53.50 in cash assistance and $263 in food stamps per month.  AI=d be making 
more money, and I=d have benefits instead of Medicaid,@ Hargrove told a reporter.  
                                                 
445See Joel Dresang, ADemonstrators Protest W-2 Training System: Community group says it 
wants >real= jobs, wages for program participants,@ Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, November 7, 
1997, p. 3; Verena Dobnick, AJudge Rules Real Work Merits Real Pay; Says Training 
Cheated Homeless,@ Bergen County Record, March 20, 1998, p. A10. 
446See Melissa Healy, AN.Y. >Workfare= Not So Fair After All, Some Say,@ Los Angeles 
Times, July 5, 1997, p. 1. 
447See Nina Bernstein, AFliers Given to Welfare Recipients Seek Workers to Cover a Strike,@ 
New York Times, April 8, 2000, p. A11.  
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AI know I would feel better because I=d be getting a paycheck and people wouldn=t 
look down on me like I was crazy anymore.@448 
 
High-Tech Computer Programmers  
                                                 
448Ibid. 
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The dilemma regarding freedom of association is stark for workers at 
temporary employment agencies, even at the high end of the economic ladder.  They 
are defined as employees of the agency, not of the place of employment where they 
work.  Therefore, if they want to exercise the right of association to organize and 
bargain collectively, they have to organize with other workers of the agency.  
Temporary agency employees usually have no contact and no opportunity to 
communicate with each other because they are spread among different work sites.  
Meanwhile, those temporary agency workers who work for long periods at one 
place, often called Aperma-temps,@ have none of the rights, benefits or protections 
afforded to regular employees, including the right to form and join a union to deal 
with the employer.449 
A recent, dramatic example of temporary agency workers= dilemma is found at 
the cutting edge of the new economy.  Microsoft Corporation=s elegant Acampus@ in 
Redmond, Washington indeed gives the appearance of a tranquil college setting.  
Graceful buildings are set among gentle slopes and winding brooks.  Young people 
(mostly men) toss frisbees and play softball on broad lawns and fields.  They gather 
in windowed cafeterias for lunch and snacks.  Free video game machines are 
abundant.  Shuttle buses with free candy baskets move employees around the site. 
More than 20,000 workers are employed at Microsoft=s Redmond campus and 
other nearby facilities.  But 6,000 of them are not employed by Microsoft.  Instead, 
they are employed by many temporary agencies supplying high-tech workers to 
Microsoft and other area companies.  Many have worked for several years at 
Microsoft.  They have come to be known as perma-temps, temporary employees 
working for long periods, often side-by-side in teams with regular, full-time 
employees (often referred to as AFTEs.@ in U.S. labor parlance). 
Microsoft FTEs enjoy health insurance, pension plans, paid vacations and, 
most lucratively with the rising value of technology stocks in recent years, share 
ownership in the company.  Perma-temps have none of that.  They receive a 
generous hourly pay, usually $25-35 per hour, and nothing more.  They have to pay 
$300 per month for family medical insurance.  They often work fifty hours a week 
but are not entitled to overtime pay after forty hours because they are excluded from 
coverage by the Fair Labor Standards Act as highly skilled technical employees. 
                                                 
449For a description of an embryonic effort at association by temporary workers, see Steven 
Greenhouse, ATemporary Workers Seeking Code of Conduct for Job Agencies, New York 
Times, January 31, 2000, p. B1. 
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AIt=s an unbelievable erosion of what I expected from a company like 
Microsoft,@ said Marcus Courtney, a young Montanan who became a Microsoft 
perma-temp in 1996.  AWe do the same work, but for second-class statusCno health, 
no pension, no vacation, no stock.  We=re in the orange ghetto,@ he said, referring to 
the orange ID cards that distinguish temporary employees from blue-carded 
FTEs.450   
                                                 
450Human Rights Watch interview, Seattle, Washington, November 4, 1999. 
232 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
AHere=s a common situationCtell me how you would feel,@ said Jeff Nachtigal, 
another Microsoft perma-temp. AYou work on a project for months in a team of ten 
people, five perma-temps and five FTEs.  You do the same things.  You become 
friends.  You=re all part of the team.  Then at the end of a project meeting, the FTEs 
plan a >morale= event paid for by Microsoft, a dinner at the nicest restaurant in town. 
 But only for them.  The rest of us just sit there.@451 
AWe needed to do something,@ said Courtney.  He and other perma-temps 
formed the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (WashTech) in early 
1998, with help from the Communications Workers of America (CWA).  The CWA 
is the union of AT&T workers and others in the high-technology sector.452 
WashTech is in the early stages of an effort to organize Microsoft perma-
temps.  AWe=ve got a long way to go,@ Courtney concedes.  AWe=re starting by 
establishing WashTech as a reliable source of information for high-tech workers in 
the area.@ Courtney said he told CWA organizers, AWe have to do it differently here. 
 The old-style union tactics of house visits and leaflets blasting management won=t 
be enough.@ 
But WashTech has a ACatch-22"-type problem.  By defining perma-temps as 
contractors employed by various temporary agencies, Microsoft avoids being their 
employer for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act=s protection of the right 
to organize.  Meanwhile, the agencies tell temps that in order to form a union 
management will deal with, they have to organize other employees of the agency, 
not just those working at Microsoft. 
Placed by an agency at Microsoft since May 1998, Barbara Judd worked in a 
perma-temp group of eighteen workers involved in a project developing a tax 
preparation software package.  The only Microsoft FTEs in the project were their 
supervisors and managers.   
Judd has an MBA and worked for years as a financial analyst.  AI spent nine 
years with one company as a regular full-time worker,@ she said, Awith health 
insurance, a pension, and paid vacations.  I always thought of temporary work as 
something to fill in for people who are out, or as a probation to see if you can do the 
job, then become a full-timer.@ Judd said, AMicrosoft brought in a bunch of skilled, 
experienced people to develop this new product.  They told us how important it was 
                                                 
451Ibid. 
452Full disclosure: staff associates of Human Rights Watch voted in favor of representation 
by a New York-based local union of CWA in an NLRB election in October 1999. 
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to the company.  We came from four different temp agencies.  We thought we=d go 
blue [convert from temporary to regular FTE status] once it was launched.  Now 
they=ve told us we=ll stay orange for at least two more years.@453 
                                                 
453Human Rights Watch interview, Seattle, Washington, November 4, 1999. 
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In early 1999 Microsoft announced it was going to require agencies supplying 
workers to the firm to provide more benefits for temporary workers.  But when Judd 
asked her agency about the move, AThey told me, >We=re grandfathered.  We don=t 
have to add benefits.= We were already upset about job titles and pay grade being 
out of line, both with each other and with other employees.  And now this.@454 
Judd and her coworkers formed a union.  Sixteen of the eighteen perma-temps 
in the group joined WashTech.  A First we asked our Microsoft managers to bargain 
with us,@ she said.  Management refused.  A spokesman for Microsoft told the press 
that A>bargaining units are a matter between employers and employees= and 
Microsoft is not the employer of the workers.@455   
The group turned to their agencies, but agency managers refused to talk to 
them.  One manager told the press that  A>the company does not believe the group >is 
an appropriate bargaining unit under the federal labor laws.=@456  According to Judd, 
one manager told her, A>If you keep it up, we=re going to sic Microsoft=s lawyers on 
you.=@457 
When the workers sought to distribute WashTech information at work, their 
Microsoft managers issued a Anon-solicitation and non-distribution policy for 
Contingent Staff [perma-temps] . . . to help maintain Microsoft project site 
efficiency and security.@458  That instruction was followed by another e-mail 
                                                 
454Ibid. 
455See Leslie Helm, ATechnology: 16 Microsoft Temps Organize into Bargaining Unit; 
Labor: Group Hoping for Improved Benefits Signs a Petition Seeking Representation by 
Local Union,@ Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1999, p. C3. 
456Ibid. 
457ibid. 
458Microsoft e-mail to all temporary workers, June 30, 1999, on file with Human Rights 
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message: AJust a reminder that distribution of materials that are not related to 
Microsoft business purposes is PROHIBITED.@459  But when asked if an employee=s 
solicitation for a school fundraiser was covered by the ban, a manager responded, 
AThat was not the purpose of my talking about the distribution of materials.@460  
                                                                                                             
Watch. 
459Microsoft e-mail of September 17, 1999 (capitalized in original), on file with Human 
Rights Watch. 
460Microsoft exchange of e-mails, September 17, 1999, on file with Human Rights Watch.  
Discriminatory application of a work rule against distribution of worker organizing materials 
as distinct from other materials could give rise to an unfair labor practice charge.  No charge 
was filed in this matter. 
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Attempts to be recognized by the temp agencies were equally unavailing.  
A>We don=t have to talk to you, and we won=t= is what they told us,@ said Barbara 
Judd.  AThey told us we had to get all the temps from all four agencies that worked 
at other companies besides Microsoft.  We had no way to know who they were or 
how to reach them.  Besides, they had nothing to do with our problems at 
Microsoft.@461 
Frustration of these workers= freedom of association was subtle, not raw.  
Marcus Courtney, Jeff Nachtigal, Barbara Judd and other Microsoft permatemps 
were not fired for leadership or activity in WashTech.462  But their situation was still 
precarious.  In February 2000, Microsoft announced a new policy effective July 1, 
2000 limiting temporary workers to one year=s employment at a time and requiring a 
one-hundred-day break between each individual=s assignment at the company.  
Under this policy, perma-temps would have to take one hundred days off beginning 
July 1, 2000 unless they are hired as full-time employees.  After one hundred days 
off, said a Microsoft manager, they would have to reapply for temporary work or 
request new jobs at a different company through their temporary employment 
agencies.463 
Barbara Judd=s permatemp post at Microsoft ended in March 2000 when the 
company announced it was abandoning the tax preparation software project that she 
and her coworkers developed.464  AWe are discontinuing our development effort on 
                                                 
461Judd interview. 
462See Nan Netherton, AContingent Workers: Microsoft Changes Policy on Use of 
Temporary Employees,@ Daily Labor Report, Bureau of National Affairs, February 23, 2000, 
p. A-7. 
463See John Cook, AMicrosoft Limits Amount of Time Temps Can Work; New Policy Could 
End Its >Permatemp= Problem,@ Seattle Post-Intelligencer, February 19, 2000, p. B3. 
464See Paul Andrews, AMicrosoft drops TaxSaver software; Workers on project call decision 
a shock,@ Seattle Times, March 24, 2000, p. D3. 
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the TaxSaver product,@ a manager told workers.  AWe will be announcing a 
partnership with H&R Block tomorrow morning.@465   
                                                 
465See Microsoft, APartnering in the tax preparation category,@  e-mail to financial products 
group, March 22, 2000, on file with Human Rights Watch. 
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AWe received two days notice@ of being laid off, Judd told Human Rights 
Watch.  Some workers moved to another tax preparation software company, but 
Judd decided to look for full-time employment.  AI believe the temporary worker 
industry is making a profit at the expense of workers, and I don=t want to be a part 
of that system,@ she said.  AWorkers who take temp jobs do not realize there is a 
larger impact than just the absence of benefits.  You essentially lose the ability to 
organize . . . [T]he legal system is just not set up to deal with these long-term temp 
[perma-temp] issues.@466 
A cynic, or more generously a pragmatist, might say that Human Rights 
Watch=s sympathy and attention should be saved for downtrodden workers like 
those in other case studies in this report, not devoted to skilled workers who can 
command a premium in the new, high-tech economy.  But the right to freedom of 
association is fundamental.  It is not tied to economic status.  All workers have this 
right and should enjoy its exercise and protection.  Indeed, medical doctors might 
well soon be another case study if their definition as independent contractors bars 
them from negotiating with powerful HMOs about pay and practice conditions, 
including medical decision-making.467 
 
Express Package Delivery Workers 
Another example of the frustration of contract workers= freedom of association 
can be found in the package shipping business.  Airborne Express is a nationwide 
package delivery company.  Airborne employs directly, as its employees, about 
18,000 workers represented by the Teamsters union.  These workers have a national 
                                                 
466Human Rights Watch telephone interview, April 25, 2000. 
467See Amy Goldstein, AAMA Votes to Unionize Doctors: Group Acts in Response to 
Managed Care=s Effect on rights, Duties of Physicians,@ Washington Post, June 24, 1999, p. 
A1; Charles Ornstein, ASeeking Treatment: Doctors= Groups Look for Ways to Stay 
Financially Afloat,@ Dallas Morning News, October 31, 1999 (noting Acurrent antitrust law 
views independent physicians as small businessmen and regards collective bargaining as 
collusion@). 
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collective bargaining agreement with Airborne providing good wages and 
comprehensive benefitsChealth insurance, pensions, vacations.   But about 15,000 
other workers are employed in Airborne=s underside.  They work at nearly 300 
Airborne subcontractors, with less than half the salary of regular Airborne 
employees and no benefits.  To all appearances, though, they are Airborne 
employees.  They wear Airborne uniforms and drive Airborne trucks.  They report 
to work at Airborne buildings and watch Airborne training videos.  They use 
Airborne=s billing and records system.  The contractors they work for serve 
Airborne as exclusive company contractors with a low-paid workforce.468 
                                                 
468Airborne representatives did not respond to requests from Human Rights Watch for 
interviews or further information about the cases described here. 
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In November 1994, sixty workers at Airborne contractors in Rhode Island 
called Expressman Courier and Interstate Parcel formed a union and sought to 
bargain collectively with their companies.  Airborne canceled the subcontracts, 
closed the companies, and fired all the workers.  Shortly afterward, Airborne 
reopened the sites under new names and new contracts with the same managers, this 
time called Agents Transportation and Professional Delivery.  These companies 
rehired former Expressman and Interstate workers, but only those they considered 
opposed to the union.  They refused to rehire worker leaders and members active in 
the union.  AThey took all the non-union guys.  The rest of us were out in the cold,@ 
said Peter Shaw, one of the leaders.469  The NLRB regional office backed up the 
workers= discrimination charge after an investigation, finding merit and issuing a 
complaint against Airborne and the contractors.470  The complaint awaits a decision 
by an administrative law judge. 
With some variation, the scenario repeated itself in other locations.  Workers 
at an Airborne contractor in Wisconsin called EEI formed a union in 1994.  EEI 
commenced bargaining but refused to make an economic offer because, in the 
words of an NLRB complaint, AAirborne controls the revenue available to EEI.@471  
At a contractor in Ohio called Boone Cartage, workers formed a union in December 
1997.  As at the Wisconsin site, Boone claimed its hands were tied because 
Airborne controlled its revenues.  Boone said if it raised workers= pay, Airborne 
would cancel its contract.  Airborne, on the other hand, argued that Boone was an 
                                                 
469See Bill Dermody, ATeamsters Says Airborne Is Playing a Shell Game,@ Journal of 
Commerce, May 17, 1997. 
470See NLRB Region 1, Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of 
Hearing, Airborne Freight Company et.al. and Teamsters Local 251, Cases 1-CA-32742, 
32767, March 27, 1997. 
471See NLRB Region 30, Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of 
Hearing, Airborne Express, Enterprise Express and Teamsters Local 344, Cases 30-CA-
12786, 12963 (June 7, 1996). 
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independent contractor and disclaimed any responsibility to bargain with Airborne 
workers at Boone.472 
                                                 
472See NLRB Region 9, Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Compliant and Notice of 
Hearing, Airborne Express and Boone Cartage and Teamsters Local 957, Cases 9-CA-
36244, 36272 1,-2,-3, December 31, 1998. 
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Dan Lamb, an Airborne contract worker at Boone, went on a forty-day hunger 
strike in mid-1998 to protest Airborne=s refusal to deal with the workers= union.  
Lamb made $8 per hour, compared with regular Airborne workers= salary of $18 per 
hour.  Lamb got no pension and had to pay for family health insurance by having 
$340 dollars per month deducted from his paycheck.  AWe=ve got to plant good 
seeds,@ said Lamb.  AWe=ve been planting bad seeds.  Somebody=s got to turn the 
tide.@473 
Asked about Lamb=s protest, an Airborne spokesman said, AThis is not an 
Airborne issue.  It=s Boone Cartage=s issue.  He=s their employee.  We don=t 
determine his wages.@474  Airborne threatened Lamb with legal action if he kept 
Airborne=s name on his protest signs.  Airborne refused to bargain with workers at 
Boone.475  This case is also before an NLRB administrative law judge. 
In another case, Airborne did not wait.  Management at First Choice Delivery, 
an Airborne subcontractor in New York, fired two leaders of an effort to form a 
union in 1995.  One of them, Gary Livingston, had a 1993 letter of commendation 
from Airborne president Robert G.  Brazzen.  AWe really appreciate all your efforts 
in extending superior service to our Airborne Express customers,@ the letter said.476 
Airborne=s status as a Ajoint employer@ with its subcontractors is now being 
litigated in a half-dozen separate cases at the NLRB.  It could take years for these 
cases to be decided.  It is already more than five years since workers in Rhode 
Island and Wisconsin formed and joined their union and since worker leaders were 
fired.  And this is a case where the legal Aindicia@ of joint employer status are quite 
strong, as with the open use of Airborne uniforms and trucks by subcontractors, for 
                                                 
473 See Kirsten Wicker, AGoing Hungry: Airborne Express worker goes on a hunger strike to 
protest low wages,@ Dayton Voice, July 23, 1998, 1. 
474See Glenn Burkins, AA hunger striker says he won=t eat until his employer signs a union 
contract,@ Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1998, 1. 
475See NLRB Region 9 Complaint and Notice of Hearing,; Glenn Burkins, AA hunger striker 
says . . .@ 
476See Marc Carey, AWorker in union drive finds back against wall,@ Albany Times Union, 
April 8, 1995. 
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example.  Many other companies find it easy to maintain the appearance of an arms-
length contractor-subcontractor relationship by avoiding such superficial indications 
of a controlling relationship.  This way, the large company effectively maintains 
control over the subcontractor and the ability to cancel a contract where workers 
exercise their right to freedom of association. 
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VI.  LEGAL OBSTACLES TO U.S. WORKERS= EXERCISE OF 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
Defenseless Workers: Exclusions in U.S. Labor Law 
Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. 
CUniversal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
 
AExclusions@ from labor law protection affect tens of millions of workers in the 
United States ranging from farmworkers to college professors.  Big chunks of the 
labor force are defenseless against employer reprisals if they try to exercise freedom 
of association.  If they protest abusive working conditions, employers can fire them 
with impunity.  If they seek to bargain collectively, employers can ignore them.  
Protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively, a bedrock requirement 
of international labor rights norms, is denied these workers. 
The 1935 Wagner Act, the original NLRA, excluded agricultural workers and 
domestic workers from its coverage.  In the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, independent 
contractors and low-level supervisors were added to the list of exclusions in the 
NLRA.  These exclusions run counter to international human rights standards 
compelling broad protection of workers= freedom of association and relevant 
comparative international practice. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association . . . Everyone has the right to form 
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests."477  The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says, "Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests."478  The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights urges guarantees for "the right of everyone to form trade 
                                                 
477UDHR Articles 20, 23 (emphasis added here and in following references).  As is known, 
the possessive pronoun is gender-specific in English, unlike most other languages.  When 
these instruments were crafted, usually with French as the foundation, Ahis@ in the English 
translation applied to men and women. 
478ICCPR Article 22. 
  
 245 
unions and join the trade union of his choice . . . for the promotion and protection of 
his economic and social interests."479 
                                                 
479ICESCR Article 8. 
As noted earlier in Chapter III., the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 
and did not enter any reservations, declarations, or understandings with respect to 
Article 22 on freedom of association.  The United States signed, but has not ratified, 
the ICESCR.  Signature constitutes a preliminary and general endorsement of the 
covenant, and creates an obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the 
objectives of the covenant, or to take measures to undermine it. 
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Under ILO Convention No.  87, "Workers . . . without distinction whatsoever 
shall have the right to establish and . . . join organisations of their own choosing."480 
 ILO Convention No.  98 says, AWorkers shall enjoy adequate protection against 
acts of anti-union discrimination. . . .@481  More than 100 countries have ratified 
these two freedom of association conventions, reflecting a solid international 
consensus.  Although the United States has not ratified them, it is bound by them by 
virtue of its membership in the ILO itself, since these conventions are taken to be of 
a constitutional nature over and above other conventions.482 
Under the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, championed by the United States, all member countries have an obligation, 
whether or not they have ratified conventions 87 and 98, Ato respect, to promote, 
and to realise the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject 
of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining. . . .@483 
On its face, U.S. law is equally comprehensive.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 
1932 excluded no category of worker and stated, "[I]t is necessary that he have full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his 
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he 
shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor. . . 
."484  Section 7 of the NLRA stipulates: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing. . . ." The NLRB was created to enforce these rights. 
                                                 
480ILO Convention No.  87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise. 
481ILO Convention No.  98 Concerning the Application of the Principle of the Right to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively. 
482See ILO Resolution, Official Bulletin, Vol LVII, p. 152 (1974). 
483ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up 
(1998). 
484Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat.  70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. '' 101-15 (1988). 
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However, Congress created enormous exclusions of workers from the legal 
protection of these rights in the final version of the 1935 Wagner Act and in the 
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act.  Under Section 2 of the NLRA 
as it now reads, "The term 'employee' . . . shall not include any individual employed 
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his 
home, . . . or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any 
individual employed as a supervisor. . . ."485   
Under these clauses and related court decisions, workers in all walks of life are 
excluded from labor law protection.  Their employers can fire them with impunity 
for engaging in concerted activity, including trying to form a union, to bargain 
collectively, or to strike.  They have no labor board or unfair labor practice 
mechanism they can turn to for redress.  These workers include many or all 
farmworkers, household employees, taxi drivers, college professors, delivery truck 
drivers, engineers, product sellers and distributors, doctors, nurses, newspaper 
employees, Indian casino employees, employees labeled "supervisors" and 
Amanagers@ who may have minimal supervisory or managerial responsibility, and 
others. 
 
Agricultural Workers 
More than three million workers in the United States are excluded from 
federal law protecting the right to organize because they are Aemployed as an 
agricultural laborer.@486  Agricultural workers' exclusion under the NLRA was not 
the result of any argument that warned of undesirable consequences of their 
coverage under the law.  Congress was focusing on industrial strife in the nation's 
manufacturing sectors and thought of agricultural employment as one or two "hired 
                                                 
485NLRA Section 2. 
486Agricultural workers are covered by the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Protection Act (AWPA) for certain working conditions, but this law does not protect the 
right to organize and bargain collectively, as it would conflict with the NLRA=s exclusion of 
agricultural workers from coverage. 
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hands" helping a small family farmer.  Although farmworkers were covered in the 
original drafts of the bill, the exclusion was added without much debate or dissent.  
There were no hearings devoted to farmworkers' problems.487 
                                                 
487See Michael H. LeRoy and Wallace Hendricks, Should "Agricultural Laborers" Continue 
To Be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 Emory Law Journal 489 (Spring 
1999) (hereafter A>Agricultural Laborers=@) for an extensive discussion of the legislative 
history of the agricultural exclusion under the NLRA. 
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Human Rights Watch's research for this report reconfirmed what many 
previous studies, reports, documentary films and other investigations have 
foundCthat farmworkers confront low wages, bad housing, poor health care, 
workplace hazards, unfair treatment and other abusive conditions on a massive 
scale.488  Their suffering could begin to be addressed by effective exercise of 
freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively.  Indeed, 
solving such problems through self-organization and bargaining with employers is 
the purpose of the NLRA.   
Even if the "hired hand" model of farm labor prevailed in the 1930s, it has 
long since given way to large-scale corporate farming and massive movement of 
farmworkers by the tens of thousands through the harvest cycles of American 
agriculture.  The continued denial of protection for farmworkers is both an 
anachronism and a case of U.S. labor law violating international human rights 
standards requiring protection of all workers= right to freedom of association. 
Farmworkers in some states are covered by state laws regulating at least some 
aspects of organization and collective bargaining.489  California and Arizona, in 
particular, have created labor boards to handle unfair labor practices, including 
discriminatory discharge cases.  Given the size of these states= agricultural labor 
force, this softens the overall national effect of the agricultural exclusion under the 
NLRA.  However, farmworker union organizers report that many of the problems 
that plague the NLRB system, such as employer threats, discriminatory discharges, 
years of delay, and weak remedies, also afflict California=s Agricultural Labor 
Relations Act and Agricultural Labor Relations Board under state law.  They see the 
Arizona law as openly favoring growers.490 
In other states, notably Florida, New Jersey, and Washington, court decisions 
have affirmed farmworkers' right to organize.491  However, in these and other states 
                                                 
488See, for example, Daniel Rothenberg, With These Hands (1999). 
489These include New Jersey, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, Kansas, South Dakota, 
Arizona and California. See LeRoy and Hendricks, A>Agricultural Laborers,=@ p. 493. 
490Human Rights Watch interview with Guadalupe Gamboa, United Farm Workers of 
America representative, Sunnyside, Washington, November 6, 1999; see S. Lynne, Walker, 
AALRB has become foe, Chavez says,@ San Diego Union-Tribune, May 26, 1987, p. A-7; 
Russ Hemphill, APoliticians Rush to Honor Chavez; But Reject Farm Workers= Rights He 
Sought,@ Phoenix Gazette, November 9, 1993, p. B1. Since this Human Rights Watch report 
focuses on national law and practice, it does not examine workers= rights under these state 
laws or further evaluate criticisms of these laws. for more discussion, see LeRoy and 
Hendricks, A>Agricultural Laborers.=@ 
491See COTA v. Molinelli, 552 A.2d. 1003 (N.J. 1989); Bravo v. Dolssen Companies, 
125Wn.2d 745; 888 P.2d 147 (1995). 
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with court-created associational rights, there is still no administrative redress 
enforced by public authorities.  Workers must file individual private lawsuits which, 
as noted above in the Washington State apple workers= case, they are reluctant to do 
and private attorneys are reluctant to undertake. 
In these few states where protection of the right to organize exists under court-
made law, the difficulty of mounting a successful lawsuit to vindicate the right 
makes such protection wholly inadequate.  In the vast majority of U.S. states, 
farmworkers are completely defenseless.  They have neither an unfair labor practice 
claim nor a lawsuit available for recourse when employers fires them for exercising 
freedom of association. 
 
Domestic Workers 
When it crafted the NLRA in 1935, Congress made a judgment that organizing 
and collective bargaining did not fit the intimate relationship between a householder 
and a domestic employee.  Like the farmer=s hired hand, the domestic worker was 
perceived by Congress as outside the scope of legislation addressing industrial 
strife.  The reality sixty-five years later is that domestic workers are vulnerable to 
human rights abuse, and there is a pressing need to provide them the right to 
organize for their own protection. 
Thousands of domestic workers have been brought into the United States by 
officials of multinational corporations, international organizations, and other elites 
residing in the United States.  Several factors have created a dramatically increasing 
need for child care and a growing, largely unregulated, labor market for in-home 
child care, both "on the books" and "off the books." One is the surge of two-income 
households and single-parent homes in the United States.  Another is the emergence 
of an even more affluent upper class able to afford domestic help.  The dispersal of 
the extended family has made fewer relatives available for child care.  In many 
areas, immigrant women fill this need. 
The Agraying@ of the U.S. population has created parallel growth in elder care 
in the home.  Much of this is provided by agencies who assign workers as 
"independent contractors" (see below), but many also are hired directly by a family 
to provide care.  In all these settings, many of the child care and elder care 
providers are immigrant women. 
Most European countries have developed special labor law regimes for 
domestic workers addressing their right of association and providing ways to 
standardize pay and working conditions through collective representation.  But the 
United States clings to the exclusion of domestic workers from protection of the 
right to act in association with one another.   
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In the United States, more than 800,000 officially reported Aprivate 
household workers@ held jobs as domestic employees in 1998.  Nearly 30 
percent were foreign migrant workers, and the vast majority were women.
492
 
                                                 
492U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished tabulations from 1998-1999 population 
survey, on file with Human Rights Watch. Of the 847,000 Aprivate household workers@: 1) 
approximately 1,000 are launderers and ironers; 2) approximately 4,000 are cooks; 3) 
approximately 14, 000 are housekeepers and butlers, defined as those who Ahire, supervise, 
and coordinate the household staff to keep the household running smoothly;@ 4) 
approximately 278,000 are child care workers, including babysitters, nannies, infant nurses, 
and governesses; and 5)approximately 549,000 are Aprivate household cleaners and 
servants,@ defined as those whose duties may include dusting and polishing furniture; 
sweeping, mopping, and waxing floors; vacuuming; cleaning ovens, refrigerators, and 
bathrooms; washing dishes; polishing silver; changing and making beds; washing, folding, 
and ironing clothes; washing windows; looking after children or elderly persons; cooking; 
feeding pets; answering the telephone and doorbell; and taking clothes to the cleaners, doing 
grocery shopping, and running other errands. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1998-1999 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, http://stats.bls.gov/oco/ocos175.htm (visited 9/17/99).  
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 These figures are surely an undercounting: an unknown number of workers 
also labored as domestics Aoff the books@CU.S. citizens, workers with non-
immigrant or temporary visas, workers with permanent visas or Agreen 
cards,@ and undocumented workers.  In all, likely more than one million 
workers in the United States are maids, cooks, babysitters, cleaners, 
gardeners, and other domestic employees. 
Domestic workers perform devalued household tasks.
493
  In her role, 
the domestic worker is often correspondingly devalued.  In the most 
egregious cases of exploitation, employers feel free to create living and 
working conditions equivalent to indentured servitude.  Numerous cases 
have surfaced of live-in migrant domestic workersCboth documented and 
undocumentedCworking over one hundred hours per week, from early 
morning until late at night six or seven days a week with no holidays, 
receiving compensation far below the national minimum wage if they are 
paid at all.
494
   
                                                 
493See Bridget Anderson, "Just Like One of the Family"? Migrant Domestic Workers in the 
European Union (unpublished thesis, 1998), p. 34, on file with Human Rights Watch. 
494See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, AAn Immigrant=s Legal Oddysey: In Suing employer, Maid 
fights Diplomatic Immunity,@ New York Times, January 12, 2000, p. B1; Tom Robbins, 
AProtecting Exploited Domestics,@ New York Daily News, August 9, 1999, p. 15; Kala 
Dwarakanath, AFighting worker exploitation,@ India in New York, May 29, 1998, p. 16; 
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Celia Rivas, attorney, Spanish Catholic 
Center, Gaithersburg, Maryland, November 29, 1999; Human Rights Watch telephone 
interview with Edward Leavy, attorney, Washington, D.C., November 19, 1999; Human 
Rights Watch telephone interviews with Steven Smitson, attorney, CASA of Maryland, Inc., 
Silver Spring, Maryland, November 4, 1999 and November 22, 1999. 
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Many domestic workers who have spoken out about their plight say that 
abusive employers deny them basic telephone privileges, prohibit them from 
leaving employers= homes unaccompanied, and forbid them to associate or 
communicate with friends and neighbors.
495
  To prevent domestic workers 
from leaving exploitative employment situations, employers confiscate the 
workers= passports and threaten them with deportation if they flee.
496
  In the 
most severe cases of abuse, migrant domestic workersCboth live-in and 
day workersChave reported instances of sexual assault, physical abuse, 
and rape.
497
 
Shamela Begum, a Bangladeshi woman, came to New York with a special visa 
in December 1998 to be employed as a domestic worker by a couple in which the 
                                                 
495See, e.g., Jessica Shattuck, ANahar Alam: fighting for the rights of domestic workers,@ 
Mother Jones, September 1, 1998, p. 22; Sonia Shah, AHelp for Immigrant Women,@ The 
Progressive, June 1, 1998, p. 14; Human Rights Watch Leavy, Smitson interviews. 
496See, e.g., Alex Tizon, AAn Illegal Aliens= Tale--Caught in a Web of Fraud and Dreams,@ 
The Seattle Times, August 1, 1999, p. A1; Dwarakanath, AFighting worker exploitation,@ 
India in New York; Human Rights Watch Leavy, Smitson interviews. 
497Human Rights Watch Rivas, Smitson interviews; Margaret Ramirez, AAdding Injury to 
Insult: Domestic workers say they are humiliated, even hurt,@ Newsday, March 15, 1998, p. 
A36; Pamela Constable, AHousekeeper Wins Suit Against Boss,@ The Washington Post, June 
10, 1997, p. E5.  
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husband was a Bahraini diplomat at the United Nations.498  Begum said that when 
she arrived in the U.S., her employers immediately confiscated her passport and  
refused to return it.499  According to Begum, until August 30, 1999, when she was 
freed through the help of New York City police and local advocates, she labored 
from approximately 6:00 a.m.  until 10:00 p.m.  seven days a week caring for the 
couple=s children and performing household duties for the family.500  Begum said 
that she was paid only $100 per month for the first eight months of her work, money 
which was not given to her directly but was instead sent to her husband in 
Bangladesh, and that she was never paid for the remaining duration of her 
employment.501   
                                                 
498Complaint, Shamela Begum v. Mohammed Saleh and Khatun Saleh, Civ. No. 99-11834, 
(SDNY, December 7, 1999), & 1; Letter from David Wohabe, attorney for Defendants 
Mohammed and Khatun Saleh, to the Honorable Richard M. Berman, United States District 
Judge, Southern District of New York, January 18, 2000, p. 1;  Somini Sengupta, AIn Suing 
Employer, Immigrant Fights Diplomatic Immunity,@ New York Times, January 12, 2000, p. 
A23. 
499Complaint, Shamela Begum v. Mohammed Saleh and Khatun Saleh, & 10. 
500Ibid., && 1, 11, 19. 
501Ibid., & 12. 
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Shamela Begum recounted that during her approximately nine months with the 
couple, she was allowed to leave their high-rise apartment on Manhattan=s East Side 
only twiceCboth times to accompany the wife to the market.502  Furthermore, she 
contended that when the couple vacationed, she was left alone, confined to their 
apartment with little or no food and no money to buy food.503  According to Begum, 
throughout her time with the couple, not only was she imprisoned in their apartment 
and occasionally denied food, but she was also frequently verbally abused and 
humiliated by them and, on several occasions, was the victim of assault and battery 
by the wife.504   
At nine months, Shamela Begum=s suffering was relatively brief.  
Yeshehareg Teferra, an Ethiopian woman, worked in Silver Spring, 
Maryland, for eight years for an Ethiopian staff member of the International 
Monetary Fund.  She worked seven days a week, thirteen hours a day with 
no days off during the eight years.  She received total compensation of 
$1,060 during that timeCthe equivalent of three cents an hour.
505
  Teferra 
said she was ordered not to speak with people outside the family; was 
required to ask permission prior to leaving the apartment; and was slapped, 
choked, and verbally abused when she complained of her treatment.
506
   
                                                 
502Ibid., & 14; Sengupta, AIn Suing Employer . . .@. 
503Ibid., & 13. 
504Ibid. In June 2000 the case was settled out of court. See Somini Sengupta, ASettlement 
Reached in Maid=s Suit Against Diplomat,@ New York Times, June 15, 2000, p. B2. 
505See AOrder Adopting Report and Recommendation,@ Deborah K. Chasanow, U.S. District 
Judge, September 14, 1999, and AReport and Recommendation, William Connelly, U.S. 
Magistrate Judge, August 19, 1999, Yeshehareg Teffera v. Dawit Makonnen, Civil No. DKC 
98-3420, United States District Court for the District of Maryland. 
506William Branigin, "A Life of Exhaustion, Beatings and Isolation," The Washington Post, 
January 5, 1999, p. A6. 
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Hilda Dos Santos was held as a Alive-in slave@ for nearly twenty years in a 
suburb of Washington, D.C.  by an employer from her native Brazil.  She was never 
paid a salary, was physically assaulted, and was denied medical care for a stomach 
tumor the size of a soccer ball.  Her plight only came to light when neighbors acted 
at the sight of her tumor, and resulting publicity led to a successful prosecution.507  
Dos Santos=s case illustrates the difficulty of uncovering such abuses.  After twenty 
years of servitude, she was granted temporary legal status to testify against her 
employer but was then subject to deportation.  An unknown number of similar 
victims remain silent because exposure means deportation for them, too.508 
                                                 
507See Ruben Castañeda, AMan Found Guilty in Slave Case; Md. Couple Brought Woman 
From Brazil,@ Washington Post, February 11, 2000, p. B1. 
508Ibid. Subsequent editorial comment noted that Athe sad fact is that no one can say for sure 
how many other cases like hers may exist . . . more than 30,000 domestic workers were 
brought into the country during the 1990s on special work visas, and uncounted others came 
to work illegally. If these workersCisolated in homes, often unable to speak English and 
fearful of deportationCencounter abuse or exploitation, help can seem completely out of 
reach.@ (See ASlavery in the Suburbs,@ Editorial, Washington Post, February 13, 2000, p. 
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Domestic Workers= Initiatives in the United States 
Whether or not they are enforced, minimum wage laws, overtime laws, and 
child labor laws apply to most domestic workers in the United States.  But if they 
attempt to form and join a union, or exercise any freedom of association 
even without the intent of forming a union, they can be summarily 
threatened, intimidated, or fired with impunity by their employer because of 
their exclusion from coverage by the NLRA.  In contrast, unions of domestic 
workers have formed in a number of European Union (EU) countries, 
including France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Greece.
509
 
                                                                                                             
B6). 
509Human Rights Watch telephone interview with representative, French Democratic 
Confederation of Workers (CFDT), Paris, France, December 14, 1999. The CFDT 
representative said that domestic workers in France negotiated a collective 
agreement in 1992Cthe Convention Collective Nationale des Employés de Maison 
(National Collective Agreement of Household Employees)Cwith the French national 
federation of employers of domestic workers. The collective agreement covers all 
domestic workers in France, both union and non-union members, and sets forth 
explicit terms and conditions with which the employer of a domestic worker must 
comply. If the collective agreement is breached, a domestic worker may report to a 
French labor inspector, request that the breach be documented, and take the case 
to court. Protections for domestic workers such as those set forth in the French 
collective agreement may soon apply to domestic workers throughout the European 
Union. A public campaign in support of a draft EU rule establishing minimum rights 
for domestic workers was launched in October 1999. Unions representing domestic 
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workers are now engaging in a vigorous EU-wide campaign to garner support for 
the charter. 
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Despite their exclusion from laws protecting the right to organize, some 
domestic workers in the United States have established local cooperatives and 
support and advocacy agencies.  They seek to improve wages and working 
conditions of domestic workers by uniting them and educating them about their 
rights.510  Human Rights Watch spoke with two such groups, Workers= Awaaz 
(Workers= Voice) and the Unidad Cooperativa de Limpieza de Casa (Unity 
Cooperative of Housecleaners), both based on Long Island in New York. 
Workers= Awaaz was founded in June 1997 as an advocacy group run by and 
for South Asian women workers, primarily domestics, in Long Island City.511  The 
group has one paid staff person and consists of approximately fifty members, 
roughly fifteen of whom are actively involved in organizing and implementing the 
activities of Workers= Awaaz.512   
Workers= Awaaz reaches out to local domestic employees and advocates for 
their rights in a variety of ways.  Its active members set up tables on streets in 
neighborhoods where a large number of migrant domestic workers live; cooperate 
with other workers= groups and women=s groups to expose the exploitative working 
conditions of many domestic workers; mount publicity campaigns by placing ads in 
local newspapers to educate domestic workers about their rights and to put 
employers who break the law on notice that they might face lawsuits; picket 
employers known to exploit domestic workers; refer domestic workers with legal 
claims against their employers to attorneys willing to represent them;513 and join 
forces with other workers= rights organizations to reach out to injured domestic 
workers to expose the connection between long hours and health problems.514   
The Unidad Cooperativa de Limpieza de Casa, which meets on alternate 
Sundays at the Workplace Project in Hempstead, New York,515 began functioning in 
                                                 
510See Dwarakanath, AFighting worker exploitation.@ 
511See Shah, AHelp for Immigrant Women.@ 
512Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Shabhano Aliani, co-founder and current 
volunteer and board member of Workers= Awaaz, November 29, 1999. 
513In 1997, an ACLU attorney, Michael Wishnie, reached a settlement in Workers= Awaaz=s 
first court case filed against an exploitative employer, obtaining $20,000 in back pay for the 
domestic worker.  See Shattuck, ANahar Alam. . . .@ 
514Ibid. 
515The Workplace Project is a not-for-profit organization that uses grassroots organizing, 
legal action, and community education to seek just working conditions for Latino immigrants 
on Long Island.  Lucia Hwang, AWorkplace Project Helps Latino Laborers Help 
Themselves,@ Newsday, October 12, 1998, p. 27; Robert Gearty, AFighting for Workers= 
Rights,@ New York Daily News, August 2, 1998, p. 2. 
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January 1999, after approximately six months of preparation and planning.516  Like 
other migrant domestic worker cooperatives that have formed across the country in 
the 1990s, the Unidad Cooperativa is made up primarily of day workers, who have 
joined forces in response to abusive employment conditions in employers= homes 
and exploitative terms imposed by employment agencies.   
                                                 
516Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Nadia-Marín Molina, executive director, 
Workplace Project, November 22, 1999. 
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According to Nadia Marín-Molina, executive director of the Workplace 
Project, employment agencies often charge domestic workers illegal application 
fees and illegally exorbitant agency placement fees and fail to abide by the 
minimum wage and hour terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act.517  Marín-Molina 
described to Human Rights Watch the case of one domestic worker who sought the 
assistance of the Workplace Project after being forced by her employment agency to 
clean eleven homes in one day, from 6:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m., for which she 
received $50.518  The goal of the cooperative is to ensure that the domestic workers 
receive a fair wage, undertake only legitimate housecleaning tasks, and have input 
with regard to when and for whom they labor.519   
According to Marín-Molina, the domestic workers Adid not see the promise of 
organizing@ because they Afeared blacklisting and retaliation@ from their 
employment agencies if they became workers Aknown to cause problems@520 Marín-
Molina noted that through the cooperative, the domestic workers have developed an 
indirect means of organizing against employment agencies by creating other 
employment alternatives.521  But as long as these workers are excluded from 
coverage by laws protecting their right to organize, their efforts can only affect 
conditions for that tiny percentage of domestics who manage to bypass the 
temporary agencies and day labor employers. 
 
Independent Contractors 
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act added exclusions of independent contractors and 
supervisors to the 1935 Wagner Act's exclusion of agricultural and domestic 
workers.  Under the Taft-Hartley exclusions, employers can appear to delegate a 
degree of autonomy to employees that they wish to transform into "independent 
                                                 
517See Katti Gray, AA United Front: A year-old co-op strives to give Hispanic maids a voice 
in their workplace,@ Newsday, September 21, 1999, p. B6; Ramirez, AAdding Injury to Insult 
.@ 
518Human Rights Watch Marín-Molina interview. 
519Ibid. 
520Ibid.   
521Ibid. 
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contractors, restructuring their pay as Amiscellaneous income@ rather than taxable 
wages.  Such maneuvering allows employers to escape many legal and financial 
obligationsCSocial Security and other payroll taxes, workers= compensation 
liability, minimum wage and overtime requirements, and others.  Employers can 
also deny contractors the health insurance, pensions and other benefits that are 
available to employees.   
Not least, employers become free to fire workers classified as independent 
contractors with legal impunity if they seek to organize.  They can also refuse to 
bargain with workers, even a majority, who are seen as contractors rather than 
employees.522 
Congressional and administrative hearings have produced evidence that many 
employers deliberately misclassify workers as independent contractors, confident 
that fear of lost income and the stress of legal action will prevent workers from 
challenging the decision.523  One study estimated that the number of misclassified 
workers will exceed five million by the year 2005.524  But U.S. labor law still rests 
on a model of workers holding permanent jobs with a single employer, rather than 
adapting to new systems of contracting and subcontracting business relationships. 
The Dunlop Commission=s 1994 report cited earlier noted what it called 
Aabuses and trends@ associated with contracting out for labor:525 
 
C Many public and private employers have subcontracted activities to 
enterprises that use the same workers part-time performing the same tasks at 
lower benefits and wage rates. 
 
C In trucking, agriculture, and construction the device of owner-operator has 
expanded rapidly.526 
                                                 
522See Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, 326 NLRB No. 75 (1998). 
523See Independent Contractor Status: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 
104th Cong. (1995); Testimony of David F. Stobaugh, AAn Employee By Another Name Is 
Still An Employee,@ U.S. Department of Labor, ERISA Advisory Council on Employee 
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, September 8, 1999 (on file with Human Rights Watch). 
524 Ibid., containing Coopers & Lybrand, Projection of the Loss in Federal Tax Revenues 
Due to Misclassification of Workers (1994), pp. 58-59. 
525See U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Commission on the Future 
of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report (May 1994), pp. 93-94. 
526This refers to the practice whereby an employer terminates the employment 
relationship and requires workers to become self-employed operators performing 
the same work as previously, but bearing all the costs and risks of ownership. 
Workers must provide for their own health insurance, retirement benefits, etc., and 
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C Homework and subcontracting have expanded in a number of sewing 
industries. 
 
                                                                                                             
are no longer allowed to form and join a union. If such Aowner-operators@ form an 
association to seek better wages and conditions, they can be prosecuted under 
anti-trust laws. 
C These developments at times result in the avoidance of Social Security taxes, 
workers= compensation, unemployment insurance and benefits such as health 
insurance and pensions. 
 
C These arrangements often attract new immigrants, minorities and women in 
the labor force who have few options. 
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Misclassification of workers as independent contractors and the resulting legal 
impediments to freedom of association run the length and depth of the economy.  In 
some cities, building owners have subcontracted cleaning operations to businesses 
that then turn around and franchise parts of the work to different groups of workers, 
often those in ethnic immigrant enclaves.  As franchisees, these workers are 
considered independent contractors who cannot bargain for better terms and 
conditions.527   
Many limousine and taxicab drivers are defined as independent contractors, 
even though they work full-time (indeed, often excessive hours) for a taxi company 
that owns the medallion or charter, the cars, the dispatching system, and other 
attributes of an employer.  As independent contractors, taxi drivers are excluded 
from coverage by labor laws that are supposed to protect the right to organize.  If 
they try to form and join a union, they can be fired with impunity by the taxicab 
company.528 
Equally vulnerable are truck drivers who transport cargo from the nation's 
shipping ports to nearby warehouses for transfer to long-haul delivery trucks.  Some 
50,000 workers perform this labor.  These workers used to be union employees 
making good  wages, benefits and pensions  before the deregulation of the trucking 
industry in the late 1970s.  Nearly all of them are now reclassified as independent 
contractors rather than employees of the cargo firms, even though they are still 
completely dependent on those firms for their work and their pay.  They are paid by 
the load and often spend hours of unpaid time waiting for cargo to be loaded onto 
their trucks.  As one leading industry periodical puts it, port truck drivers Aare the 
collective low man on the [trucking] industry totem pole.@529  
                                                 
527Commission Report., p. 93; see also Evelyn Iritani, AFranchise Hopes Turn to Frustration,@ 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, November 19, 1991, p. A1. 
528See Daphne Eviatar, ATrying to Drive Home Their Point: Workers Complain of 
Unfair Conditions,@ New York Newsday, December 12, 1999, p. A3. 
529See AOrganizing Drivers,@ editorial, Journal of Commerce, October 25, 1999. 
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Many of these workers are immigrants who scrape together enough money to 
buy a truck and haul goods from the dock to the warehouse.  They often have to do 
their own loading and unloading.  Many say that when they settle accounts for 
expenses, income from the cargo firms, and time spent on the job, they earn barely 
more than the minimum wage.530  One researcher found that Amost non-union 
truckload employees give away their loading and unloading time and waste many 
unpaid hoursCeven unpaid daysCwaiting to load or unload, waiting for dispatch, 
and waiting on equipment.@531  As one worker put it, AWe are like slaves.  We are 
like slaves to the big companies.@532 
While these workers are classified as independent contractors exempt from 
labor law coverage, many of them in fact have to sign exclusive contracts with 
trucking firms prohibiting them from selling their services to higher bidders.  When 
companies shift employees to independent contractor status, workers are suddenly 
more vulnerable to costs they did not face before.  For example, truck drivers 
injured on the job used to be covered by workers= compensation protection as 
                                                 
530See Stuart Silverstein and Jeff Leeds, AIndependent Truckers, Union Form a Convoy: A 
high-stakes, long-shot campaign to organize would, if successful, write a new page in labor 
history, but many roadblocks remain,@ Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1996, p. D1 (hereafter 
AConvoy@). 
531See Michael H.  Belzer, APaying the Toll: Economic Deregulation of the Trucking 
Industry@ (Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute 1994), p. 1.  Belzer points out that 
such practices Acontribute to inefficiency and low productivity, since the carriers who 
employ these low-cost workers have little incentive to improve their management practices 
(Ibid). 
532Quoted in Patrick Harrington, A18 Wheels, $7 an Hour,@ Seattle Times, May 23, 1999, p. 
1. 
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employees.  But as independent contractors, they must carry their own insurance, a 
benefit many forego as too expensive.  Meanwhile, trucking firms escape any 
obligations to maintain workers= compensation insurance for injured drivers.533 
Cargo firms have reacted to truckers= efforts to improve pay and conditions by 
renewed organizing and bargaining with refusals to bargain, blacklisting, and 
discrimination against organizing leaders.  Excluded from coverage by the NLRA, 
these workers have no recourse.  Employers even threaten to sue the workers under 
antitrust laws, accusing them of price-fixing for their services.534 
 
                                                 
533See, for example, Stuart Silverstein, AUndaunted by Setbacks, Truckers Look to Union: 
Drivers= struggle to organize reflects passion, problems of Southland immigrant workers.@ 
Los Angeles Times, February 17, 1997, p. A1. 
534See Silverstein and Leeds, AConvoy.@ 
Supervisors 
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In the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress also added supervisors to the list of 
workers excluded from protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively.  
Overseeing even a small portion of just one other employee's time is sufficient to 
establish supervisory status and exclude a worker from labor law protection.535 
Defenders of the new exclusion argued that employees with disciplinary 
authority over other workers must owe total allegiance to the employer; otherwise, 
an untenable conflict of interest would result.  Critics have responded that the 
exclusion of supervisors, especially low-level supervisors who themselves often 
suffer low pay and poor working conditions, is part of a Adivide-and-conquer@ 
strategy to weaken workers= bargaining power.536   
The supervisory exclusion has had notable impact on workers' freedom of 
association in the burgeoning health care sector.  In an important 1994 decision, the 
Supreme Court ruled that licensed practical nurses (LPNs) who oversee the work of 
nurses' aides are supervisors and are unprotected by the NLRA.537  Under the court=s 
ruling, the LPNs could be fired with impunity for protesting their working 
conditions or seeking to form and join a union.   
Nearly one million workers in the United States are LPNs.  They are on the 
bottom rung of the nursing ladder, just above nurses' aides.  They are themselves 
often low-paid, overloaded with patients, and burdened with long hours.  These 
working conditions might be improved through self-organization and collective 
                                                 
535See New Jersey Famous Amos Chocolate Chip Cookie Corp., 236 NLRB 1093 
(1978). 
536See, for example, George Feldman, Workplace Power and Collective Activity: The 
Supervisory and Managerial Exclusions in Labor Law, 37 Arizona Law Review 525 (1995). 
537See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994); Peter 
Blackman, AChallenge to Labor: Employers Hope to Capitalize on High Court ruling,@ New 
York Law Journal, August 18, 1994, p. 5. 
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bargaining.  However, health care employers can use the Supreme Court=s decision 
to block LPN organizing and organizing by other health care workers.  With an 
intricate system of state-based licensing of nurses, aides, therapists, technicians and 
other workers in various grades and classifications defining specific tasks that 
workers are allowed to perform or prohibited from performing, the health care 
industry is in a position to create layers of supervisory responsibility that can 
frustrate and delay workers= organizing efforts.538 
                                                 
538Bargaining unit controversies have affected worker organizing in the health care field for 
many years. For an extensive description and analysis of these problems based on empirical 
research supported by the W.E. Upjohn Institute, see Michael H. LeRoy, Joshua L. Schwarz 
and Karen S. Koziara, AThe Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining for Hospitals: An 
Empirical Public Policy Analysis of Bargaining Unit Determinations,@ 9 Yale Journal of 
Regulation 1 (Winter 1992). 
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Issues arising under the Supreme Court=s decision continue to generate 
litigation and controversy.  In an effort to protect nurses who seek to exercise the 
right to organize, the NLRB has sought to apply Health Care & Retirement Corp.  
narrowly, not applying the decision against nurses= whose supervisory duties are 
incidental.  Some courts of appeals have supported the board=s approach.539  Other 
circuit courts are unsympathetic and continue to exclude nurses from coverage by 
the NLRA if they perform any supervisory function.  In one recent decision, a 
federal appeals court overruled the NLRB and nullified an election in which a group 
of nurses voted 17-4 in favor of representation.  The court said that thirteen of the 
nurses were supervisors.540 
 
Managers 
In 1974, the Supreme Court expanded the supervisory exclusion in the NLRA 
to include "managers." In NLRB v.  Bell Aerospace, the court found that a group of 
buyers in the company's purchasing and procurement department were managers 
excluded from the NLRA=s protection.  The buyers had no supervisory 
responsibility and did not manage the enterprise in the common-sense meaning 
normally associated with "management." However, the court said that they 
Aeffectuate management policies@ and were thus unprotected by the law.541   
The Supreme Court used similar logic to define university faculty members in 
private universities as managers because of their collegial governance of academic 
life.542  Although college professors have issues of pay, benefits, workload, fair 
treatment and other working conditions like any employed persons, some 300,000 
of them lack any protection under labor law when they seek to act collectively to 
address the problems.  And even if some professors might be protected by tenure 
rules from dismissal for organizing, a university administration can rebuff requests 
by a faculty organization to negotiate over terms and conditions of employment. 
                                                 
539See NLRB, AGuideline Memorandum on Charge Nurse Supervisory Issues,@ 
Memorandum OM-99-44, August 24, 1999); NLRB v. GranCare Inc., No. 97-3431 
(7
th
 Cir., March 3, 1999). 
540See Schnurmacher Nursing Home v. NLRB, 2d Cir., No. 98-4388 (l), June 6, 2000. 
541See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) 
542See NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
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Other Exclusions 
Tens of thousands of workers employed at Indian gambling casinosCand 
likely soon hundreds of thousands, given such casinos= rate of growthCare excluded 
from NLRB protection.  These workers are not excluded because they meet the 
"employee" exclusion but because their employers, sovereign Indian nations, are 
excluded from NLRA jurisdiction under Section 2 as a Apolitical subdivision.@543  
Based on a Supreme Court ruling interpreting the law, tens of thousands of 
employees of religious institutions are also excluded from protection, even those 
whose work has no relation to the religious mission of their institutions.544  Tens of 
thousands of teaching assistants in universities are also excluded from protection of 
the right to freedom of association, based on the argument that they are students, not 
workers, even though they confront workers' problems like salaries, benefits, hours 
of work, treatment by managers, etc.545 
                                                 
543For a thorough history and analysis of the issue of tribal employers= exclusion 
from the NLRA, see Helen M.  Kemp, AFallen Timber: A Proposal for the National 
Labor Relations Board to Assert Jurisdiction over Indian-Controlled Businesses on 
Tribal Reservations,@ 17 Western New England Law Review 1 (1995). 
544See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
545See Leland Stanford, Jr. University, 214 NLRB 621 (1974). The NLRB is reconsidering 
the Stanford rule excluding graduate teaching assistants from the NLRA=s protection, but has 
not made a final determination to change it. See NLRB Decision and Order, Yale University 
and Graduate Employees and Students Organization (GESO), Case 34-CA-7347 (November 
29, 1999; Courtney Leatherman, ADecision in Yale Case Leaves Graduate Students and 
University Both Claiming Victory,@ The Chronicle of Higher Education, December 10, 
1999, p. A20. 
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Public Employees 
Under international standards, the rights afforded "everyone" or "workers 
without distinction" apply to most public employees, too.  International instruments 
make limited exceptions, mainly affecting police and military forces and 
government policymakers.  The ICCPR=s Article 22, for example, says A[t]his article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed 
forces and of the police in the exercise of this right.@546  The ICESCR makes the 
same exception, and adds A[members] . . . of the administration of the state.@547  ILO 
Convention 98 says A[t]his Convention does not deal with the position of public 
servants engaged in the administration of the State.@548   
                                                 
546ICCPR Article 22(2). 
547ICESCR Article 8(2). 
548ILO Convention 98, Article 6. 
These latter exceptions have been taken to apply to higher-level political 
appointees, not rank-and-file civil servants.  Thus,  most public employees come 
within international human rights standards for organizing and bargaining 
collectively.  Not so under U.S.  law.  In this respect, the United States stands apart 
from other developed nations and affords less protection even than many poorer, 
developing countries. 
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In many U.S. states public employees are denied the right to bargain 
collectively.  North Carolina law specifically prohibits collective bargaining 
between any state, county or municipal agency and any organization of 
governmental employees.549  Although it created an exception for local fire and 
police departments, Texas law declares it to be against public policy for any other 
state, county or municipal officials to enter into a collective bargaining agreement 
with a labor organization.550   
Virginia holds collective bargaining Acontrary to the public policy of 
Virginia.@ Indeed, the state Supreme Court ordered a local school board to renounce 
an agreement with a teachers' organization, something the teachers and the school 
board had willingly, voluntarily undertaken together.551  Federal government 
employees, while allowed to form unions, are denied the right to bargain 
collectively over salaries and benefits.  They may only bargain over non-economic 
terms and conditions.552 
                                                 
549See N.C. General Statutes ''95-98 (1985). The constitutionality of this provision was 
upheld in Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit of N.C. Association of Educators v. Phillips, 
381 F.Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974). Another provision barring government workers from 
joining any labor organization was ruled unconstitutional. See Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 
296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). 
550See Texas Statutes Annotated, Art. 5154c (Vernon 1971). 
551See Commonwealth of Virginia v. County Board of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558 
(1977). 
552See prohibited subjects of bargaining,  5 U.S.C. 7106(a). 
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Public employees enjoy a type of protection against dismissal for associational 
activities not available to private sector workers.  The First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution protect public employees' right of 
association.553  Civil service rules also guard against arbitrary or unjust dismissals.  
The problem for public workers in states where collective bargaining is prohibited 
is not so much fear of dismissal for organizing but the futility of an effort to 
organize.  The employerCthe state, county, or municipal governmentCcan simply 
ignore them and their organization. 
Public employee unions have had to deal with the roadblock to collective 
bargaining by engaging in political actionCin effect, bargaining with state 
legislatures.  Some have achieved substantial results, and some are still struggling, 
according to public employee representatives.  Much depends on the outcome of 
elections to state and local office.  However, from a human rights perspective, the 
exercise and protection of fundamental rights should not depend on election results. 
 Respect for workers= rights should be constant, not changing with political winds. 
The ILO=s Committee on Freedom of Association considered a complaint 
against the United States involving the many restrictions on public employees= 
rights to organize and to bargain collectively.  The Committee rejected U.S. 
government arguments that Awhite collar@ employees are Aengaged in the 
administration of the State@ and urged the United States to bring its laws regarding 
federal employees into conformance with Conventions 87 and 98.  For state, 
country and municipal workers whose rights are frustrated, the ILO found that Athe 
situation varies widely between jurisdictions . . . where the legal framework for 
collective bargaining appears to be reasonably appropriate@ and A those states that 
have no public sector collective bargaining legislation . . . or that ban it 
completely.@554  The Committee called on the United States Ato draw the attention of 
                                                 
553It must be kept in mind that constitutional guarantees run to government action, not 
private action. Since a governmental entity is the employer of public employee, it must 
respect their freedom of association under the Constitution. The First and Fourteenth 
Amendments are not applicable to private employers. 
554See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, AComplaints Against the Government of 
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the authorities concerned, and in particular in those jurisdictions where public 
servants are totally or substantially deprived of collective bargaining rights, to the 
principle that all public service workers other than those engaged in the 
administration of the State should enjoy such rights.@555 
 
* * * * * 
                                                                                                             
the United States of America Presented by the AFL-CIO and Public Services International 
(PSI),@ Case No.  1557, 76 (Series B) ILO Official bulletin, No.  3 at 99, 110-11 (1993). 
555Ibid. 
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A precise count of workers excluded from labor laws protecting one or more 
of the elements of the right to freedom of associationCthe right to organize, the 
right to bargain collectively, and the right to strikeCis impossible to provide.  But 
cumulatively, millions of workers in the United States are affected.  They include 
approximately three million farmworkers, one million domestic employees, many of 
seven million independent contractors, four million supervisors, and ten million 
managers; 300,000 college professors, 100,000 Indian casino employees, 500,000 
employees of religious institutions, millions of public employeesCthe list goes 
on.556 
Within each category, fine distinctions would have to be made to quantify 
precisely who is excluded under the statute, who is excluded under judicial 
decisions, and who is excluded because of misclassification.  In practice, these 
issues are resolved in lengthy, complicated proceedings before the NLRB and the 
federal courts, with attendant delays and frustration of workers= organizing efforts. 
Many employees labeled Amanagers@ do not in practice have genuine 
managerial functions and may desire protection like other workers.  Many so-called 
independent contractors are really dependent contractors with their fate tied to a 
single employer whose own viability depends on the effort and productivity of these 
workers.  Even after allowing for appropriately excluded categoriesCtrue managers 
and true independent contractors, for exampleC millions of workers remain exposed 
under U.S. labor laws to discrimination, dismissal, or other reprisals if they try to 
organize around basic issues of livelihood and working conditions by exercising the 
right to freedom of association and related rights to organize, to bargain, and to 
strike. 
 
Colorado Steelworkers, the Right to Strike and Permanent Replacements in 
U.S. Labor Law 
U.S. labor law lets employers permanently replace workers who exercise the 
right to strike and allows replacement workers then to vote the union out of 
existence.  No issue arouses as much passion among workers committed to trade 
unionism.  AJust driving around town I look for out-of-state license plates, and I hate 
that person,@ a steelworker permanently replaced after nearly thirty years= service in 
a plant told Human Rights Watch.  AI figure he=s a replacement worker who took my 
job.@557  A replaced paperworker said, AI still harbor intense hatred for the scabs that 
descended like rats to steal our jobs . . . I will take that hatred to my grave.@558  
                                                 
556These estimates are based on an analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data for 
1997. 
557Human Rights Watch interview with CF&I worker Joel Buchanan, Pueblo, Colorado, May 
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20, 1999. 
558Cited in Julius Getman, The Betrayal of Local 14 (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University 
Press, 1998), p. 215 (hereafter Getman, the Betrayal of Local 14).  The epithet Ascab@ for 
someone who takes the job of a worker on strike is still deeply rooted in workers= language, 
and has evoked powerful literary portrayals as well. 
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International human rights and labor rights instruments treat the right to strike 
in a more nuanced and conditional fashion than the right to organize.  Workers must 
be afforded full freedom to form and join their own organizations.  That is really 
their own affair.  But exercising the right to strike implicates other societal interests. 
 Among basic human rights documents, only the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains a clause on the right to strike, with 
the proviso that it be exercised Ain conformity with the laws of the particular 
country.@559 
Among regional human rights and labor rights bodies, the European Social 
Charter of 1961 was the first express authorization in an international human rights 
instrument of the right to strike.  That clause stated AIt is understood that each 
Contracting Party may, insofar as it is concerned, regulate the exercise of the right 
to strike by law, provided that any further restriction that this might place on the 
right can be justified under the terms of Article 31.@560  Article 31 contains a proviso 
common to many international instruments limiting restrictions on the exercise of 
specified rights to those Anecessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national 
security, public health, or morals.@561 
The European Union=s Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers states that A[t]he right to resort to collective action in the event of a 
conflict of interests shall include the right to strike, subject to the obligations arising 
under national regulations and collective agreements.@562  In Labor Principle 3 of 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, the United States and its two 
NAFTA partners committed themselves to respect the right to strike, defined as Athe 
protection of the right of workers to strike in order to defend their collective 
                                                 
559ICESCR, Article 8 (4). 
560Council of Europe, European Social Charter (1961), Article 6, paragraph 4 and Appendix. 
561Ibid., Article 31 (1). 
562See Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy, Feb. 
 7, 1992, 31 LL.M.  247, paragraph 13 under AFreedom of association and collective 
bargaining.@ 
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interests,@ without further qualification.563  These regional statements on the right to 
strike are not binding instruments that supersede national laws, but they express the 
political will of the countries and reflect at the international level respect for 
workers= right to strike. 
                                                 
563North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Annex 1, Labor Principle 3. 
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The right to strike is not expressly mentioned in ILO Conventions 87 and 98 
or any other ILO convention.  But the right to strike has been carefully considered 
by the ILO=s Committee on Freedom of Association and other supervisory bodies 
for many decades and is now firmly established by the ILO as an essential element 
of freedom of association.  The general principle is that Athe right to strike is an 
intrinsic corollary of the right of association protected by Convention No.  87.@564 
The ILO recognizes that the right to strike is not an absolute right.  It has 
determined that the right to strike is a legitimate means to defend workers= interests 
and that a general prohibition on strikes unduly restricts the right.565  A general 
prohibition may be justified in a situation of acute national crisis, but only for a 
limited period and to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation. 
 This means genuine crisis situations such as those arising from serious conflict or 
natural disasters in which the normal conditions for the functioning of society are 
absent.566   
                                                 
564See ILO, Freedom of association and collective bargaining: General survey of the reports 
on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention (No.  87), 1948, and 
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (no.  98), 1949, paragraph 194 
(1994). 
565See ILO, Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions of the Freedom of Association 
Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, Geneva (1996); Report of the Committee of 
Experts, Vol. 4B, Chapter V (1994). 
566Ibid., paragraph 152. For a broader discussion of this and other aspects of freedom of 
association, see Lee Swepston, AHuman rights law and freedom of association: Development 
through ILO supervision,@ 137 International Labour Review 169 (1998); see also Hodges-
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The committee has articulated the view that the right to strike must be 
protected and should only be restricted as to military and police forces and in cases 
which involve essential services or public services implicating public health and 
safety.  Even then, there must be adequate safeguards for workers such as impartial 
and speedy conciliation and arbitration procedures.567  The ILO has further 
established that dismissals of strikers on a large scale involve serious risks of abuse 
and place freedom of association in grave jeopardy.568  These principles are now 
taken to be essential elements of Conventions 87 and 98 binding, like the 
conventions themselves, on countries that have not ratified them, including the 
United States.569 
                                                                                                             
Aeberhard and Odero de Diós, APrinciples of the Committee of Association concerning 
Strikes,@ 126 International Labour Review 544 (1987). 
567See Ruth Ben-Israel, International Labor Standards: the Case of the Freedom to Strike 
(Antwerp, Kluwer Publishers, 1988), p.104. 
568ILO General Survey (1994), paragraphs 176-178; Digest of Decisions (1996), paragraphs 
590-600. 
569Ibid., pp. 66-70. 
In a 1991 report on a complaint against the United States filed by the AFL-
CIO on the permanent-replacement doctrine in U.S. law, the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association concluded: 
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The right to strike is one of the essential means through which workers 
and their organisations may promote and defend their economic and 
social interests.  The Committee considers that this basic right is not 
really guaranteed when a worker who exercises it legally runs the risk of 
seeing his or her job taken up permanently by another worker, just as 
legally.  The Committee considers that, if a strike is otherwise legal, the 
use of labour drawn from outside the undertaking to replace strikers for 
an indeterminate period entails a risk of derogation from the right to 
strike which may affect the free exercise of trade union rights.570 
 
The committee=s conclusion is formulated in soft diplomatic language.  Under 
its mandate, it does not Alevel charges at, or condemn, governments.@571  But within 
this boundary, the ILO=s committee on Freedom of Association clearly finds the 
U.S. permanent-replacement doctrine contrary to the free exercise of trade union 
rights. 
 
Background: the MacKay Case 
                                                 
570See International Labor Organization, Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint 
against the Government of the United States presented by the American Federation of Labor 
and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), para.  92, Report No.  278, Case No.  
1543 (1991). 
571See ILO, AProcedure for the examination of complaints alleging infringements of trade 
union rights,@ at www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/cfa_proc.htm, 
paragraph 23. 
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The permanent-replacement doctrine was elaborated by the Supreme Court in 
a 1938 decision not greatly noticed at the time or even for many years afterward.572  
Striker replacement was not the issue presented in the Mackay case.  It was not 
among the issues briefed or argued by the parties.  The case involved alleged 
discrimination in the company=s refusal to reinstate strike leaders while reinstating 
other strikers.  Indeed, the workers and their union won the Mackay case, with 
discrimination against the leaders found to be unlawful.  In passing, however, the 
Supreme Court ruled, referring to Section 13 of the NLRA, that Aan employer . . . is 
not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of 
the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them.@ It is on 
the basis of this Adicta@Cthe legal term for comments in a court decision not related 
to the formal holding in a caseCthat the entire structure of the permanent-
replacement doctrine depends.  It has never been codified in any statute or 
regulation, but subsequent court decisions have solidified the doctrine into an 
established element of U.S. labor law. 
The permanent striker-replacement doctrine remained a relatively obscure 
feature of U.S. law until employers began wielding it more aggressively in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  Many analysts attribute this development to President 
Ronald Reagan=s firing and permanent replacement of air traffic controllers in 1981 
even though, as federal employees, controllers did not come under coverage of the 
NLRA and the MacKay rule.  They were fired as a disciplinary measure under 
federal legislation barring strikes by federal employees.  In fact, the use of 
permanent replacements began trending upward before Reagan=s action.573  But the 
air traffic controllers= case solidified the force of using permanent replacements to 
block workers= exercise of the right to strike.574 
 
Unfair Labor Practice Strikes vs. Economic Strikes 
The permanent-replacement doctrine makes a distinction between workers 
who strike over unfair labor practices committed by the employer and those who 
strike over economic terms and conditions of employment.  So-called Aunfair labor 
practice strikers@ must be reinstated to their jobs when they end the strike.  
AEconomic strikers,@ on the other hand, are unprotected.  They can be permanently 
                                                 
572NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
573See Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: 
Empirical Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 Berkeley Journal of 
Employment and Labor Law 169 (1995). 
574See Steven Greenhouse, AStrikes Decrease to 50-Year Low . . . as Threat of Replacement 
Rises,@ New York Times, January 29, 1996, p. A1. 
Legal Obstacles to U.S. Workers= Exercise of Freedom of Association 283  
 
 
replaced.575  And one year after their strike began, replacement workers can vote to 
decertify the union and extinguish all bargaining rights. 
In practice, the distinction between an unfair labor practice strike and an 
economic strike fails to protect workers= right to strike.  As the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association noted, Athat distinction obfuscates the real issue . . . [of] 
whether United States labour law and jurisprudence (the so-called MacKay 
doctrine) are in conformity with the freedom of association principles.@576 
                                                 
575Strikers who are permanently replaced are put on a recall list and must be offered 
positions vacated by  permanent replacements, if the latter quit or are dismissed. 
576ILO Case No.  1543, para.  89. 
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A practical problem in administering the distinction is that workers and 
employers only find out years after the strike took place, when an appeals court 
issues a final ruling, whether it was an unfair labor practice strike or an economic 
strike.  Employers using permanent replacements always declare that workers= 
strikes are economic in motivation.  Workers file unfair labor practice charges with 
the NLRB arguing that their strike was prompted by the employer=s unfair labor 
practices.  As the ILO noted in considering the U.S. permanent-replacement case, Aa 
determination of unfair labour practice . . . may take several years until the last 
appeal option has been exhausted.@577  Ultimately, courts decide whether the 
workers were unfair labor practice strikers or economic strikers.  But by then, even 
with a decision in favor or the workers, the strike is often long broken and workers 
scattered to other jobs. 
 
The Permanent Replacement Threat 
The permanent-replacement doctrine is not used only against workers= exercise 
of the right to strike.  Employers aggressively use the threat of permanent 
replacement in campaigns against workers= efforts to form and join a union and to 
bargain collectively.  In every organizing drive examined by Human Rights Watch 
for this report, management raised the prospect of permanent replacement in written 
materials, in captive-audience meetings, and in one-on-one meetings where 
supervisors spoke with workers under their authority.  At Cabana Chips in Detroit, 
for example, a company letter said that workers  
 
Can be permanently replaced if the strike is for economic reasons (a 
strike over wages, benefits, or working conditions) . . . Question: Do you 
mean that non-strikers could be hired to take my job in an economic 
strike? . . . Answer: YES.  Federal law gives the company the right to 
hire permanent replacements to continue to serve our customers . . .  
Question: Isn=t the company required to fire the replacements when the 
strike is over? . . . Answer: NO.  The company is NOT required to fire 
the replacements by law.  Strikers are only entitled to get their jobs back 
when and if openings occur. 
 
                                                 
577Ibid., para.  91. 
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Cabana management then reproduced a portion of the NLRB=s Guide to Basic 
Law and Procedures underlining a sentence saying strikers can be replaced by their 
employer, then wrote below, ARemember! >But they can be replaced by their 
employer=@578 (all emphases in original). 
In a similar vein, at Precision Thermoform and Packaging company in 
Baltimore, Maryland, management told employees in a letter that Athe law provides 
that an employer can CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND HIRE NEW EMPLOYEES 
TO PERMANENTLY REPLACE THE EMPLOYEES WHO ARE OUT ON 
STRIKE.  If this happens, as it frequently does, the replaced strikers have no jobs to 
go back to when the strike ends@ (emphasis in original).579 
Captive-audience meetings and one-on-one sessions with supervisors lay 
heavy stress on permanent replacements.  AThey kept talking about how they can get 
rid of us for good if we ever went on strike,@ said Robert Atkinson in an interview 
with Human Rights Watch describing captive-audience meetings at Smithfield 
Foods= Wilson, N.C.  plant in July 1999. 
The permanent replacement threat is not only raised in organizing.  An 
industrial relations researcher found that management threatens permanent 
replacement during collective bargaining negotiations more often than unions 
threaten to strike.580 
The United States is almost alone in the world in allowing permanent 
replacement of workers who exercise the right to strike.  Some of the United States= 
key trading partners take a polar opposite approach.  In Mexico, for example, 
federal law requires companies to cease operations during a legal strike.  Permanent 
replacements are also prohibited throughout Canada.  In Quebec, even temporary 
striker replacements are banned, and a company may only maintain operations using 
                                                 
578See letter to employees of January 7, 1999 from company president Ray Jenkins (on file 
with Human Rights Watch). 
579See PTP ADear Employee@ letter, undated (October 1995), on file with Human Rights 
Watch. 
580See Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, The Social Contract at the Bargaining Table: Evidence 
from a National Survey of Labor and Management Negotiators, Industrial Relations 
Research Association, Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting, Volume 2 (1999). 
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management and supervisory personnel.  In most European countries the law is 
silent on the subject because permanent replacements are never used and the very 
idea of permanent replacement of strikers is considered outlandish. 
 
Colorado Steelworkers  
When we asked them to hire new people to give us some relief, they told us 
they couldn=t find qualified workers anywhere in Colorado.  But when we went out, 
suddenly they came up with hundreds of replacements. 
CA steelworker permanently replaced when he exercised the right to strike 
 
Along Interstate 25 in southeast Colorado, where the central plains meet the 
Rocky Mountains, the high smokestacks of Oregon Steel Mills= Pueblo plant loom 
into view as dramatically as Pike=s Peak in the distance.  Coloradans know the plant 
as ACF&I,@ recalling its origins as the Colorado Fuel & Iron company.  CF&I began 
supplying Western coal and hard rock mining firms with steel products for 
construction, piping, and rail transport in the late nineteenth century.   
South of Pueblo is Ludlow, Colorado, the site of an infamous August 1914 
massacre of miners and family members, including eleven children, by mine 
owners= militiamen.  The miners and their families had taken shelter in a tent city 
after mine operators, under orders from John D.  Rockefeller, evicted them from 
company-owned housing when they went on strike in September 1913.581 
Today another labor rights crisis besets the area.  Oregon Steel permanently 
replaced more than 1,000 workers who exercised the right to strike in October 
1997.  Many of the replacements came from outside the Pueblo area, drawn by the 
company=s newspaper advertisements throughout Colorado and neighboring states 
offering wages of $13-$19 per hour for permanent replacements.  A company notice 
declared, AIt is the intent of the Company for every replacement worker hired to 
mean one less job for the strikers at the conclusion of the strike.@582 
                                                 
581See Pam Pemberton, ALudlow Massacre remembered on 85th anniversary,@ The Pueblo 
Chieftain, April 18, 1999, p. 1. 
582See, e.g., Denver Post classified advertising section, October 1, 1997; ANotice to 
Permanent Replacement Employees,@ Oregon Steel (notice distributed to replacement 
workers, 1997). 
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On December 30, 1997, three months after it began, Oregon Steel workers 
ended their strike and offered unconditionally to return to work.  The company 
refused to take them back except when vacancies occur after a replacement worker 
leaves.  Hundreds of Oregon Steel workers remained jobless two years later, when 
Human Rights Watch researched the case.  The NLRB issued a complaint finding 
merit in the workers= claim that the strike was caused by management=s unfair labor 
practices.583 
The board=s complaint was upheld by an administrative law judge after an 
eight-month-long hearing on the complaint that began in August 1998 and 
concluded in March 1999.  More than a year after the hearing ended, the judge 
issued his decision in the case finding the company guilty of interference, coercion, 
discrimination and bad-faith bargaining.584  But management has already vowed to 
resist the judge=s findings and orders, promising years= more delay in the courts. 
AHow can the government and Congress allow companies to do this?@ asks 
Lloyd Montiel, a twenty-seven-year veteran of the Oregon Steel plant.  AThey [the 
company] can plan a strike, cause a strike, and then get rid of people who gave them 
a lifetime of work and bring in young guys who never saw the inside of a steel 
mill.@585  AIt should not be OK for the company to throw away loyal workers who 
have given their lives and their health to the company,@ says Linda Friend, a 
registered nurse who cares for retired steel workers in Pueblo.586 
 
Background to the Crisis 
Much of the sprawling CF&I mill is silent now.  Like many huge, integrated 
steel companies throughout the United States, the Pueblo plant has shrunk in size 
since the mid-century heyday of ABig Steel.@ New steel-making technology, trade 
                                                 
583See Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing, New 
CF&I, Inc. And Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, Cases nos. 27-
CA-15562; 27-CA-15750 (NLRB Region 27, June 30, 1998). 
584See Decision of ALJ Albert A. Metz, New CF&I, Inc. and Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. and 
United Steelworkers of America, Cases 27-CA-15562 et. al., May 17, 2000. 
585Human Rights Watch interview, May 20, 1999. 
586Ibid. 
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competition, open-pit mining that uses trucks instead of rail, a focus on niche 
products rather than mass production, and other changes have reduced the 
workforce from over 10,000 in earlier decades to just over 1,000 when Human 
Rights Watch carried out research into this case. 
Despite its smaller size, the Oregon Steel plant is still one of the largest area 
employers with important Amultiplier@ effects in the local and regional economy.  It 
has traditionally afforded good wages and benefits to workers under collective 
bargaining agreements with two local unions of the United Steelworkers of America 
(USWA).  CF&I workers formed their unions decades ago during large-scale 
organizing drives by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).   
Oregon Steel bought CF&I in 1993 and now calls the facility Rocky Mountain 
Steel.  In a 1993-1997 labor agreement, the USWA agreed to concessions that 
helped rescue the company from bankruptcy.  With profitability restored, workers 
sought gains in new contract negotiations that began in mid-1997.  Two key issues 
were pension benefits and retirement health insurance, always concerns for workers 
with long service in a company.  With layoffs in previous years taking place by 
seniority, most of the workers remaining in 1997 were over forty-five years old, and 
many had well over twenty years of service with the company.   
Another vital issue was mandatory overtime.  Workers claimed that last-
minute compulsory overtime disrupted family life and community involvement like 
youth league coaching.  AI was a widow and a single parent for four and a half years 
because of forced overtime,@ said Jan Pacheco, the wife of steel worker Howard 
Pacheco.  AI had to do everything with the house, the kids, their school, 
teamsCeverything.@587  Herb St. Clair, an employee with thirty-two years of 
seniority, said, AThey pushed me to work seventy-two hours a week.  My wife and I 
were strangers.  When we complained, they told us, >If you don=t like it, go get a job 
at Wal-Mart.=@588 
Oregon Steel management viewed the workers= proposals as a Asurprise@ and 
Aexorbitant.@589  Worker negotiators saw their pension proposal as one designed Ato 
bring pensions at Oregon Steel up to a level common in the steel industry.@590 
These and other issues were unresolved when the strike began on October 3, 
1997.  But by that time, massive unfair labor practices had taken place during 
bargaining.  According to the findings of a meticulously documented 111-page 
                                                 
587Human Rights Watch interview, May 20, 1999. 
588Ibid. 
589See AOregon Steel MillsCChronology of Labor Dispute,@ company fact sheet (1998). 
590See AThe Rest of the Story,@ USWA response to company fact sheets (1998), on file with 
Human Rights Watch. 
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decision by the administrative law judge who heard evidence in the case, Oregon 
Steel management=s unfair labor practices before the strike began included:591 
 
C spying on a union meeting where bargaining strategies were discussed; 
 
C threatening to close the plant if workers exercised the right to strike; 
 
C threatening to revoke its contract offer if workers exercised the right to strike; 
                                                 
591See Metz decision, May 17, 2000. 
 
C threatening to close the plant and Areopen non-union in thirty days @ if workers 
struck (as one supervisor said, AWell, I wish you guys would straighten this 
thing out because Joe=s (Joe Corvin, President of Oregon Steel Mills) is going 
to shut this place down and bring it back nonunion@); 
 
C threatening to fire workers if they participated in a strike; 
 
C assigning undesirable, dirty jobs cleaning arc furnaces and cooling towers to 
union supporters because of their support for the union; 
 
290 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
C telling workers if they participated in a strike they would never work for 
Oregon Steel again (as one supervisor said, AI guaran-f---ing-tee you guys will 
never be hired back again@);592 
 
C threatening to Abust@ the union if workers struck (as one witness testified, a 
supervisor said, Awithin 15 minutes they would have two bus loads of people 
in the mill to do our jobs and the union would no longer exist@); 
 
C promising promotions to workers if they would not support the union during a 
strike; 
 
C refusing to provide relevant information to the union on 401(k) and other 
retirement pay and benefit plans. 
 
The judge further determined that after the strike began on October 3, 1997, 
Oregon Steel management launched a new round of unfair labor practices against 
workers: 
 
C unlawfully hiring permanent replacements; 
 
C unlawfully refusing to reinstate workers when they ended the strike; 
 
                                                 
592Oregon Steel unfair labor practice hearing transcript, pp. 795-796; Metz decision, p. 14. 
C unlawfully denying workers access to loans from their 401(k) plans by 
imposing a new requirement that loan repayment must be through payroll 
deductions (obviously impossible if workers were on strike), when before the 
strike no such requirement was in place and workers could repay loans from 
bank accounts or by other payment methods;  
 
C unlawfully revoking its contract proposal to the union after the strike began; 
 
C unlawfully implementing its final offer without having bargained in good faith. 
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In all, said the judge, Oregon Steel=s unfair labor practices Awere substantial and 
antithetical to good faith bargaining.@593   
Even before the judge=s ruling, Oregon Steel management had already 
declared it would not honor it.  Company president Joe Corvin called the NLRB 
Aone of the most political of federal agencies@ and said Athe federal courts will 
review the facts and law in this case and for that we are not only thankful, but 
optimistic . . . [T]he NLRB complaint is just the first step in a lengthy process 
which will not be concluded for several years.@594   
When the judge=s decision was issued, Oregon Steel refused to accept it.595  
AWe=re looking at years and years of hearings before there=s any conclusion to this,@ 
declared a company spokesperson.596  The spokesperson added,  AThe company will 
                                                 
593Metz decision, May 17, 2000, p. 92.  In a separate case unrelated to the issue of whether 
the strike is a AULP@ strike or an Aeconomic@ strike, the NLRB issued a complaint against the 
union for picket line misconduct including damage to replacement workers= automobiles.  
See Complaint, United Steelworkers of America and its Locals 2102 and 3267 and New 
CF&I, Inc.  and Oregon Steel Mills, Inc., 27-CB-3780 et.al.  (1998).  An administrative 
judge=s decision in that case was pending.  when this report went to press. 
594See John Norton, AOregon Steel chief underwhelmed by NLRB ruling,@ The Pueblo 
Chieftain, March 3, 1998, p. 1. 
595See Jason Blevins, ARuling favors steel strikers; Pueblo mill vows to fight decision,@ The 
Denver Post, May 20, 2000, p. C-1. 
596See Erika Gonzales, AJudge=s ruling on steel strikers doesn=t end dispute: Pueblo operation 
was told to rehire workers, pay their back wages,@ Denver Rocky Mountain News, May 23, 
2000, p. 3B. 
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continue to operate as before the decision.@597  A company attorney said , A[T]his 
decision is no more a victory for the union than was the issuance of a complaint in 
the first place or the beginning of the trial.@598 
                                                 
597See Tripp Balz, AALJ finds ULPs by Rocky Mountain Steel, calls for rehires of former 
strikers, back pay,@ BNA Daily Labor Report, May 24, 2000, p. A-2. 
598Ibid. 
It can indeed take several years for the labor board and the courts to establish 
that Oregon Steel committed unfair labor practices requiring workers= reinstatement, 
as the administrative judge ruled, rather than an economic strike allowing 
management to permanently replace them.  In the meantime, union and company 
attorneys, NLRB staffers, Oregon Steel managers and hundreds of replacement 
workers are employed and making a living while hundreds of workers who 
exercised a right guaranteed under international human rights standards and under 
U.S. law have lost their jobs, lack medical insurance and pension contributions, and 
cannot provide for their families= welfare as they did before. 
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Joel Buchanan, a worker with twenty-nine years in the Oregon Steel plant, told 
Human Rights Watch, AI didn=t know the company could do permanent 
replacements until we ended the strike and offered to go back [on December 30, 
1998].  I know the union explained it, but it still didn=t seem possible.  Before the 
strike the company was pushing us for forced overtime.  When we asked them to 
hire new people to give us some relief, they told us they couldn=t find qualified 
workers anywhere in Colorado.  But when we went out, suddenly they came up with 
hundreds of replacements.@599 
Conditions for replacement workers have come under scrutiny.  Two workers 
have suffered fatal accidents since management replaced those who exercised the 
right to strike.  Another worker lost both arms in a separate accident.  The most 
recent fatality prompted an unprecedented plant-wide safety inspection by the 
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which normally inspects 
only areas where a fatal accident occurred.600   
                                                 
599Human Rights Watch Interview, May 20, 1999. 
600See Tripp Baltz, AOSHA Investigating Steel Mill Accident That Resulted in Replacement 
Worker=s Death,@ Daily Labor Report, Bureau of National Affairs, March 1, 2000, p. A-11; 
John Norton, AOSHA Inspects Pueblo, Colo. Steel Mill after Second Fatal Accident,@ The 
Pueblo Chieftain, March 3, 2000, p.1. 
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One of the harshest results of the permanent-replacement doctrine is the 
breach it causes in the community.  Human Rights Watch spoke with a group of 
Oregon Steel workers who articulated this phenomenon.  Ken Louis, a twenty-nine 
years= service worker, said, APermanent replacements are turning this city into an >I 
hate my neighbor= attitude.@ Mike Rodriguez told Human Rights Watch, AJust 
driving around town I look for out-of-state license plates and I hate that person.  I 
figure he=s a replacement worker who took my job.  I don=t trust people the way I 
used to.@ Paul Cruz said, AMy neighbor=s grandson went in and took a job.  I 
couldn=t go to my neighbor=s funeral when he died, knowing his grandson would be 
there.@ AIt will take generations to repair the damage,@ said Jan Pacheco.601 
 
Maine Paper Workers 
In 1998, Julius Getman, a prominent labor law expert, published an exhaustive 
study of another major strike that featured permanent replacements.  The strike and 
permanent replacement of workers at International Paper Company=s Androscoggin 
Mill in Jay, Maine, showed the same dynamics of broken faith in the law and 
community ruptures.  AI was naive,@ said Randy Berry of Local 14 of the United 
Paperworkers Union, whose members exercised the right to strike at International 
Paper in June 1987.  AI figured as blatant as they were, the Labor Board would have 
to see our side.@602  
Commenting on the strike, legal analysts brought to life the stakes for workers 
who are permanently replaced: 
 
[F]or employees who may have spent twenty years with the company 
building up a stake of experience and seniority that can rarely be 
duplicated elsewhere, the stark reality is that if they do go on strike, they 
can be replaced by the company with people who in less than twenty 
minutes on the job gain permanent priority over the striking veterans.  
As the Jay paperworkers learned to their regret, the Supreme Court 
pictures a strike not as a protected right, but as a gamble with one=s 
jobCthe most valuable asset that most employees possess.603 
 
Within three months International Paper management permanently replaced 1,200 
strikers.  In October 1988, workers ended their strike, but permanent replacements 
                                                 
601Ibid. 
602See Getman, The Betrayal of Local 14, p. 45. 
603See Paul Weiler and Guy Mundlak, AEconomic Competitiveness and the Law, A 102 Yale 
Law Journal 1907, p. 1917. 
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remained on the job.  Maurice Poulin, an International Paper worker whose 
grandfather, father, brothers and sons had worked at the plant, found it 
Aunbelievable that a company would forget all this service of lifetimes and replace 
all of us with one swipe . . . It=s almost like we had our own holocaust. . . .@604  In 
local schools, physical confrontation and mutual taunting took place between the 
children of strikers and the children of replacement workers.605 
                                                 
604See Getman, The Betrayal of Local 14, p. 45. 
605Ibid., p. 120. 
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Summing up the aftermath of the strike years later, a striker who lost his job 
after thirty-five years as a papermaker said, AI still harbor intense hatred for IP and 
the scabs that descended like rats to steal our jobs when we left the mill.  I will take 
that hatred to my grave.  There have been suicides, early deaths, divorces, 
alcoholism, broken families, lost homes, and who knows what else.  Thank God 
there were no murders.@606   
 
Arizona Copper Miners 
Another comprehensive, book-length treatment by Jonathan D.  Rosenblum, 
then a journalist and later an attorney and advisor to the International Labor 
Organization, examined another use of permanent replacements by a major firm.  
This case is cited here because it was the first major strike broken under the 
permanent-replacement doctrine in the early 1980s, an action credited with 
emboldening other employers to permanently replace workers who exercise the 
right to strike.607   
In June 1983 at Phelps-Dodge Corporation=s copper mines in Morenci, Bisbee, 
Ajo and Douglas, Arizona, 1,200 miners belonging to the steelworkers union went 
on strike.  In August, the company began hiring permanent replacements, protected 
by the mobilization of several hundred state troopers and national guardsmen.  In an 
NLRB vote in October 1984, replacement workers decertified the union. 
Rosenblum=s account provides insights into the effects of the permanent-
replacement doctrine both on workers= rights and on family and community ties.  
For example, one brother speaks about another who crossed the picket line: AWhen 
                                                 
606Ibid., p. 215. 
607The earlier air traffic controllers= strike was broken by the Reagan administration=s 
application of federal law forbidding strikes by public employees and did not fall within the 
scope of the permanent-replacement doctrine under the NLRA flowing from the 1938 
Mackay Radio decision. However, the replacement of striking air traffic controllers has been 
widely noted for sending a Asignal@ of government approval of the use of permanent 
replacements. The action of Phelps-Dodge management was one of the first responses to the 
signal. 
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my dad ended up in the hospital, there we wereCtwo sons in the same roomCbut we 
didn=t talk to each other.  At Christmas we would see my mom and stay on separate 
sides of the room.  We were like strangers.@608  The brothers were reunited only 
when a third brother, a supervisor at the plant, was killed in a workplace accident 
attributed by workers to strikebreakers= inexperience.   
                                                 
608Ibid., p. 128. 
298 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
Describing her reaction when a son-in-law took a job during the strike, a 
striker=s mother said, AAfter our son-in-law went to work we never saw our 
daughter, never saw our grandkids, never saw our son-in-law.  This is a very close-
knit place.  If we would see them in the J.C.  Penney, they would run off.  If I was in 
the meat department and she saw me, she would go to the vegetables so she 
wouldn=t have to face me eye-to-eye.@609 
The dispute ran over to local churches.  Most of the strikers were Mexican-
American Catholics, and many of the replacements were Mormons.  Striking 
workers charged that Mormon leaders were encouraging strikebreaking.  Some 
Mormon church members confirmed that church leaders counseled going to work at 
Phelps-Dodge during the strike.610 
A Catholic church had to establish two lines for communion, one for strikers 
and one for replacements.  One woman left the church, telling the pastor she 
Acouldn=t understand how strikebreakers could come to church praying the same 
prayers and to the same God while taking away her husband=s and her friends= 
jobs.@611  As an example of harsh sentiments, Rosenblum reports: AEntering and 
leaving the mine gate, the strikebreakers began a ritual of waving paychecks and 
flicking pennies at the strikers.@612  For their part, the strikers= cause was 
undermined by an incident of a shot fired into a strikebreaker=s home, wounding his 
three-year-old daughter.613 
Jonathan Rosenblum=s investigation of the Phelps-Dodge strike uncovered 
important information about possible unlawful conduct by management during the 
strike.  However, it came too late to help the workers.  In a 1986 decision, the 
NLRB appointed by President Reagan rejected appeals by the workers and ruled 
that they undertook an economic strike, not an unfair labor practice strike. 
                                                 
609Ibid., p. 129. 
610See AChurch Strikebreaking Charged: LDS members contend they were urged to defy 
pickets,@ Tucson Citizen, May 24, 1984. 
611See Rosenblum, Copper Crucible, p. 133. 
612Ibid., p. 154. 
613Ibid., pp. 88-89. The crime was not solved, and no one was charged. 
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In a 1990 interview, company president Richard Moolick told Rosenblum that 
as of August 1983, A>I had decided to break the union.=@ This is significant because 
Phelps-Dodge was under a continuing legal obligation in August 1983 to bargain in 
good faith with workers on issues giving rise to the strike.  Moolick=s admission of a 
decision to Abreak@ the union when he was obligated to bargain with the union 
evinces an unlawful refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.  
 In an interview shortly before his death, John Boland, who served as Phelps-
Dodge=s attorney in the strike, told Rosenblum, A>You must keep in mind that dear 
to the heart of Moolick was to get rid of the unions . . . I=m sure that the decisions 
by Moolick as the strike progressed were influenced by his long-range decision to 
obtain a union-free shop.  In other words, if a decision is doubtful about >do this or 
don=t do this=Cand the possibility of ultimately getting rid of the union was a factor 
anywhere in thereCwhy that=s the one he=d choose.=@614 
Rosenblum quotes Moolick as telling him: A>I was born with the thought that 
you could walk through a picket line.  Nobody can keep you out.  You walk 
through.=@615  Speaking of the union at Phelps-Dodge, he added, A>The first time I sat 
at a bargaining table there were some card-carrying commies on their side.  To me it 
was an affront to sit across from a goddamned commie.=@616 
Tangentially, Richard Moolick resurfaced in the Oregon Steel strike in Pueblo 
in 1999Cfifteen years after the strike at Phelps-Dodge.  Now retired, Moolick heads 
a mining museum in Leadville, Colorado.  In an April 5, 1999 letter to Joe Corvin, 
the president of Oregon Steel, Moolick sought a $5,000 contribution to his museum. 
 He supported his request by declaring, AIn 1997 I supplied [Pueblo plant manager] 
Mike Buckentin with the game plan he used so successfully in combating the Steel 
Workers at CF&I in Pueblo.@ He added, AIn 1983 I took on the Steelworkers 
coalition at the Phelps-Dodge properties in Arizona and Texas and was successful 
                                                 
614Ibid, p. 194. 
615Ibid, p. 59. 
616Ibid. 
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in breaking some 35 unions.@ Responding to the appeal, Oregon Steel contributed 
$5,000 to Moolick=s museum.617   
 
Workers in Other Major Strikes 
                                                 
617See Dennis DeMaio, AUnion-busting plan in Pueblo exposed,@ Colorado Labor Advocate, 
August 27, 1999, p. 1. In the article, Oregon Steel spokesperson Vicki Tagliafico called 
Moolick=s Agame plan@ reference Aan overstatement@ and justified the contribution to the 
museum as being a Agood corporate citizen.@ Moolick himself blamed Aa mole@ for leaking 
the letter. As for the Agame plan,@ Moolick said, AWhat I told [Buckentin] basically is what 
you can do and what you can=t do. I told him what had worked for me effectively in the past.@ 
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The Phelps-Dodge, International Paper and Oregon Steel strikes are only three 
of many cases of national importance where the permanent-replacement doctrine 
was used to frustrate workers= exercise of the right to strike in recent years.  More 
than 6,000 Greyhound Corporation bus drivers were permanently replaced in a 
1990 strike.618  In response to a United Auto Workers strike in 1992, Caterpillar 
Corporation threatened to bring in permanent replacements.  Workers ended the 
strike.  But the company=s move also ended a thriving program of labor-
management cooperation that had taken shape with gains for both parties.  Years of 
unfair labor practice disputes and a poisoned atmosphere of labor-management 
relations have followed.619   
In Charlotte, North Carolina, 1,450 workers were permanently replaced at the 
Continental General Tire factory in a 1998 strike.  The company was owned by 
                                                 
618See Peter T. Kilborn, AReplacement Workers: Management=s Big Gun,@ New York Times, 
March 13, 1990, p. A24; AP byline, AStrikers at Greyhound Feel Forgotten,@ New York 
Times, March 4, 1991, p. B7. 
619See Peter T. Kilborn, ACaterpillar=s Trump Card: Threat of Permanently Replacing Strikers 
Gave Company Big Advantage Against Union,@ New York Times, April 16, 1992, p. A1; 
Stephen Franklin, ANo peace, no contract a year after Caterpillar standoff,@ Chicago Tribune, 
April 12, 1993, p. 1; Stephen Franklin, ALessons from a labor-management war: class still 
not over in dispute at Caterpillar,@ Chicago Tribune, May 15, 1994, p. 1; Barry Bearak, AThe 
Inside Strategy: Less Work and More Play at Cat; Workers stung by strike=s bitter end try 
tactic of t-shirts, balloons and antics; Bosses answer with firings,@ Los Angeles Times, May 
16, 1995, p. A1; Barry Bearak, AThe Strike at Caterpillar: Staggered by Hits, Unions Need 
Ways to Regain Punch, Jobs: Balance of power tips to management, leaving workers feeling 
vulnerable in a cold new business world,@ Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1995, p. A1. 
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Continental AG, a German-based multinational corporation.  When asked why he 
treats U.S. workers in ways he would never consider in Germany, CEO Bernd 
Frangenberg declared, AIt=s a different culture with different relationships.  This 
country is different.  The labor laws are different.@620 
                                                 
620See ATire chief talks tough on wages,@ Charlotte Observer, January 21, 1999; AContinental 
General Tire Co. to hire replacement workers,@ The Buffalo News, November 16, 1998, p. 
1B. 
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Indeed, the United States is practically alone in the world with its permanent 
striker replacement policy, despite growing sentiment in favor of changing this 
aspect of U.S. labor law.  In 1991, for example, the House of Representatives 
passed legislation to prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements in most strike 
situations.  A companion bill in the Senate gathered majority support, but fell under 
the weight of a filibuster.  The Clinton administration in 1995 issued an executive 
order authorizing denial of federal contracts to firms that permanently replaced 
economic strikers.621  A federal appeals court struck down the order for exceeding 
the executive=s authority, concluding that it Ais pre-empted by the NLRA which 
guarantees the right to hire permanent replacements.@622  
 
Human Rights Implications 
The Oregon Steel case and others like it, where workers are permanently 
replaced when they exercise the right to strike, embody a fundamental breach of the 
principle of freedom of association and the related right to strike.  The permanence 
in what the ILO diplomatically calls Athe use of labour drawn from outside the 
undertaking to replace strikers for an indeterminate period@ contravenes 
international labor rights principles, with its inherently aggressive, intimidating use 
both against workers who face replacement and as a threat against all workers 
seeking to exercise rights of association, organizing, and bargaining. 
Workers= freedom of association does not abide abstractly in human rights 
instruments or national laws.  Exercising the right only has meaning in a real world 
of sometimes converging, sometimes clashing interests among workers, employers, 
governments and other forces in society.  Where workers have formed a union, 
exercise of the right to freedom of association is not static or episodic.  It is rooted 
in a relationship over time between two parties.  The relationship includes the 
possibility of occasional strikes by workers or lockouts by management. 
The exercise of economic strength by workers or employers to back up 
proposals in bargaining is a normal, natural, and accepted right of unions and 
management.  The anticipated sacrifice and pain of economic action propel parties 
toward compromise.  This is why most labor negotiations end in a settlement 
without a strike.   
As noted earlier, employers have many options for continuing operations 
during a strike.  Most obviously, in addition to using  managers and supervisors to 
maintain activity, employers can hire temporary replacements.  Indeed, most strikes 
that include the use of replacement workers involve temporary, not permanent 
                                                 
621See Executive Order No. 12,954, 60 Federal Register 13,023 (1995). 
622See Chamber of Commerce v.  Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C.  Cir., 1996). 
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replacements, and strikes with temporary replacements are shorter in duration than 
those with permanent replacements.623 
                                                 
623See, e.g., John F. Schnell and Cynthia L. Gramm, AThe Empirical Relations Between 
Employers= Striker Replacement Strategies and Strike Duration,@ 47 Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 189 (1994). 
A collective bargaining relationship is not indissoluble.  Companies close 
facilities.  Workers sometimes choose to substitute a new union for one they are 
dissatisfied with, or to decertify a union altogether.  But as a rule the collective 
bargaining relationship is a sustained one.  Parties in this relationship accept that in 
the course of collective bargaining they might resort to economic action through a 
strike or lockoutCa realization that creates a powerful force for resolving their 
differences through mutual agreement. 
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This basis for coexistence and compromise is recognized as beneficial to the 
parties and beneficial to society, compared with the alternatives of government 
control or of unilateral employer power to set employment terms when workers 
desire representation.624  But this basis of mutuality is destroyed when employers 
can seize on workers= exercise of the right to strike as an opportunity to permanently 
take away their jobs.  Workers= exercise of the right to freedom of association and 
related rights to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike can only be upheld 
when a balance of rights and interests is forged.  Permanent replacement crosses the 
line by creating an imbalance between the rights of the conflicting parties.   
 
Worker Solidarity and Secondary Boycotts 
Workers' right to freedom of association is not limited to the single workplace. 
 They often seek to associate with other workers of the same employer.  For 
example, members of the automobile workers' union have formed a single 
organization to bargain with large nationwide companies like Ford Motor Co. and 
General Motors Corp.  Members of several different unionsCelectrical workers, 
auto workers, steel workers and othersChave banded together to bargain with 
General Electric Co.  Beyond that, workers sometimes come together to deal with 
coalitions of employers, as hospital workers in New York bargain with a single 
employers' group representing several hospitals. 
Such company-wide or industry-wide bargaining relationships are legal under 
U.S. law.  But the situation changes dramaticallyCin sharp contrast to workers' 
rights in other countries and contrary to international labor rights normsCwhen 
workers seek to associate with employees in other companies with which their 
employer has a supplier or customer relationship.  What workers see as solidarity, 
U.S. labor law defines as illegal "secondary boycotts."625 
                                                 
624The NLRA declares Athe policy of the United States@ as one Aencouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining.@ See 29 U.S.C. ' 151. 
625See Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. '158(b)(4). 
Freedom of association among workers of different employers, seen as labor 
solidarity by worker advocates, is severely restricted under U.S. law.  Before the 
ban on secondary boycotts was enacted in 1947, workers could request help from 
counterparts at other companies.  That is, workers involved in a dispute with a 
"primary" employer could ask workers at "secondary" employers to press their own 
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(secondary) company to curtail business with the primary firm.  Now such appeals 
are prohibited. 
A secondary company that continues doing business like selling or purchasing 
goods and services from a primary firm involved in a labor dispute is helping that 
primary firm to prevail in the dispute with its workers.  However, primary firm 
workers involved in a labor dispute are not permitted correspondingly to seek help 
from workers at the secondary company.  Moreover, workers at the secondary 
company may not take action of their own volition to help workers in the primary 
dispute.  Among workers, both appealing for help and offering help are strictly 
prohibited, while employers can continue doing business with each other as if no 
dispute existed. 
The ban on workers' solidarity is backed up by strict, mandatory injunction 
requirements and punitive sanctions.  These sanctions are harsher than any visited 
on employers for violating workers= rights, and they are more aggressively enforced. 
  
Under Section 10(l) of the NLRA, the NLRB must seek an immediate 
injunction to halt an appeal, an offer, or an act of secondary action.  Workers' 
organizations are liable for payment of financial damages for a company's economic 
losses due to solidarity action. 
In contrast to mandatory injunctions against workers' solidarity under Section 
10(l), Section 10(j) of the NLRA authorizes only discretionary seeking of 
injunctions to halt employers' unfair labor practices like firing worker leaders or 
refusing to bargain in good faith, however egregious and destructive of workers' 
freedom of association they might be.  In further contrast, employers face no 
punitive measures for violating workers= rights.  The only recourse is usually an 
order to reinstate a fired worker, or an order to bargain with workers' chosen 
representative, with no further assurance that workers' rights are vindicated or that 
employer violations are deterred. 
In recent years the NLRB has increased its use of 10(j) proceedings for 
workers from an almost-never to a rare frequency.  In 1998, fewer than fifty 10(j) 
injunctions were sought on workers' behalfCa drop in a sea of some 10,000 
meritorious unfair labor practice cases.626  But even fewer 10(l) injunctions were 
sought, because the ban on workers' solidarity action is so absolute and the 
                                                 
626It should be noted that most unfair labor practice cases involve multiple acts of violations, 
so the real count against which fifty 10(j) injunctions should be measured is in the tens of 
thousands. 
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punishment is so swift and resolute that workers rarely test the law's harsh 
strictures.627 
 
International Norms 
The U.S. prohibition on solidarity action contrasts sharply with practice of 
most other countries and runs counter to principles developed by the ILO's 
Committee on Freedom of Association over many decades of treating cases under 
Conventions 87 and 98.  For example, Japanese labor law contains no prohibition 
on worker solidarity appeals or action comparable to Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.  
In fact, Japanese labor law proscribes only employer unfair labor practices, tracking 
the language of Section 8(a) of the NLRA.628  The only union economic action 
affirmatively constrained under Japanese labor law involves a narrow issue of safety 
equipment; namely, that "no act which hampers or causes the stoppage of normal 
maintenance or operation of safety equipment at factories or other places of 
employment shall be resorted to even as an act of dispute."629 
In the European Union (EU), all member states except the United Kingdom 
recognize the lawfulness of workers' solidarity action.  At the same time, they 
regulate such action to minimize its effects and to channel disputes toward peaceful 
resolutions.630 
                                                 
627See 1998 NLRB Annual Report, p. 19.  
628Much of Japan's labor law was set in place during the post-World War II 
occupation by the United States, using the Wagner Act as the basic model. See 
William B. Gould, Japan=s Reshaping of American Labor Law (Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 1984). 
629See Rodo Kankei Chousei Hou (Labor Relations Adjustment Act), Law No.  25 of Sept.  
27, 1946, Ch.  5, Art.  36. 
630See Juri Aaltonen, "International Secondary Industrial Action in the EU Member 
States," Metalworkers Foundation of Finland (March 1998), on file with Human 
Rights Watch. 
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In many EU countries, especially in northern Europe, employers and unions 
can agree to no-strike clauses in collective agreements that preclude secondary 
action.  In other countries including Spain, Italy and France, the right to strike is 
constitutionally protected and no-strike clauses are prohibited.631 
                                                 
631Ibid., paragraphs 17.2, 17.3. 
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Some countries such as Austria and the Netherlands apply a rule of 
"reasonableness" or "proportionality" to workers' invoking of solidarity action 
rights, allowing workers to affect a secondary firm=s dealings with the primary 
company involved in the dispute, but not to influence dealings with other companies 
not involved in a labor dispute.632  Some countries, such as Denmark, have a "last 
resort" requirement for using mediation and conciliation mechanisms before action 
can be taken.633 
In some EU countries including France, Spain and Italy, workers engaged in 
secondary action must share a community of interest with those involved in the 
primary dispute, giving them some stake in the outcome.  As one researcher notes, 
ASince the right to strike is constitutionally protected in all these countries, it can, 
however, be presumed that the demand for interest community is not particularly 
strict.  The estimation of interest community probably remains above all to the 
employees themselves.@634  In contrast, in Sweden and Finland the opposite rule 
obtains: the permissibility of secondary action is tied to the disinterest of secondary 
actors.  According to the same scholar, Athe lawfulness of the secondary action is in 
these countries the more probable the more remote the interests of the primary and 
secondary action participants are from each other.@635 
Secondary industrial action is a complex and sensitive matter for any country=s 
labor law system.  No country leaves this area of the law totally unregulated.  But in 
nearly every country, secondary action is lawful so long as the primary dispute is 
lawful and so long as the secondary action is carried out within the bounds of that 
country's regulations, like those described above.  The United States, however, has 
imposed a blanket prohibition on solidarity action.  No effort is made in U.S. law 
and practice to find a compromise that balances the interests of primary and 
secondary workers and employers. 
 
ILO Rulings 
                                                 
632Ibid., paragraph 17.4. 
633Ibid., paragraph 17.3. 
634Ibid., paragraph 17.2. 
635Ibid., paragraph 17.3. 
310 Unfair Advantage  
 
 
The United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher adopted legislation based on 
the U.S. statutory scheme prohibiting workers' solidarity action.  The ILO found 
these laws to be "excessive limitations upon the exercise of the right to strike."636  
The ILO went on to say: 
 
                                                 
636 See Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, International Labor Conference, 76th Sess., Rep. III, Part 4A, 234, 238-
239 (1989).   
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Taken together, these changes appear to make it virtually impossible for 
workers and unions lawfully to engage in any form of boycott activity, or 
"sympathetic" action against parties not directly involved in a given 
dispute . . . [I]t appears to the Committee that where a boycott relates 
directly to the social and economic concerns of the workers involved in 
either or both of the original dispute and the secondary action, and where 
the original dispute and the secondary action are not unlawful in 
themselves, then that boycott should be regarded as a legitimate exercise 
of the right to strike.  This is clearly consistent with the approach the 
Committee has adopted in relation to "sympathy strikes.637   
 
Upon further consideration of the British legislation, the ILO concluded: 
 
It was now virtually impossible for workers and unions lawfully to 
engage in any form of boycott activity or sympathetic action against 
parties not directly involved in a given dispute; the protections no longer 
applied to situations where unions and their members had "mixed" 
industrial, social and political motives for what they did; . . . 
Accordingly, the Committee asked the Government to introduce 
amendments . . . which accorded adequate protection to the right to 
engage in other legitimate forms of industrial action such as protests and 
sympathy strikes."638 
 
The ILO set forth a general rule on trade union sympathy appeals and action 
under Convention 87 as follows: 
 
Sympathy strikes, which are recognized as lawful in some countries, are 
becoming increasingly frequent because of the move towards the 
concentration of enterprises, the globalization of the economy and the 
delocalisation of work centres.  While pointing out that a number of 
distinctions need to be drawn here (such as an exact definition of the 
concept of a sympathy strike; a relationship justifying recourse to this 
type of strike, etc.), the Committee [of Experts] considers that a general 
prohibition on sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and that workers 
                                                 
637Ibid. 
638See Report of Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, International Labor Conference, 78th Sess., Rep. III, Part 4A, 220-221 
(1991). 
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should be able to take such action, provided the initial strike they are 
supporting is itself lawful. 
